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PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST mDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) 
) Case No. CVIS-1406 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY ) MOTION TO DISMISS OR ABATE 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, ) (I.R.C.P. 12(B)(8)) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
~ 006/078 
Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley TroxeJl") seeks dismissal of 
the instant action because issues fundamental to Plaintiffs claims herein, including whether an 
attorney with defendant Hawley Troxell formed an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff, has 
been raised by Plaintiff Frantz and litigated in an action currently pending in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court, District ofldaho: specifically, In Re: Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia N Frantz, 
Debtors, Case No. 11-21337-TLM, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho (Coeur 
d'Alene) and the Adversary Proceeding therein, No. 13-07024-TLM ("Adversary Proceeding"). 
Indeed that specific issue has been determined adversely to Mr. Frantz in that previously filed 
action. The Honorable Terry Myers, Chief Judge of the United 
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never 
information from Mr. Frantz or his counsel. As that issue is wholly dispositive of Mr. Frantz's 
claims herein, this action should be dismissed. In the alternative, this action should be stayed 
pending a final judgment in Frantz's bankruptcy proceeding. 
Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In 2008, Plaintiff Martin Frantz found cause to sue his former attorneys, Witherspoon 
Kelley Davenport & Toole ("Witherspoon Kelley") for legal malpractice. Mr. Frantz contended 
that Witherspoon Kelley had failed to timely bring an action against Mr. Frantz's real estate 
agent, Ms. Bennett. Mr. Frantz also contended that Witherspoon Kelley failed to disclose to him a 
conflict of interest, based on the firm's representation of Ms. Bennett's father and an associated 
business. Mr. Frantz was represented by the law finn of Owens & Crandall in the lawsuit he filed 
against Witherspoon KeHey ("Witherspoon Suit"). (Exhibi1 I and Exhibit II to Affidavit of 
John C. Riseborough.) 
In connection with the Witherspoon Suit, Mr. Frantz's counsel recognized that they 
needed expert testimony on the standard of care to properly present Mr. Frantz's claim of attorney 
malpractice. Accordingly, in December 2008, Ms. McCrea of Owens & Crandall contacted 
Merlyn Clark, a partner with defendant Hawley Troxell. In 2009, by letter, Owens & Crandall 
retained Mr. Clark requesting that he advise as to whether he could testify to violations of the 
standard of care required of attorneys in Idaho under the facts of the case. Ms. McCrae forwarded 
to Mr. Clark materials to review in connection with that commission. (Exhibit IlI to Affidavit of 
John C. Riseborough.) Mr. Clark reviewed the materials and authored a 21 page report dated 
May 4, 2009, reflecting his opinions. He set forth in that report the materials that he reviewed in 
connection with forming his opinions. As fowid by Chief Judge Myers, none of the materials 
contained confidential client communications from Mr. Frantz or confidential information. 
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Witherspoon Kelly, identifying Mr. Clark as a testifying expert witness. (Exhibit IV to Affidavit 
of John C. Riseborough.) 
Hawley Troxell billed Owens & Crandall directly for Mr. Clark's services. Owens & 
Crandall paid two of the three invoices. Mr. Frantz paid one Hawley Troxell bill directly for 
Mr. Clark's services on May 26, 2009. The Witherspoon suit was subsequently settled. (Exhibit I 
and II to Affidavit of John C. Riseborough.) 
On or about June 28, 2010, Mr. Frantz and his wife, Cynthia Frantz ("Frantzes") received 
a demand letter sent by Hawley Troxell, on behalf of Idaho Independent Bank ("JIB") in regard to 
commercial guaranties executed by the Frantzes in which they guaranteed outstanding and 
matured obligations owed by one of their entities to IIB. (Exhibit V), to Affidavit of John C. 
Riseborough. On July 19, 2010, a lawsuit was filed by Hawley Troxell on behalf of IIB in the 
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, In and For the County of Kootenai, Case No. CV l 0-
6088, to recover on the Guaranty obligations when there was no payment made to IIB following 
the demand letter ("Guarantor Lawsuit"). The Frantzes filed an Answer and Counterclaims 
against IIB through counsel and the parties engaged in written discovery. 
On October 17, 2011, on the eve of the scheduled depositions of the Frantzes in the 
Guarantor Lawsuit, the Frantzes filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition, staying the Guarantor 
Lawsuit, and all other lawsuits the Frantzes were involved in ("Bankruptcy Case"). Hawley 
Troxell continued to actively represent IIB's recovery efforts in the Bankruptcy Case. In response 
to the filing of a Motion for a 2004 Examination of the Frantzes (deposition) by Hawley Troxell 
on behalf of a IIB in December 2011, in the Bankruptcy Case, the Frantzes filed an objection and 
sought to disqualify Hawley Troxell, based on the fact that a member of that firm represented a 
company, which Mr. Frantz was a shareholder. This 
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Troxell has not and does not represent the Debtors in any matters and therefore there is no conflict 
of interest in the attorneys of Hawley Troxell representing IIB against the Debtor in this 
bankruptcy case and any other dispute against the Debtors; .... " That Order was entered in the 
Bankruptcy Case in January, 2012. (Exhibit VI to Affidavit of John C. Riseborough) 
On August 23, 2013, Hawley Troxell filed the Adversary Proceeding on behalf of IIB, 
specifically a Complaint for Determination of Non-Dischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§523(a)(2) and (a)(6), asserting that the Debtors had committed fraud and conversion and the 
obligations owed to IIB should be held non-dischargeable ("Non-Discharge Action"). 
Trial of the Non-Discharge Action was scheduled to commence December 1, 2014. On 
October 3, 2014, Mr. Frantz moved to continue the trial, but that motion was denied. Then on 
October 31, 2014, in the Non-Discharge Action, Mr. Frantz again moved to disqualify Hawley 
Troxell, this time claiming that Hawley Troxell, by Merlyn Clark, had entered into an attorney-
client relationship with Mr. Frantz alleging that he had acted as both a consulting expert and a 
testifying attorney expert in the Witherspoon Suit. Mr. Frantz contended that during that 
"representation," Mr. Clark obtained confidential financial information. He further contended that 
the Hawley Troxell attorneys representing IIB in the Non-Discharge Action had access to and 
were actually using confidential financial information provided by Owen & Crandall to Mr. 
Clark. (See Motion and Memorandum to Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, 
Document No. 55, Exhibit VII to Affidavit of John C. Riseborough.) 
Hawley Troxell objected to the Motion with affidavits establishing that Mr. Clark had 
never established an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Frantz, that Mr. Clark had never 
received confidential information, and that Hawley Troxell was not using any confidential 
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December 1, 2014, the original trial date, the Honorable Terry Myers, Chief U.S. 
Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho, held a two day evidentiary 
hearing regarding the Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell. Witnesses were called, sworn and 
subject to cross examination by counsel. Significantly, Regina McCrea, the attorney from Owens 
& Crandall who had actually retained Merlyn Clark testified, as did Mr. Frantz. 
After carefully considering the evidence, Judge Myers unequivocalJy held that Mr. Clark 
had never formed an attorney-client relationship with the Plaintiff, Mr. Frantz. He further held 
that Mr. Clark had not received any confidential information. (Exhibit IX to Affidavit of John C. 
Riseborough.) Whereupon the Court entered an Order denying Mr. Frantz's Motion to Disqualify 
Hawley Troxell. (Exhibit X to Affidavit of John C. RJseborough.) The Bankruptcy Court then 
rescheduled the Non-Discharge Action for trial, which is set to commence shortly on May 26, 
2015. 
A. 
ID.ARGUMENT 
Abatement is An Appropriate Remedy in Idaho and in This Action as the Same 
Issue is Currently Being Litigated in a Previously Filed Action. 
Idaho law recognizes the defense of abatement and IRCP 12(b)(8) requires that such 
defense be asserted by motion. The Rule does not create the defense, but rather provides the 
procedure by which the defense· is heard and determined. Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 
Idaho 905,907,684 P.2d 307 (App. 1984). 
Abatement is the power of the trial court to dismiss or stay an action where a similar 
action is already proceeding in another forum. The policy behind such a defense is to prevent 
concurrent litigation of the same issue in different Courts that could result in conflicting 
decisions. The purpose of the defense is to allow a Court to consider the factors of judicial 
economy, minimizing costs and deJay to the litigants, promoting the prompt and orderly 
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disposition of each or and 
V. 
rests on comity and the avoiding conflict execution judgments by 
independent courts, and is a necessary one because any other rule would unavoidably lead to 
perpetual collision and be productive of most calamitous results.'' Id. at 22, citing 21 C.J.S. 
Courts, § 188 at p. 222 ( 1990). 
Idaho Courts have determined that there are two tests that govern the determination of 
whether a lawsuit should proceed where a similar lawsuit is pending in another court. Klaue v. 
Hern, 133 Idaho 437, 988 P.2d 211 (1999). First, the court should consider whether the other case 
has proceeded to judgment, in which event the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion 
may bar additional litigation. Id; See also Wing, 106 Idaho 905, 908, 684 P .2d 307, 310 (Ct. App. 
1984); see also, Roberts v. Hollandsworth, 101 Idaho 522, 616 P.2d 1058 (1980) (District Court 
did not err in dismissing state court action where federal court had previously entered summary 
judgment against Plaintiff for the same cause.) It appears that the Frantz Non-Discharge Action 
has not proceeded to judgment at this point, but will shortly due to the pending trial date. 
The second test is whether the court, although not barred from deciding the case, should 
nevertheless refrain from deciding it. See Wing, 106 Idaho at 908, 684 P .2d at 310. The 
determination of whether to proceed with a case where a similar case is pending elsewhere and 
has not gone to judgment, is committed to the Trial Court's sound discretion. Rueth v. State, 103 
Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982); Zaleha v. Rosholt et al., 129 Idaho 532, at 533, 925 P.2d at 926; 
Wing, 106 Idaho at 908, 684 P.2d at 310. That determination will not be overturned absent abuse. 
Diet Center Inc., at 22 citing Wing at 905. 
In Diet Center, a class action lawsuit pending in California Superior Court in San 
Francisco, Diet Center sent demands for arbitration to six of the fifty-two arbitrating plaintiffs. 
Diet Center, Inc., 124 Idaho at 21. Arbitration came to a standstill when the parties failed to agree 
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to to 
that arbitrators had the power to determine 
an 
which the arbitrations were 
conducted. Id. Respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds, inter aha, that there was another 
action pending against the parties pursuant to LR.C.P 12(b)(8). Id The Idaho District Court 
determined that it had jurisdiction over the dispute, however, the court refused to consider the 
action on its merits on the ground that there was another action pending between the parties 
pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(8). Diet Center appealed. 
In Diet Ctr., Inc., supra, 124 Idaho 20, 22-23, 855 P.2d 481, 483-84 (Ct. App. 1994), 
suggested several guidelines for whether to exercise jurisdiction: 
In deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case when there is 
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, a trial 
court must evaluate the identity of the real parties in interest and the degree 
to which the claims or issues are similar. The trial court is to consider 
whether the court in which the matter already is pending is in a position to 
determine the whole controversy and to settle all the rights of the parties. 
Diet Center, Inc., 22-23, citing Wing, 106 Idaho at 908, 684 P.2d at 310 (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437, 988 P.2d 211 (1999). 
Ultimately, the District Court's decision to decline jurisdiction under LR.C.P. 12(b)(8) 
was upheld. Id. 
The fundamental issue in the instant action is whether there was an attorney-client 
relationship between Mr. Clark and Mr. Frantz. Mr. Frantz chose to seek the determination of this 
exact issue from the Federal Bankruptcy Court in an attempt to disqualify Hawley Troxell and 
delay the Non-Discharge Action. That Federal Bankruptcy Court held a two day evidentiary 
hearing, with testimony provided not only by Mr. Frantz and Mr. Clark, but also by Regina 
McCrea of the law firm that represented Mr. Frantz and hired Mr. Clark as an expert witness. 
After listening to the testimony, argument and reviewing admitted exhibits, Chief Judge Myers 
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was no no 
were 
Riseborough.) 
In both actions, despite his express acknowledgment in a signed Stipulated Order to the 
contrary in January 2012 (Ex. VI), Mr. Frantz is contending that Hawley Troxel1, by Merlyn 
Clark, had a conflict of interest by having purportedly represented Mr. Frantz in 2009, that 
confidential materials were provided to Mr. Clark, and that the attorneys for Hawley Troxell in 
the Non-Discharge Action are utilizing those confidential materials. All three issues were litigated 
in the Bankruptcy Case and had been determined adversely to Mr. Frantz. But for the fact that 
Chief Judge Myers' decision and Order denying disqualification of Hawley Troxell is not yet 
final, collateral estoppel and/or res judicata would apply to bar hantz' s claims. 
B. Abatement is Appropriate as the Same Parties are Litigating the Same Issue. 
Idaho law recognizes that abatement is appropriate where the same parties, or those in 
privity with those parties, are litigating the same issue in another forum. I.R.C.P. I2(b)(8); see 
also Klaue, 133 Idaho 439. As recognized in Diet Center, supra, the court must determine who 
the real parties in interest are, i.e., whose interests are being addressed in each forum. Here, the 
parties are essentially the same. 
Mr. Frantz is a party in both the bankruptcy and the instant action. Hawley Troxell is a 
defendant in this action, and in privity with JIB in the bankruptcy action. Hawley Troxell was the 
direct party that was the subject of the Motion to Disqualify, with real interests at stake in the 
outcome. 
In Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., 280 F. Supp. 1094 (D. Idaho 2003), the Federal 
District Court of Idaho made clear that privity is a flexible concept dependent on the particular 
relationship between the parties in each individual set of cases. Id citing In re Schimmels, 127 
F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1997). "Even when the parties are not identical, privity may exist if there is 
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"substantial identity between the party and the nonparty'' In re Schimmels, at 88L Privity was also 
found where the nonparty ''had a significant interest and participated in the prior action," 
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 99 S.Ct. 970 (1979). 
"The issue is one of substance rather than the names in the caption of the case; the inquiry 
is not ]united to a traditional privity analysis" In re Schimmels quoting Alpert's Newspaper 
Deliver Inc., v. NY Times Co., 876 F.2d 266,270 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
There is substantial identity between parties in this matter. Both Hawley Troxell and lIB 
were placed in jeopardy by the Motion to Disqualify. Both Hawley Troxell and IIB had an interest 
in utilizing the evidence they had developed for trial, an interest which would have been denied 
had the Court found that Hawley Troxell was utilizing confidential materials. Both Hawley 
Troxell and IIB had an interest in Hawley Troxell remaining as counsel in the case for practical 
and economic considerations. Hawley Troxell had been counsel of record for IIB since July 2010 
and had been actively pursuing IIB 's recovery rights against the Frantzes both in and out of the 
Bankruptcy Case. Further, Mr. Frantz had waited until the eve of trial in 2014, to raise the issues, 
after all discovery, motion practice, and trial preparation was complete for the Non-Discharge 
Action and after he had stipulated in the Bankruptcy Case in 2012, that there was no conflict in 
the representation of Hawley Troxell on behalf of IIB. The interests of Hawley TroxeH and IIB 
were so aligned such that there is substantial identity between the parties for the purposes of 
considering whether abatement is appropriate, not to mention that the Motion to Disqualify was 
directly against Hawley Troxell. 
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I.R.CP 12(b)(8) Allows a Court to Consider the Factors of Judicial Economy, 
Minimizing Costs and Delay to the Litigants, Pro~oting the Prompt and Orderly 
Disposition of each Claim or Issue, and Avoiding Potentially Inconsistent Judgments. 
1. Judicial Economy. 
Reducing repetitive or unnecessary litigation is a legitimate goal as it frees up judicial 
resources for legitimate disputes and promotes judicial economy. Hill v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619, 627, 249 P.3d 812 (2011) citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 
S.Ct. 411, 415 (1980). "Promoting an efficient judiciary ultimately benefits the public." Hill at 
627. 
In this matter, the fundamental question - whether an attorney-client relationship exists 
between Mr. Frantz and Hawley Troxell - has already been litigated and determined by another 
court. Re-litigating the exact same question in Idaho District Court does not promote the public's 
interest in an efficient and expeditious judiciary. Precious court resources will be tied-up, again, 
to re-]itigate an issue already soundly decided, and notably decided against the Plaintiff, Mr. 
Frantz. 
2. Costs and Delays. 
Expenses and delays are factors that should be considered in determining whether to 
dismiss an action based on an issue previously litigated in another pending matter. See Diet 
Center, 124 Idaho at 22 ( citations omitted). 
Here, a significant amount of time and expense has already been expended to thoroughly 
litigate the issue of whether there existed an attorney-client relationship. The parties submitted 
extensive briefing. IIB, by and through HawJey Troxell, was forced to pay some of the attorney's 
fees and costs to litigate the issue. Hawley Troxell was invested in responding to unfounded 
accusations. The Bankruptcy trial, scheduled to start on December 1, was delayed to litigate the 
attorney-client issue. A two day evidentiary hearing with testimony was held. Chief Judge Myers 
findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon 
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was 
shortly. The bankruptcy remains pending. The additional cost and expense to Hawley Troxell to 
re-litigate a previously decided issue would be unduly burdensome and underscores the propriety 
of dismissing or abating this action now. 
3. Promnt Resolution of Issues or Claims. 
"The court which first acquires jurisdiction over a controversy should retain that 
jurisdiction and dispose of the controversy." Klaue, at 441 citing Diet Ctr., Inc., 124 Idaho at 22. 
The Bankruptcy Court in the underlying matter sought to immediately address an issue of 
fundamental importance despite its having been raised almost three years into the bankruptcy 
proceeding. The trial in that matter was scheduled for December 1 of the same year. The 
Bankruptcy Court moved promptly to set an evidentiary hearing which was held on December 1st, 
the original trial date. After receiving the adverse ruling by the Court, Mr. Frantz filed this action. 
Allowing this action to proceed does not promote the principle of prompt resolutions of issues and 
claims. Rather, it allows Mr. Frantz to endlessly tie up the issue while he attempts to seek another 
detennination, as he did not like the decision of the Bankruptcy Court where he initially pursued 
it. 
4. Potentially Inconsistent Findings. 
Finally, the Bankruptcy court in this matter resolved the ultimate threshold question: Did 
there exist, at any time before the bankruptcy proceeding, an attorney-client relationship between 
Mr. Frantz and Hawley Troxell. The Court answered "No." One can readily see the impact this 
action could have on the bankruptcy proceeding, which is into its fourth year and is on the eve of 
the Non-Discharge Action in which Hawley Troxell is proceeding on behalf of IIB, in accordance 
with the findings and decision of Chief Judge Myers. 
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CONCLUSION. 
Dismissal this matter. Should not willing to action, Defendant 
respectfully requests this matter be stayed until such time as the aforementioned Non-Discharge 
Action is adjudicated to finality. 
DATED this~ day of May, 2015. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
.d/ //~/ 
By:_.....:·:....,,.. t'L:kc..··!.:.1-.;~"'--c.--'. /=-'----------~ Riseborough, ISB #7898 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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JOHN RISEBOROUGH, ISB #7898 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
7 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley TroxeH Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV15-1406 
) 
) ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY 
) TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, by and through its 
attorney of rec~rd, John C. Riseborough of Paine Hamblen LLP and for its answer to Plaintiffs 
Complaint, admits, denies and alleges as follows. 
I. 
Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint does not contain allegations of liability creating 
conduct or resulting damages and accordingly does not require an affirmative response. To the 
extent paragraph 1 requires a response from this Defendant, it is denied. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY TROXELL ENNlS 
~~YaJ..lhnlroxell, 
IT. 
that a Defendant. 
III. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint, except it is 
admitted that Plaintiff Frantz filed for bankruptcy in October of 2011 and that Defendant 
represents Idaho Independent Bank (IIB), one of the creditors in those proceedings. It is further 
admitted that Defendant, on behalf of IIB, filed a Complaint for Determination of Non-
Dischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) and (a)(6) in an adversary proceeding in 
the bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his wife Cynthia Frantz, including a claim that 
Plaintiff and his wife Cynthia Frantz made false statements in writing regarding their :financial 
condition to obtain loans and extensions of credit. 
IV. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
V. 
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 5, 6 and 8 of Plaintiff's Compfaint. In 
answering paragraph 7 thereof, Defendant admits only that jurisdiction and venue are proper in 
this Court 
VI. 
Paragraph 9 appears to be historical background for which no answer is required. To the 
extent an answer is required, the allegations of paragraph 9 are denied for lack of information. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY TROXELL ENNJS 
VIL 
0, ~-L-UMW. it 
admitted commenced a malpractice 
alleging professional negligence by said attorneys. 
VIII. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 11 and 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint, except 
it is admitted that Merlyn Clark prepared a report within the scope of his retention by the law 
firm of Owens and Crandall. 
IX. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Complaint, although it is 
admitted that on May 26, 2009, Plaintiff Frantz paid the bill Hawley Troxell had submitted to the 
Jaw firm of Owens and Crandall for the services Clark provided to that law firm. 
X. 
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of Plaintiffs Complaint, 
except that the first loan was a purchase loan, not a development loan, and it was later renewed 
and became part of the development Joan. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 17 and 18, except that it is admitted that 
llB retained Defendant to commence a lawsuit to obtain payment from Plaintiff Frantz and his 
wife Cynthia Frantz for a loan guaranteed by Plaintiff Frantz and Cynthia Frantz that had 
matured. 
XI. 
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 19 and 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint, except 
the claim filed exceeds $6,400,000. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS 
XII. 
LLVA,LU~•••v'u SllIIliClel:U to allow it to or except during bankruptcy, Plaintiff 
Frantz opposed Defendant's representation of IIB based on an alleged conflict of interest by 
Hawley Troxell Ultimately, at a hearing before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Idaho, Plaintiff Frantz and Cynthia Frantz admitted that no such conflict of interest 
existed. Further, Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthia Frantz signed a Stipulated Court Order 
which stated in relevant part: "There is no conflict of interest in the attorneys of Hawley Troxell 
representing IIB against the debtors in this bankruptcy case, and any other dispute against the 
debtors." 
XIII. 
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 22, except the words "shortly thereafter," 
and that there are additional claims for denial of discharge alleged in the Complaint for 
Determination of Non-Dischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) and (a)(6) filed by 
Defendant in the bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthia Frantz. 
XIV. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 23, 24 and 25 of Plaintiffs Complaint, 
except Defendant admits that Plaintiff did file a Motion to Disqualify Defendant in the 
Adversary Proceeding that is the subject of the Complaint for Determination of Non-
Discbargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) and (a)(6) filed by Defendant in the 
bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthia Frantz. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS 
xv. 
I 
its prior answer herein a.'1d further admits, denies and alleges as 
XVI. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 27, 28, 29 and each of its subparts, 30, 31, 
32, 33 and 34 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
XVII. 
In responding to Count II of Plaintiffs Complaint, Breach of Fiduciary Duty Defendant 
realleges and incorporates by reference its prior answers herein and admits, denies and alleges as 
follows: 
XVIII. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and 
46 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
XIX. 
Paragraphs 47 and 48 of Plaintiff's Complaint do not reqmre a response by this 
Defendant at this time. 
BYWAY OF FURTHER ANSWER AND AS ITS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES: 
1. 
Plaintiffs Complaint, in part, fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 
II. 
There is currently an action pending between the parties and/or their privies in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. Issues fundamental to Plaintiffs Complaint have 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS 
M,&iffl@'lt,~~~ .:f!,)xell, No. 
!@009/012 
or will determined in that proceeding, which was to the commencement of 
Alternatively, this Court should exercise its discretion and dismiss this action in favor of 
determination by the Court with first jurisdiction, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
ofidaho. 
III. 
An element essential to the successful prosecution of Plaintiff's allegations is the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship between Merlyn Clark and Plaintiff and that 
confidential information was disclosed. Those issues, among others, were previously litigated in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. After a two day evidentiary hearing, the 
Bankruptcy Court ruled that Merlyn Clark was never Plaintiff Frantz's attorney and that 
Defendant did not receive confidential information. Thus elements essential to Plaintiff's claims 
have been determined adversely to Plaintiff and res judicata bars his claims herein. 
Alternatively, Plaintiff is coJ!aterally estopped from further litigating said issues. 
IV. 
Any losses or damages claimed by Plaintiff herein were caused and solely resulted from 
his own acts and omissions. If not the sole cause of such losses and damages, Plaintiff's acts and 
omissions were a contributing proximate cause thereof amounting to negligence which is equal 
to or greater than that of Defendant. 
Ill 010/012 
acts acts or 
omissions of Defendant, Plaintiff's recovery must nevertheless be reduced in proportion to his 
contributory negligence. 
VI. 
The Plaintiff's claims are barred on the basis of estoppel. 
VII. 
Plaintiff's claims are barred in this action based on the grounds oflaches. 
VIII. 
Plaintiff may have failed to act seasonably and reasonably to mitigate his losses or 
damages. 
IX. 
The statute of limitations on Plaintiff's claims has expired. 
X. 
Defendant reserves the right to seek sanctions and other appropriate relief pursuant to 
Idaho Jaw including IRCP 1 l(a)(l). Further, Defendant seeks recovery of attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in defense of this action pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code 12-121, 12-123, 
and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and any other applicable statute or common 
law provision. 
WHEREFORE, having answered Plaintiff's Complaint to the extent possible at this time, 
Defendant prays that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that he take nothing 
~ULt/Ul..i:: 
to 
In the Defendant prays that the Court stay th.is action pending decision and 
judgment in the Non-Discharge proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of 
Idaho, currently pending. 
DA TED this L/+J.iday of May, 2015. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
J C. Riseborough, ISB #7898 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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R1SEBOROUGH, #7898 
HAMBLEN 
West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) 
) Case No. CV15-1406 
Plaintiff, ) 
) AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT 
vs. ) HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & 
) HAWLEY, LLP 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY ) 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, by and through its 
attorney of record, John C. Riseborough of Paine Hamblen LLP and for its answer to Plaintiff's 
Complaint, admits, denies and alleges as fol1ows. 
I. 
Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint does not contain allegations of liability creating 
conduct or resulting damages and accordingly does not require an affirmative response. To the 
extent paragraph l requires a response from this Defendant, it is denied. 
AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY 
IJf~L. ENN!iSaj:litA<W;lefiJY, LLP -
that a 
It 
paragraph 
of Defendant 
III. 
is 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint, except it is 
admitted that Plaintiff Frantz filed for bankruptcy in October of 2011 and that Defendant 
represents Idaho Independent Bank (1IB), one of the creditors in those proceedings. It is further 
admitted that Defendant, on behalf of IIB, filed a Complaint for Determination of Non-
Dischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) and (a)(6) in an atlversary proceeding in 
the bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his wife Cynthia Frantz, including a claim that 
Plaintiff and his wife Cynthia Frantz made false statements in writing regarding their financial 
condition to obtain Joans and extensions of credit. 
JV. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
V. 
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 5, 6 and 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint. In 
a."lswering paragraph 7 thereof, Defendant admits only that jurisdiction and venue are proper in 
this Court. 
VI. 
Paragraph 9 appears to be historical background for which no answer is required. To the 
extent an answer is required, the allegations of paragraph 9 are denied for lack of information. 
AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY 
11JUX1i;i11i;; ffli'Nffl3&:lll?AiWllHlV, LLP 
VIL 
that commenced a malpractice attorneys 
i 
alleging professional negligence by said attorneys. Defendant affirmatively alleges that Merlyn 
Clark was retained by plaintiff Frantz's attorneys, Owens & Crandall, ti:i provide services as a 
testifying expert on the issue of whether Plaintiff Frantz' s fonner attdrneys had vio1ated the 
I 
applicable standard. of care. Defendant further alleges that such ~tention constituted a 
commercial transaction within the provisions of Idaho Code 12-120(3). 
VIII. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 11 and 12 of Plaintiiff s Complaint, except 
it is admitted that Merlyn Clark prepared a report within the scope of ~s retention by the law 
firm of Owens and Crandall. 
IX. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs cJmplaint, although it is 
I 
admitted that on May 26, 2009, Plaintiff Frantz paid the bill Hawley Trox~H had submitted to the 
I 
I 
law firm of Owens and Crandall for the services Clark provided to that law firm. 
I 
X. I 
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 01 Plaintiffs Complaint, 
except that the first loan was a purchase loan, not a development loan, · d it was later renewed 
and became part of the development loan. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 17 and 18, except that it is admitted that 
IIB retained Defendant to commence a lawsuit to obtain payment from laintiff Frantz and his 
AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY 
m~~4 UJ\W!.tiiY, LLP · 
I 
I 
I 
I 
wife Cynthia Frantz for a loan guaranteed by Plaintiff Frantz and C~tliia that had 
I 
I 
Xl 
I 
Def end ant admits the allegations of paragraph 19 and 20 of Plainf ff s Complaint, except 
I 
the claim filed exceeds $6,400,000. I 
I 
I XII. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 21 of Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of 
information sufficient to allow it to admit or deny except that, during e bankruptcy, Plaintiff 
Frantz opposed Defendant's representation of IIB based an an aJleged conflict of interest by 
Hawley Troxell. Ultimately, at a hearing before the United States B uptcy Court for the 
District of Idaho, Plaintiff Frantz and Cynthia Frantz admitted that no s ch conflict of interest 
existed. Further, Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthia Frantz signed a tipulated Court Order 
which stated in relevant part: "There is no conflict of interest in the atto eys of Hawley Troxell 
representing IIB against the debtors in this bankruptcy case, and any ot er dispute against the 
debtors." 
XIII. 
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 22, except the wor s ''shortly thereafter," 
and that there are additional claims for denial of discharge alleged in the Complaint for 
Determination of Non-Dischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a (2) and (a)(6) filed by 
Defendant in the bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthi Frantz. 
AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY 
ri.f~:X&hl. eJhU.Sef;lirhMV,Ii61f, LLP - 4 
OJ 
XIV. 
paragraph 
exc:eot Defendant admits that Plaintiff file a Motion to Disq1ify Defendant the 
Adversary Proceeding that is the subject of the Complaint for etermination of Non-
Dischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) and (a)(6) file by Defendant in the 
bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthia Frantz. 
xv. 
In answering Count I of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant realle sand incorporates by 
reference its prior answer herein and further admits, denies and alleges as ollows: 
XVI. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 27, 28, 29 and eac of its subparts, 30, 31, 
32, 33 and 34 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
XVII. 
I 
In responding to Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint, Breach of Fiduciary Duty Defendant 
realleges and incorporates by reference its prior answers herein and admits, denies and alleges as 
follows: 
XVIII. 
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and 
46 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
XIX. 
Paragraphs 47 and 48 of Plaintiff's Complaint do not require a response by this 
Defendant at this time. 
AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY 
~@~~~~kl'<;TN~'W~EY,LLP~ 
ANSWER 
I. 
part, to state can be granted. 
II. 
There is currently an action pending between the parties and/or their privies in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. Issues fundamental to Plaintiffs Complaint have 
been or will be determined in that proceeding, which was filed prior to• the commencement of 
this action. Accordingly, this Court should stay this action pursua!rJt to IRCP 12(b)(8). 
Alternatively, this Court should exercise its discretion and dismiss this action in favor of 
determination by the Court with first jurisdiction, United States Bankruptqy Court for the District 
ofldaho. 
III. 
An element essential to the successful prosecution of Plaintitf s allegations is the 
I 
existence of an attorney~client relationship between Merlyn Clark 4rtd Plaintiff and that 
confidential information was disclosed. Those issues, among others, wer~ previously litigated in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. After a two day e~identiary hearing, the 
Bankruptcy Court ruled that Merlyn Clark was never Plaintiff Frantz's attorney and that 
Defendant did not receive confidential information. Thus elements essential to Plaintiffs claims 
have been determined adversely to Plaintiff and res judicata bats his claims herein. 
Alternatively, Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from further litigating said i:ssues. 
IV. 
Any losses or damages claimed by Plaintiff herein were caused and solely resulted from 
his own acts and omissions. If not the sole cause of such losses and damages, Plaintiff's acts and 
AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY 
!Wltt!PlxmtJM'.~E& BA~, LLP • 6 
1 tl...Llin ll.niILDJ...d:!il-, LLr 1*i VVO/ Vl.V 
were 
If the acts and omissions of Plaintiff were not equal to or greater than any acts or 
omissions of Defendant, Plaintiffs recovery must nevertheless be reduced in proportion to his 
contributory negligence. 
VI. 
The Plaintiffs claims are barred on the basis of estoppel. 
VII. 
Plaintiffs claims are barred in this action based on the grounds of laches. 
VIII. 
Plaintiff may have failed to act seasonably and reasonably to mitigate his losses or 
damages. 
IX. 
The statute of limitations on Plaintiffs claims has expired. 
BY WAY OF FUR1HER ANSWER AND AS ITS CLAIM FOR AN A WARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS: 
I. 
The gravamen of Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant and the basis for Plaintiffs 
recovery is a provision of services as a testifying expert by Defendant, through Merlyn Clark, 
which provision of services constitutes a commercial transaction within ithe meaning of Idaho 
~ VVV/ V.LV 
I l 
II. 
Defendant seeks recovery of attorney's fees and costs incurred in defense of this action 
pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code 12-121, 12-123, and Rule 54; of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and any other applicable statute or common law provision. Defendant reserves 
the right to seek sanctions and other appropriate relief pursuant to: Idaho law, including 
IRCP l l(a)(l). 
WHEREFORE, having answered Plaintiffs Complaint to the extent possible at this time, 
Defendant prays thal Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice ahd that he take nothing 
thereby. Defendant further prays for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code 12-120(3), 12-121, 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the alternative, Defendant prays that the Court stay this action pending decision and 
judgment in the Non-Discharge proceeding in the United States Banl.auptcy Court, District of 
Idaho, currently pending. 
DATED this/-¥ day of May, 2015. 
AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY 
l'fl'~~E& lMW!slW, LLP- 8 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP' 
/:1 /'' I 
By:_~,c._ .._C=-----'--{_-_____ _ 
hn C. Riseborough, ISB #7898 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
N. Linco]n Suite 
Post FaJls, Idaho 83854 
Ph: 208-262-38931 Fax: 208-262-3894 
jonathon@cdaJegal.com 
ISB No. 9129 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz. 
·'i 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership. 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 15-1406 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO 
MOTION FOR PRO HAC VICE 
ADMISSION 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, Martin Frantz, by and through his attorney of record, Jonathon 
Frantz of Frantz Law, PLLC, and hereby responds to the Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice 
Admission as follows: 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell") raises two issues in its 
objection. Each will be addressed in turn. 
1. Mr. Katz's Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission is Procedurally Proper 
Hawley Troxell claims that Mr. Kat's motion for pro hac vice (the "l\fotion") is 
procedurally defective because it was not served on Hawley Troxell's counsel. However, . 
/ 
Hawley Troxe11 had no counsel of record in this matter at the time the Motion was served. 
r rantz Law rLJA, 
case 
227(c)(l)-(3) (emphasis added). 
The Motion was served on April 7, 2015. Paine Hamblen did not appear in this matter 
until (at the eariiest) April 22, 2015. 1 Therefore, Paine Hamblen was not "counsel ofrecord." 
As a result, IBCR 227 did not require service of the Motion upon Paine Hamblen. Therefore, the 
rule was properly followed. 
2. Mr. Katz is Aware and will follow the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
Next, Hawley Troxell asserts that Mr. Katz contacted Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB") 
directly in vioJation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. See IRPC 4.2. Hawley Troxell 
here misunderstands the concept of representation. IIB is not a party to this litigation. No 
attorney has filed, mailed, stated, or hinted at the fact that they represent IIB in this matter. As a 
result, IIB, in this litigation, is unrepresented. 2 
IRPC 4.2 prohibits attorneys from communica6ng with "a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter ... " (emphasis added). Further, when an attorney 
represents a party in one matter, it is not an "omnipresent" representation in all matters. 
JIB is not a party to this case. No attorney has ever communicated to either this court or 
the attorney for Martin Frantz that s/he represents IIB in this matter. Therefore, Mr. Katz did not 
contact a person he knew to be represented by another lawyer in this matter. As a result, there 
was no violation of IRPC 4.2. Further, the communication with IIB was a request to see if llB 
wanted to join Mr. Frantz as a plaintiff in this case. Hawley Troxell, who represents IIB in other 
1 Paine Hamblen did not file a notice of appearance until May 5, 2015. But it filed documents as 
if it were Hawley Troxell's attorney on April 22, 2015. 
2 Further, it makes sense for IIB to not be represented in this litigation. IlB is not a party and has 
no P,roverbial "doe: in the fight" 
Martin Frantz vs Hawley 1"foxell. eta! 
TO OBJECTION 
matter as 
Hamblen has not even purported to appear for IIB. Therefore, IIB is not represented in this 
matter. 
Also, both Idaho and Illinois have adopted the same model rules of professionai conduct. 
Mr. Katz is licensed in Illinois and therefore is familiar with the identical rules of professional 
conduct which are in place in Idaho. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Hawley Troxell 's objection should be dismissed and this Court 
should enter an order granting Mr. Katz pro bac vice admission. 
DATED this 30th day of May, 2015. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
By: Isl ___ _ 
Jonathon Frantz, 
Attorney for Martin Frantz 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of May, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
John C. Riseborough 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] 
[X] 
[ ] 
Overnight Mail 
FAX (509) 838-0007 
Hand Delivery 
/s/ Jonathon Frantz 
p.u 
C!'<lllt.Z LdW rLL\, 
jonathon@cdaJegal.com 
ISB No. 9129 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership. 
Defendant. 
STATEOFIDAHO) 
) ss. 
Kootenai County ) 
Case No.: CV 15-1406 
DECLARATION OF JONA THON 
FRANTZ 
I, Jonathon Frantz, hereby testify under the penalty of pe1jury as follows: 
I am over the age of eighteen. I represent Martin Frantz in this matter. On February 20t\ 
2015 I filed this litigation on behalf of Martin Frantz. The complaint and summons were not 
immediately served. Then, on March 2, 2015 I sent an email wherein I discussed a phone call 1 
from a person who purported to be an employee at Paine Hamblin. In that emaiJ, I discuss that 
the person who called me informed me that Paine Hamblin would file a notice of appearance in 
the matter on March 3, 2015. At that time, I was never informed or provided any documentation 
1 John C. Riseborough testifies that it the phone conversation took place on March 3, 2015. See 
p., 
Frantz Law PLLC +12082623894 
appeared on behalf 
Hamblen them that 
end, I was asked if I had served the complaint yet I responded that I had not 
The foJlowing day, Paine Hamblin did not file a notice of appearance. After more than a 
month later, Paine Hamblen still had not filed any notice of appearance or made any further 
communication with me. As a result, I believed that Paine Hamblin would not appear in this 
matter. 
Further, when Paine Hamb]en finally did file documents in this case, it did so without 
filing a notice of appearance or paying the appropriate fee to the Kootenai County Court. 2 
DA TED this 30th day of May, 2015. 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of May, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
John C. Riseborough 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ } Overnight Mail 
[X] FAX (509) 838-0007 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
on 
p.8 
1· 1 ·a111..t. LO:W C LL\, 
,iAH: OF [WO }. 
~OUNTY OF KOOTENAJ 
onattncm Frantz 
Law, 
N. Llnco]n COURT 
Falls, Idaho 83854 r\ • r i 
Ph: 208-262-38931 Fax: 208-262-3894 
jonathon@cdaJegal.com 
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ISB No. 9129 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership. 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 15-1406 
OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN 
F.KURTZ 
Plaintiff, Martin Frantz, hereby objects to the following portions of the Affidavit of John F. 
Kurtz, which was submitted on April 23, 2015 in support of Hawley Troxell's objection to Mr. 
Katz Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission: 
1. fl2-8 and all included exhibits: Irrelevant. The named paragraphs have absolutely 
nothing to do with whether or not Mr. Katz should be granted pro hac vice admission. 
2. <][9 and an included exhibits: Hearsay. Mr. Kurtz is testifying to communication between 
two non-parties. 
DATED this 30th day of May, 2015. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
By: Isl ___ _ 
Jonathon Frantz, 
Attorney for Mattin Frantz 
John C. Riseborough 
[X] FAX (509) 838-0007 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
Jonathon Frantz 
PLLC 
Lincoln St, 
Idaho 83854 
Ph: 208-262-38931 Fax: 208-262-3894 
jonathon@cda1ega1.com 
ISB No. 9129 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
fDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership. 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 15-1406 
OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN 
C. RISEBOROUGH 
Plaintiff, Martin Frantz, hereby objects to the last sentence of paragraph 2 as such is hearsay. 
Mr. Riseborough testifies as to the contents of a conversation between two non-parties, his 
paralegal and Jonathon Frantz. 
DATED this 30th day of May, 2015. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
By: Isl __ _ 
Jonathon Frantz, 
Attomey for Mattin Frantz 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of May, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
John C. Riseborough 
[XJ FAX (509) 838-0007 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
17 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455~6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
J. HJ\, 11 V, 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MAR TTN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV15-1406 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___ ) 
ST/\ TE OF WASHINGTON) 
) ss: 
County c1f Spokane ) 
JOHN C. R1SEBOROUGH, being first duly sworn upon oalh, deposes and says: 
l, VVl./ Vt..V 
I am one of the attorneys representing defendant, Hawley TroxeU Ennis & 
Hawley in this matter and have personaJ knowledge of the matters asserted herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Expert Witness 
Disclosure filed in the Unit<:d StatC8 Bankruptcy Court. ;.)i~ttic1 of Idaho, in an adversary 
VI~ ill uu, IL. nm I' !\1\ !1 V, l, VU.JI VL.U 
a 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy the Affidavit of Jolm F. 
Kurtz, Jr., in support of Motion in Limine to prohibit the expert testimony of Jeffrey Katz. 
JOl{N C. RISEBOROUGH 
SIGNED AND SWORN to before me this a<o t" day of June, 2015, by JOHN C. 
RISEBOROUGH. 
Vll/{.,V/«Vl..)/11\1 VV•l run f\l\ ll V, 
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Attomey for MarinD. Frantz and Cyxrthia M. Frantz, Defendants 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTIUCT OF IDAHO 
(Coeur d'Alene) 
In.Re: Case No. ll~21337-TLM 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTiilA M. 
FRANTZ, Chapter7 
Debtors. 
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho 
corporation, Adversary Proc. No. 13~07024 
Plaintiff, 
VS, 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ, an individual, and 
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ, an individual, 
Defendants. 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE (Jeffrey K.atz)· 1 
EXHIBIT 
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! 
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EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE (Jeffrey Katz) 
Martin & Cynthia Frantz, hereby discloses its intent to call Mr. Jeffi:ey Katz as 
an expert witness at the bearing to Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP in the 
above-entitled matter. Mr. Katz's hourly rate for preparation and trial testimony is $175 per 
hour. 
Attached hereto and incorporated herein is a true and correct copy of the disclosure 
prepared by Mr. Katz's which sets forth his findings and conclusions to which he'll testify at the 
aforementioned hearing. Mr. Katz's qualifications are set forth in Mr. Katz resume, attached 
hereto and incorporated herein, as well as the aforementioned disclosure. 
DATED this 25th day of November, 2014. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
Isl 
Jonathon Frantz;, 
Attomey for Martin and Cynthia Frantz 
. . .- . . . 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE (Jeffrey Katz)- 2 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of November, I sertt true correct 
copies of the foregoing to the following via email (with approval from the recipients as to the 
form of communication): 
John F Kurtz, Jr.· jkurtz@hawleytroxeU.com 
Sheila Schwager~ sschwager@hawleytroxell.com 
I FURTIIBR CERTIFY that on the 25th day of November, 2014, I sent true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to the Court via personal delivery to the Coeur d'Alene Federal 
Courthouse. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that on the 25th day ofNovernber, 2014 until today (not including 
Thanksgiving Day) I was unable to file this document on the ECF due to what I believe was a 
technical error by the ECF. 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
Jonathon Frantz 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE (Jeffrey Katz)- 3 
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26(a)(2) Expert Witness 
LaSalle Street Suite 2100, Chicago, Illinois 60602. 
MaJn 
A Mr. Jefferey O. Katz is a leading expert on matters of lawyer 
professional responsibility. In 2012, Mr. Katz fou..._11,ded the American 
Association for Justice Professional Liability Litigation Group) which 
he has chaired since. He is a member of the Association for 
Professional Responsibility Lawyers, and he chaired the Chicago Bar 
Association Young Lawyers Section Professional Responsibility 
Committee from 2009 until 2012. 
Mr. Katz attended the University of Wisconsin at Maa.ison, where he 
earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations and 
Political Science. Mr. Katz earned bis Juris Doctor degree a.t the Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio. For the 
entirety of his career, Mr. Katz has worked as a litigator and trial 
attorney in Chicago, Illinois, with a primary focus on professional 
liability matters involving attorneys. Mr. Katz is a partner at The 
Patterson Law Firm, a distinguished boutique litigation firm located in 
downtown Chicago. 
Mr. Katz has filed and litigated over 400 legal complaints stemming 
from the professional negligence of attorneys in a variety of · 
circumstances, roles, and jurisdictions throughout the United States. 
Mr. Katz is admitted to practice law in the states of Illinois, 
Wisconsin, and Kentucky. He is also admitted to practice in United 
States District Comts in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana. He has been 
admitted to the Sixth and Se'Venth Circuit United States Courts of 
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. 
Mr. Katz has an extensive record of publications and lectures on best 
practice methods I with a. particular focus on professional 
responsibility. Mr. Katz recently published an article in the summer 
2014 issue of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice in which he · 
proposed an amended Rule 8.4, a rule pertaining to lawyer 
misconduct that is mirrored in both Dlinois and Idaho. Mr. Katz also 
taught a seminar for attorneys on Rules 1.3 and 1.4, two professional 
responsibility rules that are also mirrored in both Illinois and Idaho. 
Mr. Katz lectured in a late 2014 National Business Institute seminar 
on professional liability dispute resolution, in which his speaking 
topics focused on trends in professional liability cases and the 
elements of professional liability tort claims. Mr. Katz gave a lecture at 
JV H/ L. VI L. V 1 JI L' !\ l VU , l J /\!ll ,l I\J\ .I.IV, 
} 
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Association for Justice .Annual Convention 
Washington in July of 2014 titled "Avoida:nce the Dreaded 
Legal Malpractice Claim." His lecture, ''A Practical Due Diligence 
Checklist on Preventing the Most Common Attorneys Errors in Civil 
Litigationl' at the ACI/LPL Legal Malpractice Conference in May of 
2012 in New York was a product of his expertise in the area of 
professional responsibility, and he has served as a moderator for the · 
Chicago Bar Association Seminars on Rules of Professional Conduct 
in December 2009, June 2010, December 2010, June 2011, 
December 2011 1 and June 2012. 
B. Mr. Katz will testify that he was retained by Martin and Cynthia 
Frantz's attorneys as a Rule 26(a)(2) expert to testify with regard to a 
matter of professional responsibility. Mr. Katz will testify as to the 
professional standards of conduct applicable to Mr. Clark and Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP1 during the t:i.me in which they were 
retained by Mr. Frantz and the duties and responsibilities that extend 
from th.at relationship and continue to exist in the present matter 
with Idaho Independent Bank. Mr. Katz will focus on the duties owed 
to Mr. Frantz and the proper and professionally responsible actions 
that should be taken in the present matter. 
Amongst other testimony, Mr. Katz 'Will testify that an attorney-client 
relationship did exist between Mr. Frantz and Mr. Clark end Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP. Due to the language contained within 
the retainer agreement, Mr. Clark's role :in the prior matter, and Mr. 
Frantz's expectations of Mr. Clark's contributions, Mr. Clark and 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, served a dual-role as both expert 
witnesses and expert consultants. Because the present matter is 
substantially related to the prior matter and because Mr. Clark and 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, received or were given access to 
confidential financial information that is at issue in the present 
matter and adverse to the interests of Mr. and Mrs. Frantz, the motion 
for disqualification is proper. 
Further1 Mr. Katz will testify that the record does not establish that 
Mr. Frantz made a valid waiver of any privilege or conflicted 
representation. Finally, Mr. Katz will testify that know:ingly hiring a 
previously retained expert consultant of an adverse party does in fact 
create grounds for disqualification, as appears to be the case in the 
present matter. It is Mr. Katz's opinion that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct prohibit Mr. Clark and Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley, LLP, from continuing as counsel for Idaho Independent Bank 
in the present matter. 
Hl U~: jj AM riu 1~0. 
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D. In addition to his educationi trruning, and experience1 Mr. Katz's 
opinions are or will be based upon hia review of the following material: 
'1 l,I D,..f.,.-nd""'nts' Mr.u'on +o n1· "q11 "'T~-Ft, ro,,ns"'l' 
......... .....,.... a.J., ... ....- ,L "" .,_,, "" \A,.~J ""' i...l J. """ J 
(2) The Declaration of Regina McCrea, along with all attached 
exhibits; 
(3) The Declaration of Martin Frantz, along with all attached e1thibits; 
(4) The Declaration of Jonathon Frantz, along 'With all attached 
exhibits; 
(5) Idaho Independent Bank's Memo in Opposition to the Motion to 
Disqualify, along with all attached affidavits and exhibits; 
(6) Second Declaration of Martin Frantz, along with all attached 
ex..hibitSi 
(7) Defendants' Reply in Support of their Motion to Disqualify; 
· (8) The Supplem.eI:1.tal Declaration of Regina McCrea; 
(9) The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct; and 
(10).Any additional material that may be appropriately considered or 
later provided or disclosed. 
Dated; November 24, 2014 
Respectfully submitted; 
/ s / Jefferey O. Katz 
Jefferey O. Katz 
The Patterson Law Firm, LLC 
One North LaSalle Street; Suite 2100 
Chicago, IL 60602 
Tel. 312-223-1699 
Fax. 312-223-8549 
U l U/ Ut..U 
JVll/ V/ lJ/l'l\l VV.fJ J'\lll J. J\J\ J.l v, 
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Jefferey Ogden Katz 
Patterson Law Firm 
North LaSalle Street, Suite 
Chicago, UJinois 60602 
(312) 750~1817 (Phone) 
(312) 223-8549 (Fax) 
(312) 545-5107 (Mobile) 
· jkatz@pattersonlawfmn.com 
WWW. pattersonlavrorm.com 
The Patterson Law Finn LLC, Chicago, IL 
Partner (September 2012-Present) 
Desc 
Main 
• Practice concentrated in litigation, including but not limited to general commercial litigation and 
professional liability matters involving attorneys, accountants and other professionals. 
• Originated and obtained judgment in the amount of $2,550,377 for Scottie Pippen against Cluistian 
Laettner in action involving failed purchase of professional sports franchise. 
• Second chaired five week jury trial resulting in a judgment of $2,000,000 on behalf of Scottie Pippen 
against fo:rmer attorneys and advisors. 
• First chaired action on behalf of Ben Gordon against former accountant and advisor which resulted in 
summary judgment in the amount of $1,386,666 for Mr. Gordon. Subsequently first chaired and 
obtained summary judgment for Mr. Gordon in defense of action brought by form.er agent seeking in 
excess of$1,200,000 for alleged breach of professional services contract. 
• First chaired and obtained voluntary dismissal of major bank vice president charged with contribution 
and indemnification in the middle of a jury trial involving legal malpractice. 
• First chaired and obtained settlement in the amount of $1,100,000 on behalf of a major Chicago law 
furn in connection with a departing.partner's alleged theft of a contingent fee matter. 
The Spellmire Law Firm LLC, Chicago, IL 
Attorney (September 2005-September 2012) 
EDUCATION 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cle-veland, OH 
Juris Doctor, May 2004 · 
Universjty of Wisconsin at Madison, Madison, WI 
Bachelor of Arts: International Relations and Political Science, May 2000 
BARAD1\1ISS10NS 
State of Illinois, November 2004 
State of Wisconsin, September2009 
State ofKentucky. June 2014 
United States District Court, Northem District of Illinois, January 2005 
United States District Court, Western District of Wisconsin, October 2008 
United States District Court, Northern District of Indiana, February 2010 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh C1rcuit, September 2011 
United States District Court, Central District oflllinois1 June 2014 
United States Supreme Court, October 2013 
JVJV/LO/lU J/rJ'lj uo;1J JUV1 i'J\A !YV, .I., V l WI Vt.,,V 
l-
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Admitted Pro Hae Vice in Wisconsin, Ohio, Texas, Indiana, Kentucky and DC state courts 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
Member$ American Bar Association, Illinois State Bar Association. Chicago Associationi =::i,svuJlid.Li\Jl.l 
Professional Responsibility Lawyers and American Association Justice (formerly 
Chair, Chicago Bar Association Young Lawyers Section ProfessionaJ Responsibility Committee (2009-
2010. 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 years) 
.Founding Chair, American Association for Justice Professional Liability Litigation Group (2012-present). 
PUBLICATIONS MYJl SEMJNARS 
No Good Mental Note: Keys to Progressi11g, A.4.J Tr;ial Lawyer Magazine (SUI""...mer Edition) 
Attomeys, The Internet, & Hate Speech: An Argument For An Amended Model Rule 8.4, Seattle Journal 
for Social Justice (Summer 2014 issue). 
Avoidance of the Dreaded Lega] Malpractice Claim, American Association for Justice Annual 
Convention (Washington, D.C., July 2014) 
Streamlining Client Representation: Leveraging new business structures, Law Bul1etin Seminars 
(Chicago, June 2014) 
Contributing Editor, InsideCounsel Magazine (January 2014.:Present) 
So You Want to File a Legal Malpractice Case? American Association for Justice Annual Convention 
(Chicago, June 2012) 
View from the Plaintiff's Bar: Adapting Your Claims and Litigation Strategies to New and Innovative 
Theories Being Brought by Your Adversaries, ACJ/LPL Legal Malpractice Conference (New York, May 
2012). 
A Practical Due Diligence Check.list on Preventing the Most Common Attorneys Errors in Civil 
Litigation, A CI/LPL Legal Malpractice Conference (New York, May 2012) 
Ethical Considerations Related to Modem Technology, Chicago Bar Association YLS Professional 
Responsibility Committee (Chicago, September 2010). 
"Rules 1.3 and 1.4 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct," Half Moon Seminar (Chicago, October, 
2006). 
Moderator: Chicago Bar Association Seminars on RuJes of Professional. Conduct (December, 2009, June, 
2010. December 2010, June 2011,December 2011, and June2012). 
Moderator: Chicago Bar Association Seminar-State of the Profession (December 2012). 
VOLUNTEER/PRO BONO EXPERIENCE 
Volunteer attorney with Chicago Volunteer Legal Services (2005-Present) 
Chicago Bar Association e-mentoring program mentor (2006-2007, 2012) 
Brief grader; for Chicago Bar Association moot court competition (2006) 
American Association for Justice (fonnerly ATLA) mock trial judge (2006) 
Chicago Bar Associatfon Judicial Evaluation Com:rnittee (2009-Present) 
Young Professionals Committee for Justice Mary Jane Theis (2011-2012) 
Case WestemReserve University School of Law AJunuli Recruiting Coordinator (2011-:Present) 
American Association for Justice Law Schools Committee (2012-Present) 
Regional Coordinator American Association for Justice STAC Program (2013, 2014) 
American Association for Justice NLD Education Committee (Present) 
CRAR.ITABLEEXPERIENCE 
Founding Member of The Up Foundation (benefits Autism Speaks) 
Advisory Board Member of LifeLine Response and Clandestine Development 
AWARDS AND HONORS 
Dlinois Rising Stars List 2013 and 2014 (Professional Responsibility) 
American Association for Justice Trial Lawyers Care Award 2014 (Finalist) 
vs Hawley Docket 
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Schwager, 
John R Kurtz, Jr., ISB No, 2396 
Timothy R. Kurtz, ISB No. 8774 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Maio Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box.16i7 
Baise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: 208.344.6000 
Facsimile: 208.954.5261 
Email: sschwager@haw]eycroxell.com 
jkurtz@bawleytroxeJl.com 
tkurtz@hawleytroxell.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank 
Entered 1 
IN" THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
(COEUR D'ALENE) 
In Re: ) 
) 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ AND CYNTHIA M. · ) 
FRANTZ, ) 
) 
Debtors, ) 
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAR.Tm D. FRANTZ, an individual, and 
cYNTHIA M. FRANTZ1 an individual, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Chapter7 
Adversary Proc. No. 13-07024-TLM 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ, JR. 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE 
TO PROHIBIT THE EXPERT 
TESTTh10NY OP JEFFEREY KATZ 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ JR. JN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OF JEFFEREY KATZ 
Martin Frantz Hawley Troxell, etal 43576,~5 EX~B·IT I 
r. U l J/ ULO 
"VH/ U/ l.U!JI !'!\! VU, l't 11.lll !'11.A !HI, r, VI'±/ VLO 
Filed 11/28/14 Entered 
. in Support of Motion Umine Page 2 of 4 
sworn states 
1. I am a partner of the law fim1 of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, attorneys 
of record for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank: ("IIB") in the above captioned action. I make this 
affidavit and the statements contained herein based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a letter that Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP received from Mr. Jefferey Ogden Katz of The Patterson Law 
Firm LLC, dated October 16, 2014, 
,.,,, 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 28th day of November, 2014. 
~~~-~ 
Name: Tammy N. Deerman 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My commission expires 05/30/2020 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ JR. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT EXPERT 
VVJ.'1/ !...V/ l..JI J..I.\J. VV• i"'I JUU. ! .II../\. J.1 V, 
HEREBY that on this 28th day of No-vember, to served a 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R KURTZ JR. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO PROHIBIT THE EXPERT TESTitv.fONY OF JEFFEREY KATZ, by tbe method indicated 
below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Llncoln St .. Ste. A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83854 
Jonathon.@cdalegaLcom 
Stephen B. McCrea 
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 101 
P.O. Box 1501 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1501 
0 U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
0 E-mail 
D Telecopy 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
0 E-mail 
D Telecopy 
J. , V J, ;,JI 1.,1 W \,,I 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ JR. lN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT EXPERT 
TESTThiiONY OF JEFFEREY KATZ - 3 
Hawley 
JVH/ lV/ JI !' 1\ l U U • i '± IUYi l' /\J\ H V, l, V V/ VI.. V 
Filed Desc 
. in Support of 
October t 6. 2014 
VIA REGULAR MAIL & EMAIL 
Mr. Steven W. Berenter 
Hawley Troxell 
& 77 W. :Main St.. Suite 1000 
Boise. ID 838702 
iberen;ter@hawleyrmx:ell.c,om 
Re: In re Marty Frantz 
Dear Mr. Berenter: 
4 
By way of introduction, I am a Partner with The Patterson Law Firm LLC and have been 
retained by Mr. Marty Frantz to investigate and pursue an action against your firm in 
connection with youx provision of legal services to Mr. Frantz. 
In order to avoid :filing a Complaint at tbis ~ime, I would like to discuss this matter with 
you in order to explore the possibility of prewsuit resolution. Should you not respond to 
me by Octqber 29, 2014. we will have no choice but to file a Con1plaint sollnding in legal 
malpractice. I hope we can. resolve these issues without resort to that action. 
[ look forward to hearing from you sooll. 
cc: Marty Frantz (via email only) 
Jonathon Frantz (via email only) 
.. :·:·· 
Exhibit A 
Nor!h la Salle Street, Suite 2100 I Chicago, Illinois 60602 I Phone 312 Z.23 1699 I Fax 31 l 223 8549 l www.pattersonlawfirm.C:Ql'fl 
of 
~VlV U/ IJ! l'!\ UU,J't t\!Vl 
JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH, ISB 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane~ Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455~6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
!' t\A !V V, 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxel} Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAH01 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ. 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) Case No. CV15-1406 
) 
!, Ul//UL.O 
VS. 
) A.FFIDA VIT OF JACK GUSTA VEL 
) 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of KOOTENAI 
) ss: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
JACK GUSTA VEL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Chief Executive Officer of Idaho Independent Bank, have personal 
knowledge of the matters asserted hereunder, and am competent to be a witness in this action. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an email I received 
from Jeffrey Katz on March 9, 2015. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JACK GUSTA VEL • 
/ v~.>e•f WV! Vl.,.JI J. J.\.I. VV• .l.'! JUU LIU\ JV V, 1, U l U/ U LU 
! 
correct an message 
was sent tome on 
SIGNED AND SWORN to before met 
JACK GUSTAVEL. 
~CITE 
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State 
of!daho, residing at~~ 
My Comm1ss1on Expires: ( 
A:FF.IDAVlTOF JACK GUSTAVEL ~2 
VS 
I) VJ.'f/ VI JI ,. l\ l vv. j 't nm r:ru nu, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
on the~1iay June, 5, 
HAND DELIVERY 
U.S. MAIL 
OVER.NIGHT MAIL 
FAX TRANSMISSION 
l:\Sp<idocs\00196\00038\t>LE/\D\O 145913 l .DOC:lg 
to following: 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
301 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83815 
~~a,..,_ 
Debbie Miller 
r U l J/ VlO 
a 
VV,l.l/ (,.,\,JI"" 1,,,;1 AU! vv, 11' 1un rn.1\ HV, 
From: JeffereyKatzfmailto:Jt<atz@pattersQolawfi(Ul,com] 
Sent; Monday, March 09, 2015 8:59 AM 
To: Jack W. Gustavel 
Subject: Marty Frantz 
Mr. Gustave!-
f. ULU/ ULO 
I represent Marty Frantz In a newly fifed action again.st his former attorneys at the Howley Troxell firm. I would like to 
discuss this matter with you and discuss how it may be flnanclally beneficial to you. 
Please give me a call at your convenience. 
Jefferey Ogden Katz 
Partner 
I '111~ Patte,·s.on L:1w Fi rm 
One North LaSalle Street, Suite 2100 
Chicago, llllnols 60602 
Direct (312) 7S0.1817 
Main (312) 223.1699 El<t. 104 • Fax {312) 223.8549 
email I web~jte I r.na.e 
C:OM·IIJCNflALI fy N01.1Cl:; 
Tlll~ 11/tllctror,1c comrrit,nlc<1rion and any attached lilin cont,,in ii\forr'natton il)tencJNI I or the tlWClusfv,i u3!! ol llit!' lodi1111Junl or P.ntiry tc, whMn it Is 
rldofe6,ecl a,ict rn,1y contai11 iMorn1at1on that 11 ll•'01lflel1Hy, privileaed, co11licte,1t1,:il aod/or exempt Imm uisr.lc:isure tinae, oµµlir.11ble law. ir you ure 
not thi:;i lntGIHlM rer.1p1coc, '{tllJ art:' hcrnliy notlfit;!,;l th~t ,wy viewing. copyti,g, cJlsclo.u(P, or ,ri,t,rlbptliln of tliis inlor11mcion is p1'ohll1ltcc1 ;ind rnay 
ti1~ ~Ulljt'Ct to legal restrlr.thJn or se1nction. Pt~osa notify tl\c zi:i,1cJ~r. tiy 010<..tronic: m,lil M tot:i1ll1ona, of any ur1intr.(1tfar1 rn1:lplo.nt!, Mrl delntc tl,r. 
Ofigln<1l 111e;r.Hf1rZ wit111H111l1akiri~ .ir1v coµlc:J;, E-,r,ail~ are suscnptible to c.:1;::in(:lt~. H1a 1l,1tll:HS011 Ldw Fhn,, 1.1.C doei <Hit e•wrn,1t1Ht th;,t ti!,> iritegrftv 
of mlr. r,orn111unii;uti(ln h,i!; !itiai, rrm1i1ra11,ed or tl,at thit. cc1m1r11H!IGatlo11 IS lr1:e of 1111s,•tes, inte1r.ep1foqs or inrP.1 ft:1 !'!lltfl. 
,..(IDAHO> 
L1'1lJfil'ill'7Dm'l' Ei:N Lt' 
This emali and any liles iransmilled wflh ii ere conifdenlla1 and fmenoed solely for lhe use ol 1he en1hy or inowldual 10 whom !hey are addressed. II you have 
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From: Jane Bodle-Hill [rnaflto:Jane.Bodle-Hlll@ll6K.NE1J 
Sent: Frfday, June OS, 2015 7:58 AM 
To: Shella Schwager; John Kurtz 
Cc: Kurt Gustave!; Dawn L. Smfth 
SUbject: FW: Malpractice Opportunity 
.. ,,! <• , ' _..,M, •••••"•- / •<• '••> ""{» ' , .. ,~, •t~ *'\•' , • " 
From: Marty Frantz [maflto;mar:tYfcaotz,d~@g.mgil.com] 
Sent: Thursday, June 04, 201S 12.:49 PM 
To: Jack W. Gustave! 
Subject: Malpractice Opportunity 
Hi Jack 
From Marty 
J' 111\ 11 V, , Ull/ Ul\J 
It's our 51h anniversary this week since the litigation began and I have become aware of an opporcunity that may 
be of foteresc. 
Hawley-TroxeJ's continued representation oflIB has created a unique situation. The Chicago malpractice law 
attorney asserts it's an opportunity for not only myself but for IIB and Hawley-Troxell as well. Mr. Kacz has 
never lost a case in about 500 malpractice cases he's done nationwide. He personally represented Scottie 
Pippen of the Chicago B~1J1s in a malpractice case winning a high dollar settlement. Malpractice work js all he 
does. At the onset, he asked me if 1 would object if he were to invite IIB to join the malpractice case because 
there wouJd be an advantage to Hawley-Troxell if Im joined and also the case wouJd lead to a gujcker and more 
lucrative settlement for IIB and myself than H the parries relied soieiy on 3-.5 more years of litigating other 
complex coumercJajms and affirmative defenses. While the request seemed somewhat unconventional on the 
outset, after listening to Mr. Katz, I could not deny that the merits are compeJHng and beneficial to aJI 
parties, including Hawley-Troxell. 
As background, with regard to the malpractice case, Hawley-Troxel hid the truth about their koowJedge with 
regard to my prior engagement of their law firm. I fortuirously rao across the payment receipt from Hawley~ 
TroxeJ when moving out of my home. I personally paid them ovec $ Wk on my credit card with my name on 
LU 4 ~ AA l~O. L ULL/ ULO 
co assure there is no 
they 
Mr Katz's proposal js to draw up an agreement which pays the first $4m of insurance award funds to IIB in 
exchange for transferring the l 04 acre note/mortgage ro Eagle llidge. The remaining insurance proceeds would 
be spilt 50/50 between IIB and Eagle Ridge. Mr Katz's !aw firm is pursuing the case on a contingency fee 
basis including taking the case through higher court appeals if so required. So there is no risk to lIB other than 
3d party costs that would be pajd on a 50/50 basjs. Thfa agreement would pul IlJ3 in a position to substantially 
help Hawley-Troxell which is ex.plained below. 
But first, in regard to the merits of the case, the disqualification case was different than a malpractice case. We 
pursued the disquaJification case as a probe so that Mr Katz could wrap his head around the issues and really 
understand what happened and to see how HT would defend themselves. Mr Katz used part of that informacjon 
to evaluate the merits of a high stakes future malpractice case wllich success rests upon other facts and case !aw 
principles that were not of issue nor debated in the disqoalification bearing. Mr Katz1s firm needed to decide if 
the case was strong enough to compel them to pursue the future high stakes civil litigation on a contingent fee 
basis. He looked at the fact that around 2008 & 2009, Mr. Clark at Hawley~Troxell was my key . 
attorney. Ironically. that case was also a malpractice matter against my previous CDA attorney regarding GAB. 
the centerfold of one of the subjects of IIB·s claim against me jn lhe current litigation. As a resuJt of Mr. 
Clark's work for me. I woo the malpractice case. The Chicago firm analyzed the djsquaJification case with 
overwJapping JegaJ issues. AfteJWard their review was completed, they were compelled to pursue the hjgh 
stakes maJpractice case in clvjJ court and to do so on a contingent fee basis. To that end, the malpractice case 
against HT was recently filed in civB court. 
By way of ex:.ampJe1 if the insurance award is $!Om, IlB would receive the first $4m pJus approx $2m:;;; ~6m 
totaJ co JIB ($!Om~ $2m approx legaJ costs :o $8m - $4m priority to JIB ::s: $4m remaining x 50% = $2m more to 
IIB = $6m totaJ to IIB). The joint litigalion agreement requires unanirnotis consear by both you and I co settle 
the malpracLice case with an attencion-grabbjng exception. As long as IIB is satisfied thar the maJpractice 
senlement amount is enough to extinguish/transfer the note/mortgage to Eagle Ridge, IIB can over-ride m)! 
voce and I would be regufred to accept whatever settJement offer JIB so chooses for whatever amount anywhere 
from $4m to $J Om or more. IIB could dedde to settle for a net of only $4m receiving 100% of net fr1surance 
proceeds while EagJe Ridge would receive $ -0- and would only benefit from the note/mortgage transfer. IlB 
gets to sit ln the driver's seat regarding the settJement amount and mitigate Hawley~ Troxell' s liability. 
Since we have alreadyfiJed against H~T and are pursjng the litigation with or without IIB, it would be an 
advantage to Hawley-TroxeJJ if Im were to join in the case to have sole control over the amoum of chat 
settlement to mirigme Hawley-Troxell's risk. If I1B were not pa.rt of the case, with no obligatjon to buy out the 
note/mortgage, the award funds would be used to fue! our other litigation and the amount of settlement would 
not be controJJed by IIB. Otherwise, IIB can and Jikety wrn exercise their exclusive right to accept a lesser 
amount due to thefr good relationship with Hawley-TroxeH, saving them $4m or more depending upon the 
2 
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settlement amount and how much IIB is willing to accept in · transferring the 
note/mo1tgage lO Eagle Ridge, Therefore there is little down side a significant benefit 1ncemive for 
Hawleyr Troxell to encourage IIB to join the malpractice case. part of the joint once IlB uses 
exclusive right to seule the case for an amount at chejr sole and the I04 acre is 
extinguished/transferred, sjmu!taneously. IIB's sole action wHJ require all other litigation and/or claims to be 
ex:dngujshed between us. Until the malpractice case is settled, which could be as early as within half a year, it 
would not affect the orher numerous claims and coumerclaims which we expect will take 3-5 more years to play 
out. So ic wouJd not hold up IIB's other litigation increasing the odds that a settlement wiH be forthcoming 
sooner than later. 
Even though this proposal is beneficial to Hawley-Troxell, Mr. Jeff I(atz @ l-312-223-1699 cannot discuss 
this with H~T but is authorized to accept your other counsel· s communication to discuss and determine for 
yourself rhe merits of the case and its benefit to IIB and Hawley-TroxeJI, 
Tnt IHl,.'\.'iil£C"I :mJ ;tlhlt:hm.:ws hcrcut fl1Jy C'{)niJht L.t'l11fiiJcJf1t~tl mf1,ml,UH)1& ;l1\lh'l..lCtl I\) 11i.~ ~lll't'h\'' ·chttm !'Jt\ticgc !1( :mntli~, pri\ttt.:u: Titi''<n.· 1 !<l!U)IJHllt',1111-Jlf\ ;u,: u)t.:,uU-,:,J lti 
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RJSEBOROUGH, 
HAMBLEN 
Sprague A venue 
Washington 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
1. 11.J\ J.~ V, 
#7898 
Anorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ___ , __ ) 
Case No. CV15~1406 
REPLY RE OBJECTION TO MOTION 
FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION 
COMES NOW defendant Hawley TroxeJl Ennis & Hawley LLP and for its Reply to the 
Response of Plaintiff regarding Defendant's Objection to Pro Hae Vice Admission submits the 
following: 
Plaintiff's technical response fails to provide assurance to the Court that Mr. Katz 
understands the rules and witl comply wjth them. Rather it tacitly admits and attempts to excuse 
Mr. Katz's inappropriate conduct. Plaintiff contends that the rules in Illinois and Idaho are the 
same. Whether they are or they aren't, Mr. Katz has demonstrated either an wifamiliarity with or 
a determination not to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct in Idaho. 
REPLY RE OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION · I 
JU!V U/ l:J/ I'lil UO, 1 fUV! l' JU !~ 0, 
ARGUMENT 
M:r. Katz violated 
Represented by Counsel. 
Rule 
r. ULJI ULO 
with Person 
Plaintiff's attempt to excuse Mr. Katz's unauthorized conduct with a represented party 
fails. Mr. Katz, while representing plaintiff, and while presenting to the Idaho Bankruptcy Court 
that he was acting as an expen witness, contacted a represented party in that matter. No amount 
of spin can change that fact. That neither Mr. Katz nor Mr. Frantz recognize this as a violation of 
tbc RPC's speaks volumes. Mr. Frantz's efforts to excuse Mr. Katz's conduct fail and Pro Hae 
Vice admission should be denied. 
I.R.P.C. 4.2 provides that in ''representing a cl lent, a lawyer shall not communicate about 
the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is autho1ized b~ 
law to do so." (Emphasis added). Plaintiff does not deny that IIB was represented by counsel at 
the time it was contacted, nor that HTEH did not consent to the contact. Both the current matter 
and the matter for which Mr. Katz advised Plaintiff as an ''expert" revolve around a single issue 
- whether HT.EH should be disqualified. Plaintiff's excuse that Mr. Katz had his "counsel-in-
another-matter" hat on - not his "expert-in-this-matter" hat on when he contacted BB should be 
rejected as an effort to circumvent the spirit, if not the letter of the RPC's. This District Court 
will not be well served by admitting counsel with such predilections. 
B. Mr. Katz has also violated I.R.P.C 3,3 - Candor Toward the Tribunal 
There is now further evidence of Mr. Katz's misunderstanding of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. As demonstrated by the Affidavit of Jack Gustave!, as well as the 
Affidavit of John Kurtz (Exhibit B to Affidavit of John C. Riseborough), certain actions of 
REPLY RE OBJECTION TO MOTTON FOR 
PRO HAC VtCE ADMISSION - 2 
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while failing to disclose his representation of the debtor (Affidavit of John F. Kurtz, Jr.); 
and 
b) The entire Motion to Disqualify HTEH was a subterfuge, authored and 
directed by Mr. Katz to assess the reaction of IIB and HTEH to that motion and th.us 
determine how he would hand.le Mr. Frantz's case for attorney malpractice against HTEH 
(Exhibit B to Affidavit of Gustave!). 
As to a), the attachment to the Affidavit of John C. Riseborough demonstrates that Mr. 
Katz filed an extensive expert opinion in support of the disqualification motion. He presented 
himself to the Court, not as counsel for Frantz, but as an expert witness. He did not disclose to 
the Bankrnptcy Court that he was simultaneously representing Mr. Frantz in a civil action with 
the same issue at its center. Mr. Katz thus failed to reveal significant infonnation impacting his 
credibility and bias to the Court. 
As to b), the recent emaiJ from Mr. Frantz to Mr. Gustave!, CEO of IIB, reveals that the 
motion to disqualify HTEH which took up so much of the bankruptcy court's time. was a 
"probe." As stated by Mr. Frantz: 
We pursued the disqualification case as a probe so that Mr. Katz could 
wrap his head around the issues and really understand what happened 
and see how HTEH (Hawley Troxell) would defend themselves. 
Thus, Mr. Frantz represents that his motion was not pursued for a legitimate, (albeit 
misgujded) purpose of obtaining disqualification, but rather as a tactical device by Plaintiff's 
counsel. 
REPLY RE OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
PRO HAC VJCE ADMJSSlON - 3 
vs 
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excuse that didn't happen should be 
candor See 
this violates I.R.C.P l l(a)(l) requiring each attorney signing a pleading in Idaho 
·'ihat to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry ir. is 
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law . . . and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost 
oflitigation .... " (Emphasis added). Plaintiff's "probe'' violates the tenents of that rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Katz knew that IIB was represented by HTEH when he made contact with its CEO 
without that counsel's consent to discuss the same subject of that representation. He did not 
advise the bankruptcy court of his representation of Frantz as attorney when he filed his opinions 
as an expert witness. He participated in a motion that was not brought for a proper purpose, and 
failed ro disclose that purpose to the com1. These actions demonstrate that the privilege of acting 
as attorney in Idaho's courts should be withheld from this attorney on this occasion. 
DATED this~ d~y of June, 2015. 
R.Ef>LY l{e OBJECTION TO MOTlON FOR 
PR.O HAC VICE ADMISSION. 4 
Hawley 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
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vs 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law. PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83815 
Debbie Miller 
l, UlU/ UlU 
true 
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STATE OF IUAHO }ss 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI . 
Jonathon Frantz 
Law, 
N. Lincoln St., A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83854 
Pb: 208-262-38931 Fax: 208-262-3894 
jonathon@cdalegal.com 
ISB No. 9129 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership. 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 15-1406 
FRANTZ'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR PRO HAC VICE 
ADMISSION 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Martin Frantz, by and through his attorney of record, Jonathon Frantz 
of Frantz Law, PLLC, and pursuant to the oral order issued by the Court at the hearing on this 
matter on June 30, 2015 at 2:30 pm, and hereby provides the Court with bjs brief in support of 
the motion to admit, pro hac vice, Mr. Katz as an attorney for Mr. Frantz. 
MR. KATZ HAS NOT, IS NOT, AND WILL NOT BE A WITNESS 
In Idaho Bankruptcy Adversary Case No. 13-07024-TLM, Idaho Independent Bank got 
into a dispute with Mr. Frantz, wherein Mr. Frantz moved to disqualify Idaho Independent 
Bank's attorneys: Hawley Troxell. However, the evidentiary hearing on the matter was set so 
that Mr. Frantz only had a couple of weeks in which to prepare for the evidentiary hearing. As a 
result, Mr. Frantz sought to have Mr. Katz be an expert witness in the matter. Regardless, the 
No. of 
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to matter. 
as moot 
therefore not adjudicated. Therefore, Mr. Katz has never been a witness for Mr. Frantz. 
Furthermore, Mr. Katz has no independent knowledge about the facts that form the basis of this 
matter. As a result, Mr. Katz is not and will not be a witness for Mr. Frantz in this case. 
MR. KATZ SHOULD BE ADMITTED PRO HAC VICE 
Idaho has no case law interpreting when pro hac vice admission shou]d not be granted. 
However, other jurisdictions have met this question head on. The 5th and 11th Circuits have he)d, 
The District Court may [only] refuse to admit a lawyer, otherwise qualified, on a 
showing that in any legal matter ... he has been guilty of unethical conduct of 
such a nature as to justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted genera1ly to the bar of 
the court. 
Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241,247 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Schlumberger Techs. V. Wiley, 
113 F.3d 1553,1561 (11th Cir. 1997) (the 11th circuit continued to apply the same standard after 
it split from the 5th circuit). Because Mr. Katz has not violated any rules of professional 
conduct, let alone have cause to be disbarred, he must be granted admission. 
l. IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK IS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL 
Mr. Katz at no point has violated any Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct by contacting 
IIB because IIB is not represented in this matter. Specifically, neither Mr. Katz nor Jonathon 
Frantz have ever received a letter from any attorney claiming to represent IIB in this matter. 
Further, neither Mr. Katz nor Jonathon Frantz have received a cease and desist letter from any 
attorney claiming to represent 11B in this matter. No such event has ever occurred because llB 
indeed bas no representation in this matter. 
Further, if Hawley Troxell represents IIB in this case (as alleged) there is no explanation 
for Hawley Troxell's failure to every so identify itself. Clearly, Hawley Troxell is aware of the 
p. 
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made. IIB matter. 
IIB is it cannot point to any proof showing IIB is represented 
this matter (further, Hawley Troxe11 cannot point to any proof showing that Mr. Katz or Jonathon 
Frantz would have been aware of such representation). 
Therefore, it is wholly appropriate for Mr. Katz to discuss this case personally with JIB 
personnel because IIB is not represented. As such, no rule has been violated. 
2. MR. KATZ ABIDES BY THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making false 
statements of fact or law, failing to disclose controlling legal authority, or offering evidence 
known to be false. Mr. Katz has never done any of those items. Mr. Katz disclosure in Case No. 
13-07024-TLM was formulated to comply with the Fed. R.Civ.Pro. Rule 26(a)(2)(B), which is 
very specific in its requirements. Regardless, it is completely immaterial considering the judge 
there disallowed expert witnesses and ultimately dismjssed Case No. 13-07024-TLM as moot. 
So, Mr. Katz never was an expert witness. 
Furthermore, the laughable allegations of subterfuge are outlandish and unfounded. The 
email referenced in Mr. GustaveJ's affidavit from Mr. Frantz was never reviewed by his attorney. 
Plus, it should be obvious that Mr. Frantz could have been subject to scruple if he had filed a 
malpractice claim without bringing a disqualification motion first (plaintiffs always have a duty 
to mitigate their damages). 
Additionally, Mr. Katz agreed to represent Mr. Frantz in thls case on October 7, 2014. At 
the same time, Mr. Frantz and Mr. Katz set Mr. Katz's fees, which were not dependent or 
contingent or affected in any why by the disqualffication hearing. So, Mr. Katz really did not 
care how the disqualification motion turned out. Instead, Mr. Katz only encouraged the Frantzes 
p.i 
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ensure not a 
As such, For Hawley Troxell to pretend that the sole purpose of Mr. Frantz's motion to 
disqualify was to "probe" the issue is simply ridiculous and without merit. Lastly, Mr. Frantz 
was represented at the disqualification hearing by Jonathon Frantz, not by Mr. Katz. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Mr. Katz has conducted himself appropriately and within the bounds of 
Idaho law. Therefore, there is no cause to withhold pro hac vice admission from Mr. Katz and 
he should be admitted to practice in this case. 
DATED this 13th day of July, 2015. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
By: Isl Jonathon Frantz 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of Ju]y, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
John C. Riseborough 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] FAX (509) 838-0007 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
Hawley 
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STATE OF IDAHO }ss 
COUNTY OF KOOTEHAI .. ·. 
Lincoln St, 
Post Falls,· Idaho 838 54 
Ph: 208-262-38931 F'ax: 208-<262-3894 
jonathon@cdalegal.<::om 
ISBNo. 9129 
Attorney for Plaintiff: Martin F:ra:ntz 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT ()F THE FIRST JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Case No~: CV 15-1406 
pf.• tiff run • 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership. 
DECLARATION OF JEFFERY KATZ IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FORPRO HAC 
VICE ADMISSION 
Defendant. 
I, the. undersigned, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the followingis.ttue and correct 
to the bestC>f my knowledge~ 
1. I am over the age of eighteen a.rid competent to testy to the matters contained herein. 
2. I am an ~tt9n1ey m~ensed to practice law in Ulinois~ Wisconsiti., K~ntucky pll,lS variou.s 
federal district courts (including the Seventh Circuit and US Supreme Court). 
3. In 2012, I founded the American Association for Justice Professional Liability Litigation 
Group. 
4. In 2009- 2012 Ichaired the Chicago Bar Association Young Lawyers Section 
Profession~l Responsibility Committee. 
13-Ju 15:40 
attorney negligertce. 
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6. In mid to late 2014, Mr, Frantzcontacted.meregardingapotential attorney malpractice 
claim against an attorney finn in Idaho. 
7. Aftetrevi¢W1ngtheease, on October 7,2014 I ~greed to represent Mr. Frantz in a 
malpractice action against Hawley Troxell. On that same day I forwarded to Mr. Frantz a 
representation agreement which Mr~ Hantz signed. 
8. I never agreed to represent. Mr. Fiantz in Idaho .Bankruptcy Ca$eN-0. 13~07024. I never 
clid represent Mr .. Frantz in Case No. 13-07024. 
9. that represent~on agreei;nent spelled outthe tenns and conditions by which I would 
receive remuneration. 
10 .. Neither the amounts! receive nor the service! provide under our representation 
agreement are affected~in any way by the di~qualification hearing in ldalio Banknlptc:y 
Court Case No. 13-07024. 
11. Further, base9. on the fi)ings in, Case No. 13-07024, I am aware that Mr. Jonathon Frantz 
and Mr. Steven McCrea, both Idaho licensed attorneys, represent Mr. Martin Frantz in 
Case No. 13-07024. I havenever repre~nte4 Mr. F.rantz in Ca$e No. 13-07024. 
12. Shortly after agreeing to ,represent Mr. Martin Frantz in a malpractice action ag~nst 
HawleyTroxell, Mr. Jonathon F:tarttz, attomey fotMai:tio Frantz in Case No. 13-07024, 
and I ha,d a con.ver~ation wht:lreby Jonathon Frantz askt::d iflvfartil). Fran,tz.ne~ed move to 
disqualify Hawley TroxelLin Case No. 13~07024 to preserve the malpractice action 
against Hawley Troxell,. 41 which action I had agreed to undertake representation of 
Martin Frantz. 
:41 Frantz L LC +12082623894 
I 
Martin 
14. illtima:fe}y, Jonathon Frantz-and 1 felt it bett~r forMartin Fra.ntzto roove to disqualify 
Hawley Troxell in Case No. B-07024 to ensure that Hawley Troxell would not raise an 
affirntative defense of failure to mitigate. 
15 . While I was interested to see the outcome-0f the disqualification hearmg, I did not, and 
do not, believe that the. outcome of the dtsqualillcation hearing has any bearingortthis 
malpractice litigation as th,e two are mutually exclusive legal proceedings. 
16. Ultimately, the outcome ofthe dlsqualiflcatfoii heai:ing was without effect as Case No. 
13:.07024 was dismissed onmootness. 
17. I have reviewed the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and I will follow them. 
t8. I have never received any n<>tification from any att9mey stating thatldahOiridepertdent 
Bank is represented in this above-entitled matter. 
19. No employee or agent for Idaho Independent Bank has ever advised me that they are 
represented by an attorney in this matter. 
20. I have only ever contacted Idaho Independent Bank for the purpose of discussing the 
above..entitled case. 
21 . I have never been sanctioned by any barjurisdktion for any conduct. 
22. I do not.have any fu.dep~ndent knowledge regarding ~ facts of the above-entitled case; 
23. I will not be a witness in the above-~ntitled Ca$e. 
24. I have never testified for Mr. Martin Frantz before. 
P a 
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By: /sf Jonathon Frantz 
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CERTIFICATE OF $ERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of Jµly, 2015~ I caused ~ mi~ a.rid corr~ct~opy of the 
lrtstrt!Inent above to he served o:nthe folkrwing in the tnamier indicated below: 
John c. Riseborougp. 
[ J U:S. Mail 
[ ] 
[X] 
[ ] 
OterilightMaif 
FAX (50~) 838--0007 
Hand Delivery 
Is/ Jonathon Frantz 
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STATE OF IOAHO 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
N. Lincoln 
Post Falls, Idaho 83854 
Ph:208-262-38931Fax: 208-262-3894 
jonathon@cdalegal.com 
ISB No. 9129 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz. 
FILED: 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
~~1uc1:~ 
J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Case No.: CV 15-1406 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership. 
DECLARATION OF JONATHON 
FRANTZ IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION 
Defendant. 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct 
to the best of my knowledge: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to testy to the matters contained herein. 
2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho. 
3. I represent Martin Frantz in the above-entitled case and in Idaho Bankruptcy Case No. 
13-07024. 
4. 1n mid to late 2014, Martin Frantz discussed with me his discovery that he had hired 
Hawley Troxell before. After reviewing the material, I recommended that he contact a 
legal malpractice attorney. 
13-Ju 15: Frantz L LC +12082623891 
Martin informed me he bee11 contact 
Hv<:J,J;:.V, Illinois, not H\,A,lt.:>'-.U to """""'<,r,o 
be local counsel for Mr. Katz. 
a 
an 
was asked to 
6. I informed both Martin Frantz and Mr. Katz that I would be local counsel on the case so 
long as Mr. Katz was granted pro hac vice admission ( or some other legal malpractice 
attorney took on representation for Martin Frantz). 
7. At about that same time, I discussed with Mr. Katz whether or not it would be beneficial 
to Martin Frantz's malpractice case against Hawley Troxell ifwe moved to disqualify 
Hawley Troxell. 
8. I further asked if the outcome of the dismissal motion could possibly affect the 
malpractice litigation. 
9. To that end, Mr. Katz and I discussed the va]ue of the disqualification motion in 
foreclosing Hawley Troxell's potential affirmative defense of failure to mitigate. 
10. Outside of that consideration, however, Mr. Katz informed me that the disqualification 
hearing outcome would have no bearing on Mr. Frantz's litigation against Hawley 
Troxe11. 
11. In the hearing to disqualify Hawley Troxell, I attempted to call Mr. Katz as an expert 
witness; however, the judge there disallowed expert testimony. 
12. As a result, Mr. Katz never acted as an expert witness for Martin Frantz. 
13. Furthermore, Case No. 13-07024, in which the disqualification hearing took place, was 
subsequently dismissed as moot. Therefore, there was no resolution in that case. 
14. Additionally, I have reviewed the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and have passed 
Idaho's required competency test thereto. 
15. Mr. Katz has not violated any of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
p. 
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I 
I never 
above-entitled matter. 
17. No employee or agent for Idaho Independent Bank bas ever advised me that they are 
represented by an attorney in this matter. 
18. Mr. Katz will not be called as a witness in the above-entitled case. 
DATED this 13th day of July, 2015. 
/s/ Jonathon Frantz 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of July, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
John C. Riseborough 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] FAX (509) 838-0007 
[ ] Hand De1ivery 
/s/ Jonathon Frantz 
p 
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STATE OF !OAHO }ss 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
F~yl~/ 
I JUL I l. 
COURT 
Post Falls, Idaho 83815 
Ph: 208-262-3893 
Fax: 208-262-3894 
~,ga/.~ f)E~UTY , 
Email: jonathon@cda1ega1.com 
ISB No. 9129 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
I. Introduction 
Case No.:CVlS-1406 
RESPONSE TO HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS OR ABATE (I.R.C.P. 
12(B)(8)) 
Plaintiff Martin Frantz ("Frantz") filed a legal malpractice action against Defendant Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell") on February 20, 2015 for Hawley Troxell 's 
conflicted representation and revelation of confidential information submitted by Frantz to 
Hawley Troxel] within the scope of the representation. Hawley Troxell claims that the instant 
case should be dismissed pursuant to IRCP 12(B)(8) as the issue raised in this maner is being 
litigated in a separate proceeding, the adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court, District of Idaho, captioned as No. 13-07024-TLM ("Adversary Proceeding"). However, 
as the Adversary Proceeding was rendered moot on May 20, 2015 and the moot proceeding has 
no preclusive effect, Hawley Troxell's motion must be denied. 
14-Jul 12:14 L LlC +12082623894 
II. Argument 
a. Abatement pursuant to IRCP 12(B)(8) is improper, as there are no longer 
two pending actions. 
As Hawley Troxell recognizes, "[a]batement is the power of the trial court to dismiss or stay an 
action where is similar action is a]ready proceeding in another forum. The policy behind such a 
defense is to prevent concurrent litigation of the same issue in different Courts." Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities, p. 5 ( emphasis added). As is evident from Hawley Troxell' s 
statement, for abatement to be proper, there must be two pending cases. Cases discussing 
abatement similarly require two pending actions for abatement. See, e.g., Diet Center, Inc. v. 
Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 237 (1999) ("since 
there is no pending litigation involving the same parties and issues, this Court vacates the order 
dismissing the action"). In Diet Center, a case repeatedly relied-upon by Hawley Troxell, the 
Idaho District Court declined to hear the matter pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(8) due to another action 
then pending in California, a decision upheld on appeal. Diet Center, Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho 
20, 22-23 (Ct. App. 1994). The factual scenario presented by Diet Center, where two actions 
concerning the same issue were concurrently litigated, is the axiomatic time for the use of the 
doctrine of abatement. Indeed, the presence of another cun-ently pending case has been a 
requirement for the invocation of the defense of abatement for nearly a century. Sanderson v. 
Salmon River Canal Co., 34 Idaho 145, 162 (1921) ("As a fourth affirmative defense defendant 
contends that there is another action pending in the federal court involving the same parties and 
the same issues as the present action. This tenders a proper issue in abatement."). 
Abatement is improper in the instant action. As detailed above, abatement requires two 
pending cases. Hawley Troxell has identified the Adversary Proceeding as the second pending 
action. However, on May 20, 2015, the Adversary Proceeding was rendered moot and the 
14-Ju. l-2015 :15 Frantz 
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is admittedly now only 
one proceeding, the case sub judice. The fact that there are not two pending cases leaves the 
request for abatement moot since, as admitted by Hawley TroxeH and confirmed by the relevant 
caselaw, two pending cases are required. 
b. Res judicata does not apply. 
Although not explicitly argued by Hawley Troxell, Hawley Troxell 's brief mixes elements of 
abatement with that of preclusion. The doctrines are related, with one of the tests that determine 
whether abatement is proper being "whether the other case has gone to judgment," in which case 
claim and issue preclusion may bar further litigation. Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437 (1999). 
Claim and issue preclusion are both inapplicable, as both doctrines require a final 
judgment. Hawley Troxell appears to admit as much, noting that the Adversary Proceeding has 
not proceeded to judgment at the time it filed its Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
Subsequent to the filing of its Memorandum, the Adversary Proceeding was rendered moot and 
terminated. Therefore, not only was there never a final judgment, but there will never be such a 
final judgment. A final judgment is required for both issue preclusion and claim preclusion. 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124 (2007) (issue preclusion requires "a final 
judgment in the merits in the prior litigation"); Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68 
(1994) ( claim preclusion requires a "final judgment" in order to be applied). In determining 
whether an order is final in a bankruptcy proceeding for purposes of preclusion, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has cited the Ninth Circuit's definition of finality in a banbuptcy proceeding. 
Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68 (1994). This incorporated definition is '"one that 
'ends litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but [ execute the] judgment.'" 
p.8 
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Idaho 
1989)) (fu..rt:her~U-LU~A and emphasis added). 
Here, it is evident from the order itself that there was no end to the litigation on the merits. 
Rather, as the court stated, the Adversary proceeding was rendered moot, with the trial date 
vacated. As there is no final judgment on the merits, and never will be one, claim and issue 
preclusion do not apply. 
Moreover, ever if there was a final judgment, the difference between a motion for 
disqualification and an action for 1egal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty would preclude 
the issue of preclusion from being raised. Hawley Troxell avoids this issue by solely claiming 
that the issue in both cases is whether there is an attorney-client relationship. However, this 
disregards the differences between the issues raised in the proceedings. Rule 1.9 of the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct, discussing conflicts of interest, applies to former clients. In 
deciding whether disqualification is proper, the moving party bears the burden of establishing the 
reasons for disqualification and the court conducts a multifaceted analysis that encompasses a 
variety of issues, including the timing of the motion and prejudice to the non-moving party. See 
Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 697-98 (1991). A legal malpractice claim requires that an 
attorney owe a duty to the Plaintiff, a different requirement than the "former client" of Rule 1. 9 
that encompasses a broader category of individuals. See, e.g., Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 90 P.3d 
884 (2004) (duty to testamentary beneficiaries); Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323 (2014) (duty to 
recipient of opinion letter). Therefore, the issue raised in the Adversary Proceeding, although 
similar, is legally distinct and would not have any preclusive effect However, as there was not 
final judgment, this analysis is unnecessary as preclusion is facially improper. 
p 9 
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Ill. Conclusion 
this case to IRCP 
threshold matter, abatement requires two concurrently pending cases. While there were two 
different cases at the time the Memorandum of Points and Authorities was filed, the Adversary 
Proceeding was terminated as moot. There are no longer two proceedings, and abatement is 
improper. Next, issue and claim precJusion are also inapplicable, as there was never a final 
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation. As a fina1 judgment on the merits is a necessary 
element of both claim and issue preclusion, and the Adversary Proceeding was tenninated as 
moot, there can be no preclusion. Hawley Troxell' s Motion must therefore be denied. 
DATED THIS 14th day of July, 2015. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
By: __ Isl ___ _ 
Jonathon Frantz 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 141h day of July, 2015, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of this document upon: 
John C. Riseborough 
via fax at: 509-838-0007 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
p. 
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STATE OF IDAHO }ss 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI /'\', 
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Post Falls, Idaho 83815 
Ph: 208-262-3893 
Fax: 208-262-3894 
Email: jonathon@cdalegal.com 
ISB No. 9129 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Case No.:CVlS-1406 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
DECLARATION OF JONATHON 
FRANTZ IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE 
TO HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & 
HAWLEY, LLP' S MOTION TO 
DISMISS OR ABATE (l.R.C.P. 12(B)(8)) 
Defendant. 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the following is true to the best of 
my knowledge: 
L I am over the age of eighteen and competent to testify to the matters herein. 
2. I am an attorney licensed to practice in Idaho before the state courts, US federal court for 
the district of Idaho, and the Idaho District BanlrJUptcy Court. 
3. I represent Martin Frantz and Cynthia Frantz in Idaho Bankruptcy Case No. 13-07024-
TLM Adversary Proceeding. 
4. Idaho Bankruptcy Case No. 13-07024-TLM Adversary Proceeding was dismissed by 
Judge Meyers as moot on or about May 20, 2015 and the trial was vacated. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the dockei entry (Dkt. 116) that 
was posted in the case by Judge Meyers' clerk, Mel Battle. 
14-Jul-2015 12.12 Frantz L TtC +12082623894 
By: __ 
Jonathon Frantz 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 141.h day of July, 2015, I caused to be served a tme and correct 
copy of this document upon: 
John C. Riseborough 
via fax at: 509-838-0007 
/s/ Jonathon Frantz 
p.3 
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ecf@id.uscourts.gov <ecf@id.uscourts.gov> 
To: CourtMail@idb.uscourts.gov 
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Wed, May 20, 2015 at 9:37 AM 
***NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS*** Judicial Conference of the United States policy permits 
attorneys of record and parties in a case (including prose litigants) to receive one free electronic 
copy of all documents filed electronically, if receipt is required by law or directed by the filer. 
PACER access fees apply to all other users. To avoid later charges, download a copy of each 
document during this first viewing. However, if the referenced document is a transcript, the free 
copy and 30-page limit do not apply. 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
District of Idaho [LIVE] 
Notice of Electronic Filing 
The following transaction was received from Battle, Mel entered on 5/20/2015 at 10:37 AM MDT and filed 
on 5/20/2015 
Case Name: 
Case Number: 
Idaho Independent Bank v. Frantz et al 
13-07024-TLM 
Document Number: 116 
Docket Text: 
Hearing Held 
Appearances: Sheila Schwager and John Kurtz - Counsel for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank, 
Steve McCrea and Jonathon Frantz~ Counsel for Defendants Martin and Cynthia Frantz, Corey 
Quinn - Representing Chapter 7 Trustee 
Report of Proceedings: Trial Status Conference. Argument presented regarding the effects of the 
Approved Waiver of Discharge. The Court orally enters findings and conclusions. Due to the 
Approved Waiver of Discharge this Adversary Proceeding is rendered MOOT. The trial scheduled to 
commence on May 26, 2015 is hereby VACATED. 
(RE: related document(s)[1] Complaint filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank, [115] Notice of Hearing) 
(Battle, Mel) 
The following document(s) are associated with this transaction: 
13-07024-TLM Notice will be electronically mailed to: 
Jonathon Frantz on behalf of Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz 
Jonathon@cdalegal.com 
Jonathon Frantz on behalf of Defendant Martin D. Frantz 
Jonathon@cdalegal.com 
John F Kurtz, Jr on behalf of Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank 
p.4 
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Law Mail - 13-070 
ltC 
'Hearing Held (Other) 
Stephen Brian McCrea on behalf of Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz 
mccreaecf@cda.twcbc.com 
Stephen Brian McCrea on behalf of Defendant Martin D. Frantz 
mccreaecf@cda. twcbc. com 
Sheila Rae Schwager on behalf of Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank 
sschwager@hawteytroxell.com, cdavenport@hawleytroxell.com 
13-07024sTLM Notice will net be electrcnically mailed to: 
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JOHN RJSEBOROUOH, 
PAINE HAMBLEN 
7 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201~3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
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Attorney for Defenda11t Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, Thi AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CVIS-1406 
) 
) RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT RE PRO 
) HACVICE OBJECTION 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW defendant, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") and 
in compliance with the Court's ruiing of June 30, 2015, submits the following in response to 
plaintiffs contention that the proposed admittee, Jeffrey Katz, should be admitted pro hac vice 
for this action. 
Defendant objected to the Motio11 for Pro Hae Vice Admission due to substantial 
questions as to whether the proposed admittee (a) understood the rules as applied in Idaho courts, 
and/or (b) could be expected to follow them. Plaintiffs recent filing suggests a position that 
technical interpretations beyond the spirit, not the letter, of those rules excuse his ex parte 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT RE PRO HAC VICE 
OBJECTION - 1 
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a to likely that 
current lawsuit is a subterfuge and a sham, whose primary is not to correct a conflict 
of interest, but to obtain a source of funding to satisfy Mr. Katz's $6 million indebtedness to 
Idaho Independent Bank. The Court should deny admittance pro hac vice to Mr. Katz. 
PLAINTIFF'S CITATION OF AUTHORITY 
Plaintiff attempts to persuade the Court it lacks any discretion to refuse admission to an 
attorney seeking pro hac vice status unless it can be demonstrated that the counsel is subject to 
disbannent. However the cases cited by counsel are either inapplicable, or ate contrary .to Idaho 
practice. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are the two cases Mr. Frantz cites. The first, Sanders v. 
Russell, does not state any hard and fast rule regarding when a federal district court should, let 
alone must, allow counsel to be admitted pro hac vice. That case regards the interpretation of a 
Mississippi rule which, as applied, operated to unduly restrict litigant's choice of counsel in civil 
rights litigation. ''The issue is whether the petitioners had a federal right to retain counsel of their 
choice in non-fee generating school segregation and civil rights cases in federal court." Sanders, 
401 F.2d 241 at 244. The Court specifically notes, "This case does not involve the right ta 
practice in state courts.') Indeed, in reading the Sanders case, one wonders why counsel cited it at 
all. 
The second case is Schlumberger Technologies v. Wylie. Plaintiff cites this case as 
applying the same rule as Sanders. This case clearly applies only as a standard for a Federal 
District Court in the Eleventh Circuit to apply in determining admission pro hac vice. The case 
turns on the Eleventh Circuit's view that a trial court lacks discretion in arriving at a 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT RE PRO HAC VICE 
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admission. any is nothing practice 
or on 
have broad discretion concerning such 
MR. KATZ AS A WITNESS 
At the hearing in this matter, the judge requested briefing on how Mr. Katz could 
represent Mr. Frantz and still be a witness in the case. Rather than addressing the circumstances 
under which an attorney might act as a witness in a case where he represents a party, Frantz 
baldly asserts that Katz will not be a witness, attempting to moot the issue. 1n that regard, IRPC 
Rule 3. 7 provides: 
Lawyer a.s Witness. 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the 
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: 
(i) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(ii) The testimony relates to the nature and value of 
legal service rendered in the case; or 
(iii) Disqualification of the lawyer works substantial 
hardship on the client. 
Plaintiff does not contend that a:11y of the exceptions to that rule apply and recognizes that 
Mr. Katz could not act as a witness. Rather, plaintiff asserts that there is no reason for Mr. Katz 
to be a witness. Plaintiff is likely mistaken in that regard. 
As the Court is aware, plaintiffs claim is that Merlyn Clark, in acting as an expert 
witness, somehow became Mr. Frantz's attorney in a malpractice action he brought against the 
Witherspoon Kelley firm in 2008. There is simply no evidence, other than Mr. Frantz's 
testimony to his subjective belief, that any such relationship was formed. Additionally, 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT RE PRO HAC VlCE 
OBJECTION - 3 
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was an 
Mr. 
Owens. In assessing the credibility of that subjective beliet: the finder of fact is entitled to 
consider Mr. Frantz's motivation in bringing the suit, and hls efforts to gain Idaho Independent 
Bank as an ally in that endeavor. 
Although not a model of clarity, Plaintiffs Complaint appears to be seeking damages 
from Hawley Troxell for his inability ''to discharge IIB's claim against him in the bankruptcy 
action, including the adversary proceeding .... " (See 144, p.8, Plaintjffs Complaint and Jury 
Demand.) 
Mr. Frantz remains embroiled in that bankruptcy proceeding filed in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho. 1 The principal indebtedness in that bankruptcy is a 
debt Frantz personally guaranteed to Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB") in the sum of 
approximately $6 million. As the email from Mr. Katz. to Mr. Gustave!, IIB's CEO reveals, the 
purpose of this suit against Hawley Troxell is to find a source of fonding which would relieve 
, Mr. Frantz of his substantial financial obligation to IIB. Exhibit A to Affidavit of Jack Gustave!. 
This purpose is confirmed by the proposal recently made by Mr. Frantz to Mr. Gustavel. 
Exhibit B to Affidavit of Jack Gustave!. It is the defense's position that it is this motive, and not 
a genuine subjective belief by Mr. Frantz that Mr. Clark acted as his attorney, that generated this 
lawsuit. 
1 Frantz's counsel is mistaken in advising the Court that the bankruptcy action, including the adversary proceeding 
filed by Tdaho lndependent Bank., has been dismissed. No dismissal has been entered and, as seen by the Affidavit 
of Sheiia Schwager and the Court's docket (Exhibit B), there are two substantial matters still pending 
detennination by the Bankruptcy Court before the adversary proceoding is dismissed. 
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basis and reasoning behind his contact, and what financial benefit he had mind as 
suggested in that message. As the Court observes, this forms a solid basis for refusing Mr. Katz's 
admission pro hac vice for this action. 
THE ''IT DIDN'T HAPPEN HERE" EXCUSE 
Plaintiff again contends that because Mr. Katz was representing ML. Frantz in this state 
court action, his contact with IIB ex parte while realizing that JIB was represented by Hawley 
Troxwell in the bankruptcy action is excusable. This even though he knew the purpose of that 
call was to ask IIB to agree to accept payment of Frantz's indebtedness being litigated in the 
bankruptcy action in lieu of that bankruptc~ proceeding. His excuse is "Well, that was in another 
action." 
Mr. Katz's actions clearly violate the spirit of the mle. The Court should ask itself, "Why 
do we have such a rule'?" Besides the unseemliness of such conduct, the law recognizes that Jay 
persons are at a substantial disadvantage in dealing with attorneys. Mr. Katz was clearly seeking 
to influence the action being pursued by IIB in the bankruptcy through its counsel Hawley 
Troxell, or to undermine IIB's confidence in its counsel. Contending that this Court should 
ignore that conduct because it happened in another action in another jurisdiction should be 
rejected. Pointedly, plaintiffs current counsel has not cited any Bar Opinion, or legal authority 
support such conduct as permissible. 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT RE PRO HAC VlCE 
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to 
his position as counsel for Mr. Frantz while submitting an evidentiary declaration for the 
Court (who would be the finder of fact) to consider, is a "no harm, no foul" argument. According 
to counsel and Mr. Katz, it is perfectly all right for him, as an officer of the Court, to hide his 
bias and the factors which could affect his credibility from a court that he knows will be acting as 
finder of fact in considering the evidentiary materials he is submitting. Plaintiff's response is: 
"Well, the judge didn't allow expert testimony." That response, as with plaintiffs prior 
responses, underscores counsel's lackadaisical attitude towards this Court's rules. 
Finally, on the related issue of the purpose of the Disqualification Motion, plaintiff 
submits no evidence. 
Plaintiffs response to the e-mail of Mr. Frantz is to denigrate the allegation, rather than 
rebut it. Counsel calls the allegation that the Motion to Disqualify was a subterfuge as 
"laughable," as well as "outlandish" and "unfounded." Plaintiff fails to submit any evidence, 
however, that the Motion to Disqualify was a proper motion brought for a proper purpose. 2 
Plaintiff's new contention is that the Motion was brought, "so they couldn't say we failed to 
mitigate." Whether that's creative after-the-fact thinking by counse) or the actual purpose behind 
the motion is really irrelevant to the Court's determination. 
There is the matter of the Declaration of Jeffrey Katz. At the time of the hearing in this 
matter, Frantz' s current counsel insisted that Mr. Katz wanted very badly to respond to the 
allegations. However, rather than recognizing the questionable nature of his conduct or 
2 Indeed plaintiff's counsel has not submitted anything which could be properly considered as evidence by this 
Court. Plaintiff submitted two "Declarations," neither of which are sworn. 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT RE PRO HAC VICE 
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action, none of 
provided under oath) contains the same erroneous assettions that by Jonathon Frantz, i.e., that 
the adversary proceeding has been dismissed for mootness. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff fails to excuse the complained of conduct. Further, the defense intends to assert 
as part of its defense that this suit is a device created solely for the purposes of seeking to relieve 
Mr. Frantz of his indebtedness to Idaho Independent Bank. The defense intends to challenge 
Mr. Frantz's credibility as to his subjective beJief that an attorney-client relationship existed by 
demonstrating his delay in expressing that beJief, the timing of his complaint, and he and his 
counsel's effort to engage IIB in a judgment sharing agreement to extinguish Frantz' s substanti.al 
indebtedness to that bank. This evidence will likewise :rebut Mr. Frantz's excuse for waiting to 
make the claim that Mr. Clark was his attorney until the eve of his bankruptcy t1ial for fraud. 
(Mr. Frantz's testimony is that he either forgot, or didn't think of it until then.) Mr. Katz clearly 
has relevant testimony in that regard and will likely become a witness in this action. 
For the reasons stated, the Court should decline to adroit Mr. Katz for the purposes of this 
action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUB:MITTED this A CJ day of July, 2015. 
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of Appeals Fifth ""'" , .... u. 
V. 
Honorable Dan M. RUSSELL, Judge, United 
States District Court for the Southern 
District of Mississippi, Respondent. 
Joan ANDERSON et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
Honorable William Harold COX, Judge, 
United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Mississippi, Respondent. 
Nos. 25797, 25815. Sept 18, 1968. 
Petitions for mits of mandamus from the United States 
DiStrict Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Dan 
M. Russell, Jr., J., and William Harold Cox, Chief Judge, 
to determine validity of District Court ru1e. The Court of 
Appeals, Dyer, Circuit Judge, held that District Court rule 
permitting pro hac vice appearance by out-of-state anorneys 
in nonfee generating civil rights cases only if attorney is 
nonresident, in only one case in any 12~Month period, and 
only if attorney has been admitted to state bar for at least 5 
years unless federal district cow1 of his home state admits 
Mississippi attorneys under more lenient rule contravened 
Congressional intent as embodied in civil rights acts, imposed 
unreasonable limits and was invalid. 
Writs granted. 
West Headnotes (15) 
[l] Fede:ral Courcs 
.., Particular cases, contexts, and questions 
Court of Appeals had supervisory power to grant 
writ of mandamus to prohibit district court from 
enforcing rule which had effect of precluding 
nonresident attorneys from appearing in civil 
rights cases under specified circumstances. 28 
U.S.CA §§ 2071, 2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
rule 83, 28 U.S.C.A. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
l'!\A nv, l U ! 1 
f2) 
to retain 
counsel !:heir choice who are attorneys in 
good .standing and are associated with locally-
admitted counsel in nonfee generating school 
desegregation and civil rights cases in federal 
courts were not precluded, by limitation to 
nonfee generating cases, from seeking attorney's 
fees in appropriate cases. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, §§ 204(b), 706(k), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-
3(b), 2000e-5(k), 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
(3) Attorney !\nd Client 
e= Rules of coUrt 
Attorney and Client 
€1=> Jurisdiction to admit 
Federal district courts ha'Ve broad discretion 
in prescribing requirements for admission to 
practice before them in most cases, but their rules 
must be consistent with acts of Congress. 28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1654, 2071. 
l Cases that cite this headnote 
(4] Attorney and Client 
.,_ Rules of court 
Federal district courts have valid interest in 
regulating qualifications and conduct of counsel, 
their availability for service of court papers, and 
their amenability to disciplinary proceedings. 28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 2071, 2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
rule 83, 28 U.S.C.A. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[5J Attorney and Client 
..., Rules of court 
Federal district court rules regulating 
qualifications and conduct of counsel ,nust be 
designed to preserve and protect decorum and 
dignity of profession. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071, 
2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28 U.S,C,A 
JUL/ lU/ lU l ::l/ !VIVI~ UL: U I rlVl 
attorney 
Trial court cannot substitute its judgment for that 
of litigant u1 choice or number of counsel that 
litigant may feel is required to properly represent 
:his interests. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
[71 Attorney and Client 
$:;, Jurisdiction of Courts 
Federal district court is free to Md should take 
measures against unethical conduct by attorneys 
if and when it occurs in connection with any 
proceeding pending before it. 
9 Cases that cite this headnote 
(81 Attorney and Clieut 
$;> Admission of practitioners .in different 
jurisdiction 
Federal courts cannot be used to serve local 
interest in assuring dues paying support of 
local bar association by limiting pro hac vice 
appearance of out-of-state aLtomeys in 11011fee 
generating civil rights cases. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 
2071, 2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28 
U.S.C.A 
11 Cases that cite this headnote 
(9] Civil Rights 
.,. Appointment of Counsel 
ln nonfee generating civil rights cases, only 
reasonable limits can be placed on federal 
litjgant's choice of counsel. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071, 
2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28 U.S.C.A. 
l Cases that cite this headnote 
[10} Attorney and Client 
~ Admission of practitioners in different 
jurisdiction 
~AA NO. Y. Ul L 
Di.strict court rule pennitting pro hac vice 
appearance by out-of-state attorneys in nonfee 
rights cases if ,,,.,.,,,r,.,~,., 
vw•~·~"·· in one case in 
month and has been 
ad.mined to state bar for at least 5 years unless 
federal district coui-t of his home state admits 
Mississippi attorneys under more lenient rule 
contravened Congressional mtent as embodied 
in civil rights acts, imposed unreasonable limits 
and was invalid. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071, 2072; 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28 U.S.C.A 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
[111 Attorney and Client 
i= Admission of practitioners· in different 
jurisdiction 
Federal district court rnay refuse to admit lawyer, 
otherwise qualified, on showing that in any legal 
matter, whether before the particular district 
court or in another jurisdiction. he has been 
guilty of unethical conduct of such nature as to 
justify disbarment of lawyer admitted generally 
to bar of the court. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071, 2072; 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28 U.S.C.A. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
(12] Atl"orney ind Client 
ea Admission of practitioners in different 
jurisdiction 
Privilege of pro hac vice appearance is available 
to out-of-state attorney whether he comes into 
tlle district on the day of appearance or whether 
he resides in the state on a 11onpermanej1t basis, 
so long as local counsel, generally admitted to 
district court's bar, is associated. 28 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 2071, 2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28 
U.S.C.A. 
15 Cases that cite this headnote 
(131 Attorney and Client 
.., Admission of practitioners in different 
jurisdiction 
Association of out-of-state attomey with local 
counsel admitted to district court's bar satisfies 
JVL/LU/LUl'.J/!VlVI~ UL:ur rm 
reasonable interest district court in having 
of its bar professionally responsible for 
§§ 2071, 
that headnote 
l14] CivilRights 
""" Criminal law e11forcement; prisons 
Bvidence established that plaintiff who had 
brought series of suits under Civil ru ghts Act was 
engaged in patently vindictive scheme to harass 
law enforcement officials and was not entitled 
to court appojntment of counsel. 28 U.S.CA § 
1915(d); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[l5J Civil Rights 
.., Appoit1tment of Counsel 
Court may decline to appoint counsel for 
indigent plaintiffs in order to protect defendants 
from malicious suits under Civil Rights Act. 28 
U.S.C.A § 1915(d); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
Cases that cite th.is headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*242 Jonathan Shapiro, Jackson, Miss., John H. Schafer, 
Washington, D.C., for James E. Sanders. 
R L. Goza, Canton. Miss., William A. Allain. Jackson, Miss., 
John C. Satterfield, Yazoo City, Miss .• for Judge Dan M. 
Russell, 
Melvyn Zarr, Jack Greenberg, New York City, Anthony 
G. Amsterdam, Philadelphia. Pa., Paul Brest and Marian 
E. Wright, Jac.kso11, Miss., William T. Coleman. Jr., 
Philadelphia, Pa., for Joan Anderson and others, 
Jol111 C. Sattel"field, Yazoo City, Miss., for Judge William 
Harold Cox. 
Erskine W. Wells, Jackson Miss., for intervenor Miss. State 
Bar. 
r. u lj 
Opinion 
DYER, Circuit Judge: 
We are called upon in these mandamus proceedings to 
determine the validity of the rule of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi limiting the 
pro hac vice appearance of out of state attorneys as applied 
in non-fee generating ci\>il rights cases. T.t\at rule, which 
was promulgated on September 26, 1967, 1 imposes three 
limitations upon such appearances: 
( 1) A pro hac vice appearance by an attorney is permitted only 
if he is a nonresident of the State of Mississippi; 
(2) A pro hac vice appearance by an attomey is permitted i.11 
only one case in any twelve month period and; 
*243 (3) A pro bac vice appearance by an attorney can be 
made only if he has been admitted to a state bar for at least 
five years, unless the federal district court of his home state 
admits Mississippi attorneys under a more lenient rule, in 
which event the more lenient rule applies. 2 
The Rule as to Nonresident Attorneys was applied to 
refuse admission pro hac vice in the District Court to 
Lawtet1ce Aschenbrenner, a.11 attorney employed full time 
by the Lawyers' Committee for Ci.Vil Rights Under Law, 
in a damage sttlt under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, because he 
had already appeared in one other case in the District 
Court within the preceding twelve months. Jonathan Shapiro, 
another Lawyers' Committee Attorney, was also prevented, 
by application of the Rule, from appearing pro hac vice in 
a similar suit,. and Paul am:J Iris Brest, attorneys employed 
by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund were 
prevented from appearing pro hac vice in seven school 
desegregation suits. The applications of the latter three 
attorneys were denied bacause they were not 'nonresident 
attorneys.' The Rule, as interpreted by the respondent Judges 
and by the Jackson Division Attorneys' Comity Committee, 3 
makes the pro hac vice privilege unavailable to attorneys 
tempor8rily residing in Mississippi, and those three attorneys 
had been resid:u1g in Mississippi for limited periods while 
working for their respective civil rights organizations. 
uVJ.;/ L.V/ L.VJJ/JY!Vl1 UL,UO f!Vl 
At the outset the respondents assert that this Court 
run.sCllcticm to entertai11 the petitions 
no supervisory power to question rules 
not with, 
States Supreme Court, 4 *244 and in any event mandamus is 
not the proper remedy. These argunients are patently without 
merjt. It and as we later make clear there is no if, the Rule 
is not 'consistent vvith Acts of Congress' because it has the 
effect of precluding nonresident attorneys from appearing 
in civil rights cases under the circumstances here shown, 
there is no doubt of our supervisory power by the grant 
of a writ of mandamus to prohiM the District Court from 
enforcing i.ts rtile, As the S'Upreme Court said in La Buy 
v. Howes Leather Co., 1957, 352 U.S. 249, 2:59-260, 77 
S.Ct. 309, 315, l L.Ed.2d 290: 'We believe that supervisory 
control of the District Cotuts by the Courts of Appeals is 
necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal 
system. The AJl Writs Act confers on the Courts of Appeals 
the discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in the 
exceptional circumstances existing here.' 'While sounding the 
usual caveat that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to 
be used under exceptional circumstances lest it become a 
substitute for an appeal or interlocutory appeal, we echoed in 
In re Watkins, 5 Cir. 1959, 271 F.2d 771, 76 A.L.R.2d 1113, 
what had been said in La Buy and granted the writ, finding 
that the 'procedure (of referring the case to a special master) 
nullifies the right to an effective trial before a constitutional 
court.' Id. at 775. Finally, in considering the requirement of a 
local rule providing inter ali.a for the signature by a member 
of the bar of the Southern District of Mississippi on a removal 
petition under the Civil Rights Act, we said in a mandamus 
proceeding that 'such rules may not be allowed i:o operate in 
such a way as to a.bridge the right of any class of litigants to 
use the federal courts or to deny the Sixth Amendme11t right 
of criminal defendants to counsel of their own choice.' Lefton 
v. City of Hattiesburg, 5 Cir, 1964, 333 F.2d 280,285; see 
also Alexander v. Cox, 5 Cir. 1965, 348 F.2d 894. 
Substantial allegations were made in the petitions that the 
Rule affected fundamental rights and that its adoption was 
beyond the authority of the District Court We do not doubt 
our power to grant the writ,. nor that sound discretion dictates 
that the writ be granted. 
(2] 'I\un.ing to the Rule itself, the issue is a narrow one. 
A summary of what is and what is not involved in this case 
will put the question before us in better focus. The petitioners' 
position. is simply that they have a federal right to retain 
Frantz vs Hawley 
Pf\A HU, r. u 1 'l: 
counsel of their choice who are anomeys in good standing at 
their bars and are locally-admitted 
COUJ.1Sel ii1110,1-fee generating school desegregation and 
rights cases in federal court. 5 
the right of non to case does not 
involve the right to practice in state courts. This case does 
not involve the right to general admission to a federal district 
cou1t. This case does not involve the right of attorneys to 
be adtnined pro hac vice without association with locally 
admitted counsel This case does not involve fee-generating 
cases. This case does involve the need for :free legal services in 
civil rii;hts cases. Out of twenty- "'245 two hundred lawyers 
in Mississippi, only twelve are negroes. Of course, all twelve 
are not always available. This is obviously an inadequate 
reservoir. Moreover, there is ample evidence in the record 
to demonstrate the burdens of counsel handling such cases, 
see Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 
Harv.L.Rev. 1711, 1722 (1967), as well as the petitioners' 
inability to obtain representation, which, parenthetically, is 
borne out by literally hundreds of civil rights cases that hav-e 
come to us in which out of state lawyers have had the laboring 
oar. lt is no overstatement that in Mississippi and the South 
generally 11egroes with civil rights claims or defenses have 
often found securing representation difficult. Lefton v. City 
of Hattiesburg, supra. As the Supreme Court pointed out in 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,443, 83 S.Ct. 328,343, 
9 L.Ed.2d 405, 
Lawsuits attacking racial discrimination, at least in Virginia, 
are neith.er very profitable nor very popular. They are not an 
object of general competition among Virginia lawyers; the 
problem is rather one of an apparent dearth of lawyers who 
are willi11g to lin.dertake such litigation. (Footnote omitted.) 
On the showing made in this case the ci-vil rights climate 
in Mississippi is not unlike that of Virginia. Furthermore, 
in damage cases brought by negro plaintiffs against white 
defendants, the slight chance of contingent fee recovery does 
not suggest that economic benefits are or will be such as to 
outweigh, for appreciable numbers of Mississippi lawyers, 
their reluctance to become identified wtth the negro civil 
rights effort. Under these circumstances it is imperative that a 
local rule not be applied in such a way as to abridge the right 
of civil rights litigants to use the federal court. 
(3) As we said in limine, the district courts have broad 
discretion in. prescribing requirements for admission to 
practice before them in most cases, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1654, but 
their rules must 'be consistent with Acts of Congress; 28 
§ 2071. 
.JVJ.,/ V/l.VlJ/lllVH V ,VQ rm 
omecttid the 
1,,;u1.am,ui:11.1uu of federal law, common 
and state law as will best 'adapted to the 
the civil rights laws. Rev.Stat. § 722 (1875), applying 
to Title XIII, Rev.Stat.; 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see 28 U.S.C. § 
1443, formerly Rev.Stat.§ 641 (187.S); 42 US.C.A. § 1988 
note. Therefore, a federal court is required to use common 
law powers to facilitate, and not to hinder, 'proceedings in 
vindication of civil rights.' 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
Lefton v. City of Haniesbu.rg, supra, 333 F.2d at 284~ 
accord, Brown v. City of Meridian, S Cir. 1966, 356 F.2d 
602, 605. The Rule as here applied clearly contravenes the 
Congressional intent as embodied in the civil rights acts. 
[4] [SJ We recognize that the District Court has a 
valid interest i11 regulating the qualifications and conduct 
of counsel, their availability for service of court papers, 
and their amenability to discipli.nary proceedings. See Note, 
Constitutional Right to Ei,gage An Out-of-State Attorney, 19 
Stan.L.Rev. 8.56, 866 (1967). But the assertion of the District 
Court's regulatory interest cannot justify a rule that limits the 
number of pro nae vice appearances, whether it be to one 
case a year or three cases a year. The respondents coITectly 
state that the rules of the trial court must be 'designed to 
preserve and protect decorum and the dignity of an honored 
profession.' 6 It is difficult *246 to see how the concern 
of the District Court in decorum, digi:ity, compete1,cy, good 
character or amenability to service and discipline is served by 
a numerical limitation. 
Nor can we find any valid basis for denying the p;ivilege of 
pro hac vice appearances in civil rights litigation to out-of. 
state anomeys who reside in the state on a temporary basis. 
This is particularly true here where the residence requirement 
of the state bar is such as to prevent them from qualifying for 
admission to t1,e bar of the District Court for a long period 
of time. 
No reason has been suggested and we know of none why 
admission for five years should be a pre-requisite for a pro had 
vice appearance in civil rights cases. This provision has no 
para! lei in the rules of other courts, it does not require practice 
but orily admission for five years, and .it is not requjred 
for general admission to the bar of the Southern District of 
Mississippi. Rule l, Rule Regulating Admission of Attomyes, 
July 10, 1962. It thus cannot be said to serve the purpose of 
insuring a certain level of competence in representation. 
Frantz 
r. u !:) 
whatever its source, that 
choice m 
rights litigation cannot be sustained. 
(6) Apart from the Rule (the rule does not attempt to 
prohibit pro hac vjce admission simply because the court may 
determine that certain lawyer's participation in a given case 
is unnecessary), lack of necessity- in the judge's view-
simply is not and cannot be a proper basis for exclusion in 
these cases. The trial court cannot substitute its judgment for 
that of the litigant in the choice or number of counsel that the 
litigant may feel is required to properly represent his interests. 
Amicus Curiae, the Mississippi State Bar, arguing in support 
of the Rnle, points our that It has a vital interest in the ethical 
conduct of lawyers and the disciplinary action to be taken 
in the event of misconduct. 7 The State has basically three 
interests that need to be given cotisideration. The interest in 
maintaining high levels of professio11al ethics, the financial 
or economic interests of the members of the Mississippi bar, 
and the interest in assuring a high quality of representation. 
[7] We can envisage no difficulty in maintaining standards 
of professional ethics, The pro hac vice admissio11 is to 
the fedetal not state cot1It. The federal court is free to and 
should take measures against ui1er:hical conduct if and when 
it occurs jn com1ection with any proceeding pet,du1g before 
it. Necessary sanctions may be imposed not only directly, 
but through the bar of which the pro hac vice lav.,yer is a 
member, as well as through the local lawyer with whom be is 
associated. Non-resident lawyers who stay for any significant 
period of time, as bas been the pattern with those employed by 
the various civil rights organizations, and who do not confine 
their practice within the limits prescribed by their pro hac Vice 
admission are subject to appropriate action by the State of 
Mississippi for unauthorized practice oflaw. Miss.Code Ann. 
§ 86&2 (1942). 
[8] The financial or econo:mic interest of the members of 
the Mississippi bar are not snbstantially affected. True, the 
local bar association will not receive dues paying support, 
but the federal courts cannot be used to serve such a local 
interest. Al1d si11ce we are here concerned with free legal 
services in the represe11tation of civil rights litigants, this is 
not ·a commercializatio11 of the legal profession which might 
threaten the moral and ethical fabric of the admiili.stration of 
justice.' *247 Brotherhood ofRailroad Trainmen v. Virginia 
u V '-'I L-\JI LV l J/1V!Ul~ UL., UO f !Vl 
Virginaia State Bar, 
L£d.2d 
377 l, 6, 84 S.Ct 11 
a 
civil rights cases is to be expected. His admission to a state 
bar is a basic determinant both of the attorney's professional 
qualification and good moral character because the state bar 
is the standard-setting body that .initially investigates and 
actively takes steps to insure that the canons of professional 
ethics are obser11ed, This is borne out by the fact that in 
most federal district courts in the United States, including the 
Southern. District of Mississippi, membership in the state bar 
is sufficient qualification for general admissfo11 to the district 
court bar. Association with a local lawyer gives the non-
resident lawyer a source of knowledge about local rules and 
procedures and their proper application to the case at hand. 
Moreover, in the context of civil rights litigation, an out-of-
state la-wyer :frequently develops an expertise because of his 
specialization in this field. 
rnA 1~0. r. UlO 
This cal1l.'lot be accomplished when, as so often happens in 
this district, different at various stages of 
the proceedings, with little or no knowledge of what has 
theretofore trru1spired io the case, Delays resulting from such 
unpreparedness necessarily encroach upon valuable judicial 
time. 9 Reasonable conditions may be imposed to insure 
that the same counsel will continue in the case until it is 
concluded to insure against delays and other administrative 
inefflci encies that are inherent in the rotation of counsel and 
to avoid the necessity of ccmtinuances because of substitution 
of counsel. The District Court may refuse to admit a lawyer, 
otherwise qualified, on a showing that in any legal matter, 
whether before the particular district court o:r in another 
jurisdiction, he has been guilty of unethical conduct of sucn a 
nature as to j1.1stify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally 
"248 to the bar of the court. See In re Ruffalo, 1968, 390 
U.S. 544. 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117. The privilege 
of pro hac vice appearance in such cases is available to a 
lawyer wbether he comes in to the district on the day of 
appearance or whether he resides in the state:. on a non-
permaoent basis, so tong as local counsel, generally admitted 
In sum, bearing in mind what we have said about what this to the District Coutt's Bar, is associated. Such association 
case does a11d does not involve, we are unable to perceive satisfiesthereasonableinterestoftheDistrictCourtinhaving 
how the regulatory powers of either the District Court or the a member of its Bar, who is subject to the court's general 
MississippS State Bar over professiooaJ conduct can be or are control. be professionally responsible for the litigation and 
affected. 8 who can be served with papers, can be notified of hearings and 
(9] [10] [llJ [12) [l3} In these non-fee generatirt&.n be held accountable if anything reflecting on the Court 
civil rights cases it is clear that only reasonably limits can be or an abuse of its process occurs during the course of the 
placed on a federal litigant's choice of counsel, ai1d we find litigation. fa this rule there is no need for active participation 
that the limits here established by the 'Rule as to Nonresident in the conduct of the litigation by associated counsel. lO 
Attorneys' are not reasonable. In our view the District Court 
must grant pro hac vice admissions in such cases upon a 
showing that an individual lawyer is a member in good 
standing of the bar of some state, without limitation in terms 
of years of practice or admission. The District Court may not 
limit the number of appearances that the lawyer ca.11 make in 
such cases. This is not to say or even intimate that the District 
Court's control over its docket, pretrial procedures and triais 
js to be in anywise diminished. Jt is the responsibility of the 
District Court to keep its dockets current by the expeditious 
disposition of pretrial motions, hearil1gs and the trial of cases. 
Footnotes 
The District Court's Rule as to Nonresident Attorneys is 
invalid. 
Writs Granted, 
All Citations 
401 F.2d 241, 12 Fed.R,Serv,2d 1395 
1 Prior to September 26, 1967, pro hac vice admission to the District Court merely required that a member of the bar of 
that court move the admission of a non-resident attorney. 'Rule Regulating Admission of Attorneys,' July 10. 1962. 
2 RULE AS TO NONRESIDENT ATTORNEYS 
1. Any attorney admitted to practice in a state other than Mississippi and not qualified to practice in the courts of Mississippi 
may be permitted by this Court be comity to appear and participate in the particular case, when introduced to the Court 
with such recommendation by an attorney in good standing at the bar of lhls Court; but, no nonresident attorney shall be 
vs 
vV!.;/ VI VlJ/!YlVH Ul,UV !Jll r /\.A nu, l, IJ! I 
thus admitted by comity to appear In more than one case in any calendar year, or within the space of twelve months; and 
no such attorney shall be thus permitted to appear ln any case under this rule unless such has been admitted 
to practice for at least five years before !he Court of the state from which he she comes. unless be shown to this 
Court that the federal court of such state from which the attorney comes admits attorneys from Mississippi to practice by 
comity under a more favorable or relaxed in which even! such more relaxed rule will be applled by this Court 
No person not admitted to the bar of this Court, or expressly authorized by order of the Court to appear before the Court 
in any case shall participate in any manner or to any extent in any discovery proceeding for or as an attorney (or present 
any matter to the Court for an order}; or affix his name or permlt his name to be affixed to any motion or pleading in any 
case in this Court as attorney for any litigant; and any Infraction or violation of this rule or any part thereof will be treated 
and considered by the Court as a direct contempt in the presence of the Court and summarlly puntshed accordingly. 
3 On October 2. 1967. the District Court entered an order appointing an Attorneys' Committee for the Jackson Division to 
process applications of nonresident attorneys and to make findings and recommendations thereon. 
4 Respondents cite no case law in support of their argument and seemingly rely on the text of the rules themsleves: 28 
U.S.C .A.§ 2071, The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules 
for the conduct of their business, Such rules shall be consistent with Act of Congress and rules of practice and procedure 
prescribed by the Supreme Court: 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072. 'The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general 
rules, the forms of process, writs. pleadings. and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts and courts 
of appeals of the United States in civil actions. including admiralty and maritime cases, and appeals therein, and the 
practice and procedure in proceedings for the review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United 
States and for the judlclal review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers/ 
Rule 83, Fed.R.Civ.P .. 'Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to time make 
and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by 
any district court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United States. In all cases not 
provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.' 
5 The limitation to non-fee generating cases does not preclude petitioners from seeking attorney fees In appropriate cases. 
The award of attorney's fees pursuant to Titles II and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-3(b). 
2000e-5{k); Newman v. Piggie Park. Enterprises. Inc .. 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (U.S. March 18, 1968) 
rs not In conflict with a policy of refusing to accept fees from clients. 
6 Respondent's Response. p. 17, in Anderson v. Cox. We have been unalbe to find a scintilla of evidence in the entire 
record which would lead to an inference that there had been or will be any dimlnishment of decorum or dignity because 
of the pro hac vice admission of petitioners. 
7 There is no suggestion in the record or briefs.- Indeed none could have been made- that the integrity of any of the 
lawyers irwolVed In this Jitigatioh is in Question. 
8 Since we are not here concerned with the right of non-lawyers to practice law. the State Bar's reliance upon Hacldn v. 
Arizona et al .. 1967, 389 U.S. 143, 88 S.Ct. 325, 19 L.Ed.2d 347; Darby v. Mississippi State Board of Bar Admissions, 
Miss.1966, 165 So2d 6B4 is misplaced. likewise the right to practice in the state courts is not involved. See Theard 
v, United States, 1957, 354 U.S. 278, 77 $.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342. General admission to the District Court is not in 
issue, thus the State Bar's insistence upon Application of Wasserman, 9 Cir., 1956, 240 F.2d 213 is unavailing. Our 
Interpretation of Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp .• 2 Cir., 1966, 364 F.2d 161 is more Favorable to the petitioners than 
to respondent and we find Martin v. Walton. 1961, 368 U.S. 25, 82 S.Ct. 1, 7 L.Ed.2d 5, readily disinguishable on the facts. 
9 This problem Is acute and recurring. As many as four or more law;ers have initially signed pleadings and then in a rotating 
fashion have appeared at successive hearings. Not infrequently new counsel have been substituted for one or more of 
those lnltlally appearing. 
10 After this case was orally argued the District Court. on June 12. 1968, promulgated another rule requiring, inter alia, 
that 'every lavvyer who signs or permits his name to be listed as counsel. for either party in any case shall appear In 
person in that case, unless such counsel (and each counsel who appears) is released by an order of this Court entered 
on notice to the client. or approved by the client.' We think this rule Is overly broad and thus invalid as applled to non-
fee generating civil rights cases. We presume that it was promulgated by the District Court to eliminate the problem of 
successive counsel appearing at different stages in the proceedings. If so, it can no doubt be re-cast in the light of what 
we have heretofore said. 
End or Documant ~ 2015 Thomson Reuters, No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGIES, 
INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-
Counterclaim-Defendant-Appellant, 
V. 
G. Dan WILEY; Robe.i.'1:A. Fergusson; 
Donald Bahouth, Defendants-
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs-Appellees. 
Junes, 1997. 
The United States District Court for the Southein District 
of Alabama, No. 94-0118-AH-M, Alex 'T. Howard, Jr., J., 
denied attorney's pretrial application for admission pro hac 
vice, though not :fo1ding that attorney violated any specific 
ethical rules, and certified interlocutory appeal. The Court of 
Appeals, Birch, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) denial of pretrial 
pro hac vice admission required showing of unethical co11duct 
of such nature as to justify disbarment of lawyer admitted 
generally to the bar of the district court, and (2) Court of 
Appeals reviews district court's factual findings for clear enor 
and application of the Rules of Professional Conduct to the 
facts de novo, and does not apply abuse of discretion standard 
where conduct does not occur in front of the district court and 
is not of type to disrupt proceedings before the court. 
Vacated and remanded. 
West Headnotes (8) 
{l] Federal Courts 
~ Particular Actions and Rulings 
When district court certified for interlocutory 
appeal po1tion of its order denying admission pro 
hac vice of attorney, refusal to certify portio11 
of its order striking certain declarations did 
not place that portion of the order beyond the 
jurisdiction of the CoUrt of Appeals. 28 U,S,C.A. 
§ 1292(b). 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
r. U l 0 
~1-,,,.,,1,.,•n with hac vice 
admission of attorney a:nd its interpretation of 
that standard is subject to de novo review, and 
in reviewi11g district court's interpretation and 
appljcation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which involves mixed question of law a:nd fact, 
Court of Appeals does not defer to district court's 
dete1minations. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
[3] Federal Courts 
~ Counsel 
On appeal of denial of pro hac vice admission 
to no1weside11tattorney, Court of Appeals would 
review district cowt's factual findings for clear 
error and its application of Rules of Professional 
Conduct to the facts de novo, rather than 
applying abuse of discretion standard, even 
though attorney's conduct was related to the case 
at bar, where the conduct occmred before action 
was filed and not in front of the district court a11d 
was not of a type to disrupt proceedings before 
the comt, and where decision to deny admission 
turned on application of the relevant Rules. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
(4] Attorney and Client 
+- Admission of practitioners in different 
jurisdiction 
Denial of pro hac vice admission to applicant 
who is member in good standing of a state 
bar may not be denied except on showing of 
unethical conduct of such narore as to justify 
disbannent of lawyer generally admitted to the 
bar of the district court. 
11 Cases that cite this headnote 
[S} Attorney and Client 
~ Disqualification proceedings; standing 
Where district court's order disqualifying 
attorney is based on allegation· of ethical 
JV lU/ l:J/JYJVH Ul,U;:J flVl r. u l::, 
Schlumberger Technologies, .. ,,ey, 113 F.3d 1553 {1997) 
65 USLW 2618. 10 Fia_ L_ Weekiy t-ed. C 979 
violation, court may not simply rely on 
general :inherent power to admit and suspend 
attorneys, without any limit on such power, 
but instead must dearly identify specific Rule 
of Professional Conduct is applicable to 
the relevant jurisdiction and must conclude that 
the attorney violated that rule, which is a legal 
conclusion subject to foll appellate review 
23 Cases that cite this headnote 
[6] Attorney and Client 
'i= Disqualification proceedings; standing 
Standards governing disqualification of attorney 
already admitted to appear before the district 
court differ, depending on the circumstances; if 
condtlct at issue threatens disruption of court 
proceedings or there is deliberate challenge 
to authority of district court, Cou1t of 
Appeals gives great deference to trial court's 
decision to disqualify, but otherwise Court 
of Appeals insists that diStrict colli1S rest 
disqualification decisions on violation of specific 
Rules of Professional Conduct, not on some 
transcendental code of conduct that exists only in 
the subjective opinion of the court 
10 Cases that cite this headnote 
[7) Attorney and Client 
[8J 
fe Disbarment: Revocation of License 
Power of d1strict court to disbar attorney from 
practice before the court is one that ought 
always to be exercised with great caution and 
ought never be exercised except in dear cases 
of misconduct, which affect the standing and 
character of party as anorney. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorucy and Client 
*"' Disqualification in general 
District court should not deprive attorney of 
opporrunity to practice profession before the 
court on basis of determination after the fact 
that conduct is unethical, if responsible attorneys 
would djffer in appraising the propriety of that 
conduct. 
Frantz Hawley 
6 that this ne.ionoite 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
"1554 Champ Lyons, Jr., Helmsing, Lyons, Sims & Leach, 
Mobile, AL, Jobn H. Pickering, Alex E Rogers and A. 
Stephen Hnt, Jr., Washington, DC, for Appellants. 
H. William Wadsden, Rachel Sanders-Cochran, Donald F. 
Piefce, Forrest S. Latta, Pierce, Ledyard, Latta & Wasden, 
P.C.; Orrin K. Ames, m, P. Russel Myles, Jerry A. 
McDowell, Ha11.d, Arendall, L-1.C.; James E. Atchison, G. 
Da11 Wiley, Hess & Atchison; William B. Jackson, II and 
Donald Bahouth, Mobile, AL, for Appellees_ 
Appeal :from the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Alabama. 
Before BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and 
:MICHAEL*, Senior District Judge. 
Opinion 
BIRCH, Circuit Judge: 
The issue in this appeal is the standard that govems a district 
court's decision to deny a party's motion on behalf of a non-
resjdent attorney for admission pro hac vice. The district 
court denied admission pro hac ,,tee to plaintiffs counsel, 
even though it did not find that the attorney had violated any 
specific ethical rules. We hoJd that binding circt1it precedent 
requires a showing of unethical conduct of such a nature as to 
justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally to the bar of 
the district court in order to justify the denial of au applicant's 
pro hac vice admission. Accordingly, we vacate the district 
court's order denying counsel's admission pro hoc vice and 
remand for further proceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This interlocutory appeal of the district court order denying 
admission pro hac vice to Roger M. Witten, counsel for 
Schlumberger Technologies, Inc. ("Schlumberger"), arises 
from a lawsuit filed by Schlumberger "15SS against former 
officers and directors of its wholly owned subsidiary, Global 
Tel*Link Corporatioll (''Global"). The defendants, G. Dat1 
Wiley, Robert A. Fergusson, and Donald Bahouth, were 
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the most senior officers of Global, and the first n¥o were 
, ... w,iu"J'"-"1 terminated their 
as a result of a audit of 
l, 1993, Schlumberger acquired Global, which 
is headquartered in Mobile, AJabama, and whose principal 
line of business involved the manufacture and sale of 
co1nmunicatio11 services, predominantly automated pay 
telephones for prison systems. In the fall of 1993, Louisiana 
newspapers reported allegations that Global had overcharged 
customers in its contract with the Louisiana Department of 
Corrections, and the Louisiana Public Service Commission 
started an infonnaJ investigation into Global's operations 
in that state. In October 1993, Schlumberger retained the 
Washington, D.C. law finn of Wilmer, Cutler & Picke1ing 
("WC & P'') to provide advice on comml:mications law issues. 
In December 1993, Schlumberger further retained WC & P 
to assist in a legal audit of Global and selected Witten, a 
WC & P partner, to lead the audit terun. The audit team 
included other WC & P lawyers, lawyers from the Mobile, 
Alabatna law furn of Helmsing, Lyons, Sims & Leach, and 
accountants from Price Waterhouse ("PW"). The legal audit 
began on January 10, 1994 and continued for approximately 
one month. At an initial informatio~1al meeting on the first 
day of the audit, Witten explained to Global middle and upper 
management personnel the process of the legal audit and 
told them that they would be interviewed by the audit team. 
Witten stated that the WC & P lawyers involved in the audit 
represented Schlumberger and were 1101 lawyers for any of 
Global's employees or management Dale Gaudier, in-house 
counsel for Schlumberger, distributed to Global employees a 
memorandum ("the Gaudier memo") dated January 10, 1994, 
stating in relevant part: 
Schlumberger considers this review, 
and the information it and PW and 
WC & P gather during the review, 
to be confidential You should not 
discuss or disclose to those outside 
Global the fact that a review is taking 
place or the nature of the review. You 
should also not discuss the substance 
of any conversations you may have 
with PW, WC & P or Schlumberger 
legal personnel with aoyoi1e inside or 
outside Global. 
R:3-Def. Exh. l. 
f i\J\, H V, , UlU 
The audit team theti secured Global's premises as well as 
nn,,.,n,~nt< and vUHl~Ul~L 
Global employees. 
those with 
he represented not represent 
the interviewee personally, and that he could not guarantee 
that Schlumberger would not disclose any statements made 
by the :interviewee. 1 Witten and other members of the audit 
team interviewed Bahouth and Fergusso11 last, on January 
17 to l & a11d on Jai.1uary 18, respecbvely, As a result of the 
audit, Schlumberger concluded that Global had engaged in 
extensive consumer fraud and other unlawfttl practices while 
under defendants' management Schlumberger voluntarily 
disclosed its findings to the appropriate state law enforcement 
and regulatory authorities and undertook to make restitutiOL1 
to the defrauded consumers, Schlumberger also fired the 
defendants for cause and commenced this suit in federal 
district court, alleging fraud under federal secwities laws and 
Alabama law. Witten and local counsel signed the complaint. 
Fergusson filed a motion, later joined by Wiley and Bahouth, 
to deny admission pro hac vice to Witten, alleging that Witten 
acted unethically during the interview with Fergusson. 2 In 
an affidavit attached to hls motion, *1S56 Fergusson stated 
that, based on his observation of the audit team during 
the period preceding his interview and conversations with 
Global employees who had been interviewed, he had reaso11 
to suspect that he and others might be the targets of the 
investigation. Fergusson also claimed that he asked at the 
outset of the interview whether he should have a lawyer 
present and that Witten assured him that he need not. Bahouth 
later filed an affidavit making similar allegations. 
In Schlumberger's oppositio11 to Fergusson's motion to bar 
Witten's admission, Schlumberger de.11.ied that Fergusson 
asked whether he should have a lawyer at any time during 
his interview and asserted that none of the three members 
of the audit team who participated in the inteT\liew advised 
Fergusson in any way 011 whether he should have a personal 
lawyer. SchlUlTlberger stated that, during the interview, 
Fergusson said that he might want to consult a lawyer in 
the future in his capacity as a shareholders' representative. 
According to Schlumberger, Witten did not give Fergusson 
any advice as to that matter and his only response was that 
Fergusson was being interviewed solely in his capacity as an 
officer and employee of GlobaL 3 
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on June 2, 1994. 
test:mea, essentially repeating 
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claims i11 their respective affidavits During Fergusson's 
direct examination, the court 
Fergusson whether the Gaudier 
the course of the audit. When 
the court opined that 
the statement, "You should also not discuss the substance 
of any conversations you may have with PW, WC & P or 
Schlumberger legal personnel with anyone inside or outside 
Global " contained in the Gaudier memo meant that Global 
' 
employees were precluded from talking to a personal lawyer 
regarding the audit. 4 R3-56. 
The district court de11ied Witten's admission pro hac vice at 
the end of the hearing. The court did not make any fonnal 
findings of facts and conclusions of law at that time, but 
gave the following reasons, which we construe as the court's 
findings of fact; (1) the purpose of the legal audit team 
ilivestfgation was to "get some dirt.on [the defendants) before 
they got la\.\fYers''; (2) Fergusson claims that he asked for a 
lawyer and even Witten does not deny that the subject of a 
lawyer was brought up~ and (3) the language of the Gaudier 
nietno, coupled with the fact that the subject of a lawyer was 
brought up in fergusson's interview, would be ta.ken by any 
layman as precluding him from consulting with a personal 
lawyer. R3-114 & 115. The court concluded: "So I feel that 
*1557 (Mr.] Witten ... [was] acting in a fashion which this 
Court terms to be unethical. And therefore, since this Court 
terms it to be unetltical, the Court will not admit [him) to 
practice pro hac vice in this case." R3-115. 
Schlumberger filed a motion for reconsideration, supported 
by declarations of former Fifth Circuit Judge and Attorney 
General Griffin R Bell, former Eighth Circuit Judge and 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency William H. 
Webster, and Yale Law Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard. 
The tl1ree declarants supported Schlumberger's contention 
that Witten did not violate any rules of ethical conduct 
in not affirmatively advising the defendants to retain 
personal counsel and that the Gaudier memo was a. standard 
memorandum routinely used in similar circumstances to 
preserve the corporate attomey-client privilege i11 accordance 
with Upjohn. Toe declarants asse:rted that, in their experience, 
the Gaudier memo comported with prevalent practice and that 
they have never had any experience with anyone interpreting 
such a memorandum to preclude consultation with a personal 
attorney. 
district court issued a written order in which it denied 
Schlumberger's motion to reconsider the court's denial of 
Frantz 
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admission pro hac vice to Witten. The court did not make any 
i,ew findings order.It held, that denying 
ad.mission on as it found them at 
the Jut1e 2 .hearing was within its 
stmck the because 
it interpreted them as disputing the district court's factual 
finding that the effect of the Gaudier memo on the defendants 
was to preclude them from consulting legal counsel. Thus, 
the court concluded that these affidavits did not aid the court 
because it was "completely capable of handling on its own'' 
this factual issue. Id. at 16-17. 
[1] The district court certified au appeal to this court 
pursuant to 28 US.C. § 1292(b) on the portion of its 
order denying admission pro hac vice of Witten. 5 The 
court declined to certify the portion of its order striking the 
declarations of Bell, Webster, and Hazard. 6 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
[2] The district court's determination of the appropriate legal 
standard that gov ems th.is case and its interpretation of that 
sta11dard is subject to de novo review. See United S1a1es 
1•, Me.ndo:::a-Ceoelta. 963.F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir.1992). 
Within the framework of the legal standard governing 
the court's decision to deny pro hac vice adn1ission, the 
parties disagree as to the standard of review applicable 
to the court's determinations. 1n cases involving attorney 
disqualifications, we have used two apparently inconsistent 
standards of review. See generally Norton v. Tallahassee 
Mem'l Hosp., 700 F.2d 617, 618-20 (11th Cir.1983) (''Norton 
11 ") (''(C]ourts have not always been careful to ent111ciate 
their reasons for exercising one type ofreview ... -traditional 
review of factual findings and legal conclusions or review of 
abuse of discretion .... "). In Norton II, we held that the district 
*1558 court's factual detem1inations are reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard, but that the courts "appJ(ication 
of] the standards of the Code of Professional Responsibility 
to questions of attorney disqualification warrant full appellate 
review to ensure that there is consistency of treatment." Id. 
at 619-20. On other occasions, we have reviewed a district 
court's decision to revoke ru1 attomey's adn1fasion pro hao 
vice for an abuse of discretion. See United Suites v, Dinitz, 
538 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir.1976) (en bane); Nationalist 
Movement v. City of Cumming, 913 F.2d 885, 895 (11th 
Cir.1990), ajf d sub Mm. on other grounds, Forsyth CoUhly 
v vu; Ltu1 "'v 1 ,,,)/ .1.uv1, v~. vv u1 
Naii01ialist Moveme11~ 123, 112 S.Ct 2395, !20 
;-.J.JU.;CU 101 
we 
cm:un1sumc,es ,md of the court's 
disqualification of an attorney in these cases. Indeed. we 
explained in Norton II that these circumstances dictate the 
extent of the district court's discretion and, therefore, the 
scope of our review. We explained that, in a case like Dtnitz, 
the abuse of discretion standard is applicable because "that 
particular disqualification decision (was] so closely linked to 
the trial judge's responsibility to supervise the conduct of the 
case before him." No11on II, 700 F.2d at 619. We stressed 
that, in Di'nitz, "the nial court's ... judgment was based on 
conduct he had observed" Id. (emphasis added) Similarly, in 
Nationalisl Movement, the district court revoked an attorney's 
pro hac vice admission after that attorney persisted, during 
the trial, in a course of conduct that can only be descnbed 
as "an effort to commit a fra1.ld on the court." Nanonalist 
Mo11ement, 913 F.2d at 895. The deference that we accorded 
the trial judges in both Dini.tz and Nationalist Movement was 
necessary so that the trial judge could maintain effective 
control over his or her court room and process. Id. at 895 
("(T]his case presents unique facts involvjng the integrity 
of the court system and respect for its particjpants within 
a courtroom proceeding."). In contrast, the district court's 
disqualification decision Jn Norton II turned on the proper 
application of the Rules of Professional Conduct, not on the 
court's response to an attorney's in-court disruptive behavior. 
See Norton 11. Tallahassee Mem'l Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 941-
42 (11th Cir.1982) (''Norton!") (reversing the district court's 
disqualification order based on a violatio,; of Canon 9 of 
the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct), reh'g denied, 
Norton II. 700 F.2d at 620. In reviewing a district court's 
interpretation and application of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which involve a mixed question oflaw and fact, we 
do not defer to the district court's determinations. See Norton 
11, 700 F.2d at 620; In te Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1563-
64 (J Ith Cit.1990), 
[3] Even though Witten's conduct is related to the case at 
bar, that conduct occurred before the action was ever filed 
' 
did not occur in fro11t of the district court, and was not of a 
type to disrupt the proceedings before the court Moreover, as 
we shall explain below, the court's decision to deny Witten's 
admission turns or. its application of the relevant Rules of 
Professional Conduct Therefore, in accordance with No11011 
IL we review the district court's factual fmdings for clear error 
and its application of the Rules to the facts de novo, 
Docket No. 
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to govem 01l1y the procedural requirements for denying 
admissjon pro hac vtce to an attomey, The court held that, 
once a complaint alleging misconduct rising to the level of 
disbannent is made, the district court has broad discretion 
to deny admission pro hac vice after notice and a hearing, 
without necessarily finding that the misconduct actually rose 
to a level justifying disbarment. For this proposition, the 
d"istrict court cited Din.i12:, 538 F.2d at 1219, Kleiner v. 
First National Bank, 751 F.2d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir.1985), 
ru.1d Nationalist .Movement, 913 F.2d at 895. Thus, although 
"[t)he [c]ourt did not find that Witten violated any specific 
ethical rules, as would be required for disbannent," it denied 
Witten's admission because the "(d]efendants here submitted 
'evidence of behavior that [the court] believe[d) justifie(d) 
denying an attorney admission pr'o hac vice.' " R2-l77-
"'1S59 14 (alterations in original) (quoting Evans, 524 F.2d 
at 1008). 
[4) In Evans, we enm1ciated both a procedural standard 
and a substantive standard for a district coun's decision 
to deny admission pro hac vice to a11 anomey, First, "(i]f 
a District Court has evidence of behavior that it believes 
justifies denying an attorney admission pro hac vice," it must 
give the anomey adequate notice of the ethical charges and set 
a hearing on the issue. Evans. 524 F.2d at 1008. The district 
court believed in this case that the evidence against Witten 
rose to the threshold set in Evan.s for a hearing. The court 
n1istakenly believed, however, that it had the authority to deny 
an attorney admission pro hao vice because it believed the 
evidence justified such action, without any further findings. 
This was error, because the district court disregarded the 
substantive standard set out in Evans: 
Admission to a state bar creates a presumption of good 
moral character that ca1U1ot be overcome merely by the 
whims of the District Court. An applicant for admission 
pro hac vice who (s a member in good standing of a state 
bar may not be denied the privilege to appear except ''on 
a showing that in any legal matter, whether before the 
particular district court or in another jurisdiction, he has 
been guilty of unethical conduct of such a nature as to 
justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally to the bar 
of the court!' 
VVJ..Jf VI Lt.VJ.J/lf!\lil Ut...,VV !.LU l, Vl..J 
113 F.3d 1S53 (1991) 
524 F.2d at 1001 (quotingSande"f'sv. Russell, 401 F.2d 
247-48 (5th CirJ968)). district court specifically 
of 
The district court's reliance on post-Evans cases giving 
district couits wider latitude to revoke an attorney's admission 
pro hac vice is misplaced. In a footnote, the district court 
cited Ktrkla.nd v. l.fational Mortgage Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 
1367 (11th Cir. 1989), for the proposition that "the Supreme 
Court's decision in Lets v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 443-45, 
[99 S.Ct. 698, 701-02, 58 L.Ed.2d 717) (1979), may have 
partly undermined Evans .insofar as the Supreme Co1.1rt made 
clear that 'no Fourteenth Amendment property interest is 
implicated by a state court's refosal to adrnit an attorney pro 
hac vice.'" R2-177-12 n. 16 (quoting Kirkland, 884 F.2d 
at 1371). In Kirkland. the district court revoked an attorney's 
admission pro hac vice without giving him notice of the 
charges against him or affording him a hearing, We reversed 
the district court's decision because it failed to comply with 
the procedural requirement of Evans. Kirkland, 884 F.2d at 
1372. Therefore, the Kirkland court's statement casti11g doubt 
on the continued vitality ofE,,ans' substantive standard is pure 
dictum, which is not binding on us. Indeed, it is not clear 
why a decision holding that a federal court cannot review a 
state court's dec:iaJ of admission pro hac vice because that 
denial does not implicate a Fourteenth Ame11dment property 
interest would have any bearing on our decision in Evans. 
In Evans, we did not rest our decision on any purported 
constitutional right for an attorney to be admitted pro hac 
vice in a federal court. We, instead, exercised our supervisory 
authority over the district courts in this circuit to circumscribe 
the discretion of trial judges in deciding whether to admit an 
attorney pro hac ,,tee. For this reason, we rejected the Fourth 
Circuit's standard which gives district courts the discretion 
.. to deny admissfon pro hac vice to an attorney guilty of 
'unlawyerlike conduct' " because we found "the discretion 
permitted by the Fourth Circuit too broad and, consequently, 
susceptible to abuse." Evan.s, 524 F.2d at 1007 n. l (citing 
Thomasv. Cassidy, 249F.2d 91 (4thCir.1957)). We conclude 
that, contrary to the dictum in KMdand. the Supreme Court's 
decision in Leis did not cast doubt on Evan.s' holding. Evans. 
therefore, remains binding precedent in this circuit. 
Nonetheless, the defendants suggest that Eleventh Circuit 
precedent on the isslle of attorney disquaHfication has evolved 
into two different lines of decision, one exemplified by Evans 
and the other by Dtnitz and Nationalist Movemem, and that 
Frantz Troxell, etal Docket 
the district court correctly relied on 1he latter to deny Witten's 
We we Evans 
aneimpt1~ to 
establish applicable to a 
pretrial motiot1 to appear pro hac 
vice . . . . Once an attorney has beei.1 
admitted pro hac vice and a case 
has proceeded to trial, however, the 
considerations are guite different. Tne 
interests of justice demand that a judge 
have a measure of discretion to take 
steps necessary to ensure that order is 
maintained. 
Dinitz, 538 F.2d at 1223-24. Therefore, as Dini'!:: itself 
teaches, Evans controls here because this case involves a pre-
trial motion for admission pro hac vice. 
Second, a more complete review of Eleventh Circuit 
precedent on the issue of attorney disqualificatiOJ'l shows that 
the district court's reading of that case law is erroneous. As 
we explained in our discussion of the standard of review 
applicable to this case, there are two distinct lines of Eleventh 
Circuit decisions on attorney disqualification, but these 
two lines can be reconciled if we consider the particular 
circtimstances of each case. In Dinirz and Nationalist 
Movement, we were faced with "unique facts involving the 
integrity of the court system and respect for its participants 
within a. courtroom proceedit1g." Nationalist ,Movement, 913 
F.2d at 895. In both Dtnilt: and Nationalist Movement, the 
district court revoked an attorney's admission pro hac vice 
after repeated warnings due to the attorney's persistence in 
ethically questionable conduct that occurred in the courtroom, 
fo the view of the district court, and that resulted in a 
disruption of the proceedings. See Nattanalisr Mol'ement, 
913 F.2d at 893 (Attorney actions included: "presenting .. , a 
witness to authenticate corporate documents ... [in] an anempt 
to create fraud on the court; making frivolous objections ... 
to prevent the troth from emerging about [the witness's] lack 
of qualifications to testify; concealing from the court his 
personal interest in. the litigation ... ; and asking an adverse 
witness whether he was a veteran, in an effort to embarrass 
and disparage him.'); Dfnirt, 538 F.2d at 1220-21 & nn. 
8-10 ("The disruptive effect of [the a.ttomey'Js co11duct is 
evident when we consider that the court was forced to delay 
the beginning of the trial to hear testimony on a suppression 
motion that was utterly frivolous, to wam the attorney 
repeatedly about specific instances of mis conduct, and to send 
<JV!.J/t.V/L !J/il!Vll Vl,JU ll!! 
the jury out of the courtroom no less than three times during 
course The of 
this case clearly do not 
contrast, cases the 
to disqualify an attomey was based on ·a11 alleged ethical 
violation, we carefully reviewed the court's interpretatioo 
and application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See 
Norton J, 689 F.2d at 941-42 (reversi11g the district coUlt's 
disqualification order based on a violation of Ca.11011 9 of 
the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct). In a more recent 
case, we reversed a district court's decision disqualifying 
an attorney for conduct which, according to the district 
court, was so reprehensible as to ''transgress[] a 'code' by 
which an attorney practices which transcends any written 
code of professional conduct" Finlrelstein, 901 F.2d at: 
1563. Ftnkelstein involved the following circumstances: 
In the interim period between the liability phase and the 
damages phase of a lengthy civil rights trial, and after 
the district court had encouraged the parties to negotiate 
a settlement, the attorney "leapfrogged" defendant's trial 
attorney and sent a settlement letter directly to defendant's 
*1561 corporate counsel. The tone of the letter was 
inappropriately threatening. See id at 1562-63. The district 
court understandably found such conduct reprehensible and 
disqualified the responsible attorney on that basis. Upon 
review, "[w]e share[dJ the disapproval of the district court 
caused by Finketstein's letter to [corporate counsel]. It not 
only 'exhibited an unlawyerlikerudeness' but it also displayed 
a gross n:usu11derstru.1dii.1g of true professionalism." Id. at 
1564 11. 4. Nonetheless, we reversed because the district 
court may not disqualify an attorney on the basis of some 
"transcendental code of conduct ... that ... e::idsted only in 
the subjective opinion of the court, of which (the attorney] 
had no notice, and (that) was the sole basis of the sanction 
administered after the conduct had occurred." Id. at 1565. 
Thus, where the district court's disquaJification order is 
based on an allegation of ethical violation, the court may 
not simply rely on a general inherent power to admit and 
suspend attorneys, without any limit on such power. The 
court must clearly identify a specific Rule of Professional 
Conduct which is applicable to the relevant jurisdiction and 
must conclude that the atto:mey violated that rule-a legal 
conclusion subject to full appellate review-for its order to be 
upheld. See Norton L 689 F.2d at 941. Moreover, as we stated 
in Finkelstein, "[t]his Court will 't1ot deprive an attorney 
of the opportunity to practice bis profession on the basis 
of a dete1111ination after the fact that conduct is unethical if 
responsible attorneys would differ in appraising the propriety 
vs 
f' u l ':t 
of that conduct'" Finkelstein, 901 F.2d at 1565 (quoting In re 
Ruffalo, U.S. 88 
17 
sum, our district 
decisions to deny a motion for admission pro hac 11ice 
or to disqualify an attorney already admitted to appear 
before the court is not inconsistent. It is sensibly tailored to 
circumscribe the discretion of trial judges to suit the particular 
circumstances of a given case. The standards governing a 
district court's denial of a pre-trial motion for admission pro 
hac vice are set out in Evcrns: Absent a showing of unethical 
conduct rising to a level that would justify disbarment, the 
court mil.SI admit the attorney. Evans, 524 F.2d at 1007. The 
standards governing disqualification of at, attorney already 
admitted to appear before the district court differ, depending 
on the circumstances. If the conduct at issue threatens 
disruption ofthe court proceedings, see, e.g., Dinirs, 538 F.2d 
a:t 1221 (in-court misconduct) and Nationalist Movemen.1, 
913 F.2d at 893 (same), or is a deliberate challenge to the 
authority of the distrjct couit, see, e.g., Kleiner, 751 F.2d 
at 1207 (attorney deliberately advising client to disobey the 
district court's protective order), we give great deference to 
a trial court's decision to disqualify the responsible attorney. 
If, however, the conduct at issue does not threaten the orderly 
administration of justice but is allegedly unethical, we insist 
that district courts rest their disqualification decisions on the 
violation of specific Rules of Professional Conduct, not on 
some "transcendental code of conduct ... that ... exist(s] only 
ill the subjective opinion of the coun." Fi:nkelstein, 901 F.2d 
at 1565. 8 
Based on our review of the governing case law, we conclude 
that the district court incorrectly co11strued the scope of its 
discretion. Because this case involves a pre-trial motion for 
admission pro hac vice, it is controlled by the standard 
enunciated jnEvans. The district court's order denying Witten 
admission *1562 pro hac vice is vacated because ''It)hc 
court did not find that Witten violated any specific ethical 
rules, as would be required for disbarment." R2-177-14. 9 
[7] [8] The district court in this case was roindful that 
"[a]ccusations of unethical conduct are among the most 
serious of allegations that (a c]ourt must consider ... [and] 
aware that an attorney's honor as an officer of the [ c ]ourt is at 
issue here." R2-177-15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
We share the district court's sense of gravity over this 
issue, because "the 'brand of disqualification' on grounds of 
dishonesty and bad faith could well hang over [an attorney's} 
J \J V/lU J/ll!VH Vl !V rm 
name and career for years to come."' Kirkland, 884 F.2d at 
1370 (holding that a district court's order disqualifying an 
attorney is reviewable this court even after the underlying 
settled because of the gravity of the acct\sations of 
"""''""'""""' conduct); Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1200 n. 14. These 
considerations should weigh even more heavily when ( and if) 
the district court rules upo11 remand on Witten's admission pro 
hac vice. Because Evans requires a showing of disbarrable 
conduct in order to justify the denial of Witten's admission, 
the district coun must be fu..'1:her mind:fol that "the power [to 
disbar) is one that ought always to be exercised with great 
cautio~ and ought never be exercised except in clear cases 
of misconduct, which affect the standing and character of 
the party as an attorney." Ex pa.rte Wall, 107 U.S. 265,288, 
2 S.Ct. 569, 588, 27 L.Ed. 552 (1883) (emphasis added); 
cf ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
Rule 18(C) (1993) {providing that charges of misconduct 
"shall be established by clear and convincing evidence''); 
Alabama Rules of Disciplinary Procedure Rule 19 (1995) 
("Clear and convincing evidence shall be the standard of 
proofrequired in all disciplinary proceedings ... .''). Moreover, 
the court should " 'not deprive an attorney of the opportu11ity 
to practice his profession on the basis of a determination 
after the fact that conduct is unethical if responsible attorneys 
Footnotes 
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would differ in appraising the propriety of that conduct.' " 
901 atl565 relwffalo, 
at 88 at (White, 10 
IlI. CONCLUSION 
The issue in this appeal is the standard that governs a 
district court's decision to deny a party's motion on behalf 
of a no11-resident attorney for admission pro hac vice. The 
district court denied adm.ission pt'O hac vice to plaintiff's 
counsel. even though it did not find that he violated any 
specific ethical rules. We hold that binding circuit precedent 
requires a showing of unethical conduct of such a nature as 
to justify disbam)ent of a lawyer admitted generally to the 
bar of the "'1563 district court in order to justify the denial 
of an applicant's pro hac vice admission. Accordingly, we 
VACATE the district court's order denying Winen admfosion 
pro hac vice and REMAND for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
All Citations 
113 FJd 1553, 65 USLW2&18, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 979 
Honorable James H. Michael, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Virginia. sitting by designation. 
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This assertion, Which Witten ahd · other interviewers made in their affidavits, is not disputed by the defendants. What 
happened later in the interview is disputed. as will become apparent subsequently in this opinion. 
Fergusson alleged that Witten violated rules 4.2 ("Communication with Person Represented by Counselj, 4.3 (''Dealing 
with Unrepresented Person"), 4.4 ("Respect for Rights ofThird Persons'') of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct 
("ARPC") made app!tcab!e to attorneys admitted pro hac vice in the Southern District of Alabama by Local Rule 1 (A)(4). 
The defendants later added ARPC Rule 3.7 ("Lawyer as a Witness'1 to that list. 
With respect to Bahouth, Schlumberger later submitted affidavits from several audit team members, including Witten, 
stating that Bahouth never asked whether he shOuld have a lawyer at his interview and that no member of the audit team 
ever advised Bahouth about this issue. Moreover, the affiants asserted-and Bahouth never denied-that Witten and 
two colleagues informed Bahouth on January 14, 1994 that the audit to that date had revealed questionable practices 
by Global and that Schlumberger was considering suspending Bahouth with pay. Bahouth reportedly responded that 
he knew what the questionable practices were and requested that Schlumberger postpone its decision until it heard his 
"side of the story. n • 
Before the district court made these comments, none of the defendants had ever claimed that they had interpreted the 
Gaudier memo as precluding them from consulting a personal lawyer about the audit. Schlumberger maintains that the 
purpose of the Gaudier memo was to preserve the corporate attorney-client privilege, in conformance with Upjohn Co. v, 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677. 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). Indeed. the language of the Gaudier memo is quite 
similar to the language of the letter before the Supreme Court in Upjohn. Moreover. it later became clear that Fergusson, 
at least, did not interpret the Gaudier memo to preclude any contact with a lawyer. Although Fergusson testified at the 
hearing that he never told any lawyer about the audit, he eventually admitted that he did contact a lawyer during the 
period of the audit and that he told the lawyer about the audit. Fergusson made this admission after being confronted 
vs 384 
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with telephone logs showing that he called a law firm in Palo Alto, California during the period of the audit. and stated 
that he contacted the lawyer in his capacity as a shareholders· See 144. & 159. 
Schlumberger attached to its motion for certification to § 1292(b) a letter from the District of Columbia bar to 
Witten Which contained the results of an investigation by the D.C. bar of Witlen's conduct. The letter from the bar 
does not purport to resolve the factual dispute about whether Witten personally assured and Bahoutll that 
they did not need a lawyer present while Witten intervlewed them. In any event, it is the province of the district court to 
resolve that and any other factual disputes. 
However, based on information provided by Wrtten and a review of the transcript of testimony at the June 2, 1994 
hearing, the D.C. bar concluded that Witten did not violate any D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct (which are virtually 
identical to Alabama's rules as well as the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct). The district court denied the 
defendants' motion to strike that letter. 
6 The court correctly recognized. however. that its refusal to certify the portion of its order striking the declarations does 
not place that portion of the order beyond our jurisdiction under § 1292(b). 'When a district court certifies an order for 
appeal, all questions material to that particular order are property before the court of appeals." United States v. Fleet 
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n. 2 (11th Clr.1990): accord Yamaha Motor Corp .. U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199. 
- 1 116 S.Ct. 619,623, 133 l.Ed.2d 578 (1996). 
7 The district court's and defendants' reliance on Kleiner, 751. F.2d 1193, is also misplaced. Kleiner. llke Olnitz and 
Nationalist Movement, involved the disqualification of an attorney from the case before the court for conduct related to 
the proceedings. In fact, the attorney dlsqualifled In Kleiner was a local attorney, regularlY admitted to practice before the 
district court. It is true that the conduct at issue in Kleiner did not occur in front of the district court We affirmed the district 
court's disqualificatlon In that case, however, because it was a sanction for the attorney deliberately advising his client to 
disobey the court's protective order not to contact any members of the plaintiff class. See id. at 1207. We stressed that 
disqualification was Justified by the "strong ... interest in securing obedience to mandates of the court which is necessary 
to secure the orderly administration of the laws." Id. at 1210. The conduct of which Witten ls accused in no way threatens 
the orderly administration of the laws. Indeed, this conduct occurred before the Instant action was ever filed and, thos, 
could not be viewed as a challenge to the district court's authortty in any way. 
8 The defendants contend that if we were to reverse the trial court's decision, we would be condoning "hard ball" discovery 
and investigation techniques. This contention, it appears to us. invites us to sanction Witten for conduct that does not 
necessarily violate the Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to the Southern District of Alabama bar, but on the basis 
of a "transcendental code of ethical conduct." Whatever we may personally think. of "hard ball" litigation tactics-and we 
do not mean to intimate in any way that we consider Wltten's conduct to fall within this category of tactics-It Is not up to 
us or the district court to Impose our own views of what tactics are or are not acceptable through the use of after-the-fact 
disqualification. We therefore decline the defendants' invitation for such a finding, It should be noted that district courts 
remain vested with the discretion to control the litigation before them and to curb the use of abusive litigation techniques 
during the pendency of the litigation through protective orders and other appropriate means at their disposal. 
9 Despite this language in the district court's order, the defendants assert that the court did find that Witten violated Rules 
4.2, 4.3. and 4.4 of the ARPC. Rather, according to the defendants, the district court did not find it necessary to expend 
further resources to decide whether Wltten's vlolatlon was so egregious as to justify disbarment. We do not share the 
defendants· interpretatlon of the district court's order. First. the court's order is quite carefully constructed and expressly 
relies on Dlnltz and Nationalist Movement. which do not require the court to flnd a specific ethlcal violation before taking 
disciplinary action against an attorney. Second, although the court characterized its decision at the June 2, 1994 hearing 
as having found "that Witten acted in an unethical fashion," R2-177-15, It never specified any Rule of Professional 
Conduct that Wrtten had violated. Indeed. a review of the transcript of the hearing suggests that the court relied on 
a personal ''transcendental code of conduct" rather than the Alabama or Model Rules made applicable to the instant 
proceedings through Local Rule 1(A)(4). See R3-115 {"So I feel that ... Witten ... (was) acting in a fashion which this 
Court terms to be unethical. And therefore, since this court terms it to be unethical, the Court will not admit ... [.Witten] to 
practice pro hac vice in this case.") (emphasis added). Under Finkelstein, the district court may not discipline an attorney 
-let alone find that his conduct rose to the level of disbarment-on the basis that he violated a "transcendental code of 
conduct." of which he had no notice. Finke/stein, 901 F.2d at 1565. 
1 0 Schlumberger urges us to reverse the district court's order striking the declarations of Bell, Webster, and Hazard as an 
abuse of discretion in light of Finke/stein 's teaching. We need not and do not reach this issue because we vacate the 
court's order on the basis that it misapprehended the legal standard governing the denial of admission pro hac vice. On 
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remand, however, the court should reconsider its decision to strike these declarations, or decide whether to admit similar 
declarations any new factual of the In Finkelstein 
of Document @201 Thomson Government Works. 
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JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH, ISB #7898 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
r JU l~O. 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Haw ]ey LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited LiabHity Partnel'ship, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV 15-1406 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF SHEILA R. 
) SCHWAGER 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, SHEILA R. SCHWAGER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and state: 
l, UlJ 
1. I have personal know ledge of the matters asserted herein and am competent to be 
a witne$s in this matter. 
2. 1 am a partne1· of the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley 
Troxell''), attorneys of record for Idaho ]ndependent Bank ("BB"), as to the collection efforts of 
outstanding obligations due and owing by Martin Frantz and others to that regard, I along 
AFFIDA VlT OF SHEILA R. SCHWAGER • 
vs 
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Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho, Case No. 1.1 -21337-TLM ("Bankruptcy Case"). 
3. In addition, I along with my partne1· John F. Kurtz, Jr., through Hawley Troxell 
have been representjng IIB in an Adversary Proceeding filed against Martin D. Frantz and 
Cynthia M. Ftantz, which was commenced on June 23, 2013, as Case No. 13~07024-TLM 
(''Adversary Proceeding"). In the Adversary Proceeding, IIB sought 11on~djschargability of the 
guaranty and loan obligations owed by Mr. and Mrs. Frantz to IIB in amounts exceeding $6.4 
MHlion Dolla!'s, plus accruing interest, fees. and costs. Non-dischargability was sought based 
upon multiple acts of fraud and conversion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (a)(6). 
4. I have reviewed the Declaration of Jonathon Frantz and in paiticular the assenions 
that the Adversary Proceeding has been dismissed as moot. That is inaccurate. as indicated by 
the entire Docket of the Adversary Proceeding, attached hereto as Exhibit A. and incorporated 
herein by reference. 
5. On the eve of the two week trial of the Adversary Proceeding, Mr. and Mrs. 
Frantz filed a Section 727 Waiver of Discharge in their Bankruptcy Case, conceding the non-
dischargability relief requested in the Adversary Proceeding, thus rendering a determination of 
dischargabi1ity moot. SpecificalJy, the 727 Waiver of Discharge meant that none of the 
obligations owed to IIB would be discharged and therefore a trial on the section 523 11.onb 
dishcarge issues were not necessary. Acco1·dingly, the trial date was vacated. However, despite 
counsel's suggestion to the contrary, no Ordel' of Dismissal has been entered, and in fact the 
Adversary Proceeding remains pending. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHEil,A R. SCHWAGER • 2 
,.,,.,_,;.. (,..,Vl...J/llJ.Vl.l Vl..,•.!,J. l,U.L rt!\ l• V, l. VJ l 
6. regard, HB filed the on une 2, No. 
which was on 15" The matter 
submitted and under advisement, with a decision to be forthcoming. See Ex. A. Docket No. 127. 
Further, on June 3, 2015, HB filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs as the prevailing party 
in the Adversary Proceeding. That Motion ls set for hearing for July 28, 2015. See Ex. A, 
Docket Nos. 121, 122, 123, 128. h1 shol't, no final ordeJ has been entered at this point in the 
Adversary Proceeding. If either or both of the motions aie granted, a judgment will be entered 
accordingly. 
s 
SIGNED AND SWORN to before me .this ~day of July, 2015, by SHEILA R. 
SCHWAGER. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHEILA R. SCHWAGER· 3 
Hawley etal 
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U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
District of Idaho [LIVE] (Coeur dAlene) 
Adversary Proceeding#: 13-07024-TLM 
Assigned r.o: Chief Judge Ten-y L Myers 
Lead BK Case: 11-21337 
Date Filed: 08/23/13 
Lead BK Title: Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz 
Lead BK Chaple1': 7 
Demand: $6419000 
'' V,..Jt. 
1 3 l 
MOA 
Nature[s] of Suit: 62 Dischargeability - 523(a)(2), false pretenses, false representation, actual fraud 
68 Dischargeability - 523(a)(6), willful and malicious injury 
Plai1ttiff 
Idaho Independent Bank 
c/o Sheila R Schwager 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
POB 1617 
Boise, ID 83701 
20&3446000 
V. 
Defendant 
Martin D. Frantz 
PO Box 830 
Rathdrum, ID 83858 
SSN I ITIN:
represented John F Kurtz, Jr 
by Hawley Trnxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
POB 1617 
Boise. ID 83701~1617 
(208) 344-6000 
Email: j~ur1z@hawleytroxeJl.com 
Sheila Rae Schwager 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS aod HAWLEY LLP 
POB 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
(208) 344-6000 
Email: sschwager@J.1awleytroxell.com 
represented Jonathon Frantz 
by Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. 
Suite A 
Post Falls. ID 83 854 
208-297-6647 
Fax: 208-297-6648 
Email: Jonathon@cdalegal.com 
Stephen Brian McCrea 
Defendant 
Cyntbln M. Frantz 
PO Box 830 
Rathdrum, 
SSN I ITIN
Filing Date 
08/23/2013 
08/23/20]3 
08/26/2013 
08/27/2013 
08/27/2013 
10/09/2013 
l. l\H ll V, 
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represented Jonathon Frantz 
# 
l 
( 69 pgs; 6 docs) 
2 
1 
(4 pgs; 2 docs) 
.4 
( 4 pgs; 2 docs) 
5 
(4 pgs; 2 docs) 
§ 
(23 pgs; 2 docs) 
by (See above for address) 
Stephen Brian McCrea 
(See above for address) 
Docket Text 
Adversary case 13-07024. 62 (Dischargeability -
523(a)(2), false pretenses, false representation. 
actual fraud): Complaint by ldaho Independent 
Bank against Martin D. Frantz, Cynthia M. Frantz. 
Fee Arnount $293 (Attachments:# l Exhibit 
Exhibit A# 1 Exhibit Exhibit B # J Adversary 
Pl'oceeding Cover Sheet# .1 Summons # ~ 
Summons) (Schwager, Sheila) 
Receipt ofComplaint(l3-07024-TLM) [cmp,cmp] 
( 293 .00) Filing Fee. Receipt number 4608419. Fee 
amount 293.00. (re; Doc# D (U.S. Treasury) 
Sunu11ons Issued on Cynthia M. Frantz Date Issued 
8/26/2013, Answer Due 9/25/2013; Martin D. 
Frantz Date lssued 8/26/2013, Answer Due 
9/25/2013 (Attachments:# l Summons Issued) (ar) 
Acceptance of Service. Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)J. 
Summons Issued). (Attachments:# l M. Frantz 
Summons) (Schwager, Sheila) 
Acceptance of Service. Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)d 
Summons lsi;ued). (Attachments: # l Summons C. 
Frantz) (Schwager, Sheila) 
Motion to Strike Complaint Filed by Defendants 
Cynthia M. Francz, Mrutin D. Frantz (Attachments: 
~Vu/ /.,U/ L.VlJ/ll!VH U , l l l!Vl 1' I\/\ 11 V, 
' ' VJ, 
S. Page of 31 
# l Supplement to 
Strike) (Frantz, Jonathon) 
1 Notice of Hearing by Defendants Cynthia M. 
pgs) Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document(s).§ 
Motion to Strike Complaint Filed by Defendants 
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attaclm1ents: 
# 1 Supplement Brief In Support of Motion to 
St1·ike) filed by Defendant Manin D. Frantz, 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). Motion to Strike 
hearing to be held on 10/29/2013 at 10:30 AM 
Video - Boise to Coeur d'Alene (Mountain Time) 
10/09/2013 for §, (Frantz, Jonathon) 
£ Notice of Service Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
(2 pgs) Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document(s).9. 
Motion to Strike Comp1aint Filed by Defendants 
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attaclm1ents: 
# l Supplement Brief In Support of Motion to 
Strike) filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 1 Notice of Hearing 
Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. 
Frantz (RE: Ielated document(s)§ Motion to Strike 
Complaint Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, 
Martin D. Frantz (Attachments:# 1 Supplement 
Briefln Supp011 of Motion to Strike) filed by 
Defendant Maiiin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. 
Frantz}. Motion to Strike hearing to be held on 
10/29/2013 at 10:30 AM Video- Boise to Coeur d' 
Alene (Mou11.tain Time) for§, filed by Defendant 
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). 
l 0/09/2013 (Frantz, Jonathon) 
2 Response to (related document(s): §. Motion to 
( 48 pgs; 2 docs) Strike Complaint filed by Defendant Mrutin D. 
Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz) Filed by 
Plaintiff Idaho Indepe11dent Bank (Attachments: # l 
10/25/2013 Exhibit A) (Schwager, Sheila) 
lQ Reply to (related document(s): .2. Response filed by 
(9 pgs) Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank) Filed by 
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz 
10/28/2013 (Frantz, Jonathon) 
ll Exhibits filed Rthibit A Filed by Defendants 
(45 pgs) Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related 
10/28/20] 3 document(s)lQ Reply). (Frantz, Jonathon) 
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13 
10/29/2013 
14 
l 0/3112013 (3 pgs; 2 docs) 
Ji 
11/03/2013 (3 pgs) 
li 
(33 pgs; 4 docs) 
11/13/2013 
l1 
(2 pgs) 
11/13/2013 
ll 
(6 pgs; 2 docs) 
11/20/2013 
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Certificate 
Hearing Held 
Appean111ees: Sheila Schwager - Counsel fo1· the 
Plaintiff, Jonathon :Frantz - Counsel for the 
Defendant. 
Report of Pa·ocetdings: Defendants Motion to 
Strike Complaint, Doc. No, 6. Argument 
presented. Afte1· review, the Court orally enters 
findings ;:ind conclusions. The Court DENIES 
the Motion to Strike or Dismiss Claim. An order 
by the Plaintiff is fort.hcomin.g. A telephone 
pretrial co11ference is forthcoming. 
(RE: related document(s)§. Motion to Strike filed by 
Defendant Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. 
Frantz) (Battle, Mel) 
Order Denying Motion to Strike (Related Doc#.§) 
Signed on 10/31/2013. (ar) 
BNC Certificate of Mailing~ Order on Motion to 
Strike Notice Date 11/03/2013. (Admin.) 
Answer to Complaint Filed by Defendants Cynthia 
M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments:# l 
Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B # J Exhibit C) (Frantz, 
Jonathon) 
Notice of Appearance as Co-Counsel for 
Defendcints Filed by Detendants Cynthia M. Frantz, 
Ma11in D. Frantz. (McCrea, Stephen) 
Notice of Hearing (RE: related document(s).!.§. 
Answer to Complaint Filed by Defendants Cynthia 
M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz). Pre Trial Conference 
hearing to be held on 12/J 8/2013 at 9 :00 AM 
(Pacific Time)/ 10:00 AM (Mountain Time) 
Telephonic Hearing - Boise Chambers for 1.§, (ar) 
On the date and time specified, the parties shall call 
the Courts personal conferencing phone number at 
l-877~336-1829, enter access code 3956660, 
security code 2222 and follow the operators 
instructions. Modified on 12/3/2013 (Battle, Mel). 
lU/lUl'J/lV!Vl~ Ul, rm 
- U Baiikrnptcy 
12/18/2013 
21 
(4 pgs) 
12/23/2013 
22 
(4 pgs) 
02/18/2014 
02/19/2014 
l, V,JV 
Appearances: John Kurtt: - Counsel for the 
Defendant, Jonathon Frantz and Stephen 
McCrea - Counsel for the Defense 
5 of 31 
Report of Proceedings: Telephone Pretrial 
Conference. The pleitdings are settled. Any and 
aU discovery shall be completed no lnte1· than 
August 31, 2014. The Defense shall disclose all 
Expert Witnesses by Mnrch 31, 2014 and 
]~la.in.tiff shall <lisclose all Expert Witnesses by 
April 3(l, 2014. Any ~md a.ll pretrial motions, 
including any motions for continuances, must be 
filed and a hearing held befol'e the Coutt in 
acco1·dance with the BankJ'uptcy Rules and 
.Local Bankruptcy Rules (including but not 
limited to LBR 7056.1) no later than September 
15, 2014. Pretrial briefs shall be filed no late1· 
thnn November 17, 2014 'fl'i.aJ of this tuatte,· is 
set for December l and 2, 2014 at l.:30 J>.m., 
December 3, 4 and 5, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. nt the 
United States Com·tl1ou~e, 6450 Mine1·11I Drive, 
Coeur dAlenc, lduho. A 1>retrial ordet is 
forthcoming. 
(RE: related document(s)l6 Answer to Complaint 
filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, Defendant 
Cynthia M. Frantz) (Battle, Mel) 
Order re Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for Trial 
Sjgned on 12/23/2013. Trial of this matter is set for 
December 1 and 2, 2014at 1:30 p.m., December 3, 
4 and 5, 2014 at 9:00 a.1n. at the United States 
Courthouse, 6450 Mineral Drive, Coeur dAlene, 
Idaho.(Battle, Mel) 
Stipulation Between Idaho Independent Bank and 
Ma11jn D. fra1':itz and Cynthia M Frantz lo Amend 
P,-e1rial Otder as to Experl Witness Disclosures 
Filed by PlaiJ1tiffldaho Independent Bank (RE: 
telated document(s)21 Order re Pretrial 
Proceedjngs Setting Date for Trial). (Schwager, 
Sheila) 
of 
,JV!.t/ 1,,V/ l.\J J/lVlVH Vl, ! l l!Vl 1' !\!\ i1 V, l, V.J I 
B11nJrn1ptcy Court 6 of3! 
Order Granting ,rn,l::iti # T -
(3 2 Signed on 9/2014. (ar) 
BNC Certificate - 1nnl<1~Pl1 
' 02/22/2014 (3 pgs) Notice Dace 02/22/2014. (Admin.) 
25 Stipulation Between Both Parties ta Amend Pretrial 
(4 pgs) Order As ro Expert Witness Disclosures Filed by 
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank. (Schwager, 
06/25/2014 Sheila) 
26 Order Granting Second Stipulation to Amend 
(4 pgs; 2 docs) Pretrial Order as to Expe1t Witness Disclosures 
Signed on 6/26/2014 (RE: related document(s)25 
Stipulation filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent 
06/26/2014 Bank). (ar) 
27 BNC Certificate of Mailing - PDF Document 
06/28/2014 (4 pgs) Notice Date 06/28/2014. (Admin.) 
28 Stipulation Between Planintiff and Defendants to 
(4 pgs) Amend PreMal 01·der Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (RE: re1ated document(s)2 
Order re Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for 
08/04/2014 Trial). (Schwager, Sheila) 
29 Order Granting Stipulation (Related Doc # 28) 
08/05/20]4 (4 pgs; 2 docs) Signed on 8/5/2014. (ar) 
30 BNC Certificate of Mailing - Stjpulated Order 
08/07/2014 (4 pgs) Notice Date 08/07/2014. (Admin.) 
.ll Notice of Additional Method of Record;ng 
(2 pgs) Deposition Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, 
08/29/2014 Martin D. Frantz. (McCrea, Stephen) 
32 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Defendants 
(2 pgs) flled by Defendants Cynthia M. f1·antz. Martjn D. 
09/24/2014 Frantz (McCrea, Stephen) 
33 Stipulation Between Idaho Independent Bank, 
(5 pgs) Tyson Frantz,Matthew Frantz, Tailored 
Management Services, LLC, Martin D. Frantz and 
Cynthia M. Ftantz Sripulalion Agreemenf of 
Confidential Materials and ro Enhy of Protection 
Orde1· Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank. 
09/29/2014 (Schwager, Sheila) 
VJJ/ l,IJ/ I, !J/lUVH VL,, ii l!U 
B 
35 
(3 pgs) 
09/30/2014 
36 
09/30/2014 (3 pgs; 2 docs) 
37 
10/02/2014 (3 pgs) 
38 
(17 pgs; 6 docs) 
10/03/2014 
10/03/2014 39 
(2 pgs) 
l' r\J\ H V, l, VJV 
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Independent Bank related document(s)33 
Stipulation Between Idaho Independent Bank, 
f ran tz,Matthew 
Management Services, Martin Frantz and 
Cynthia M. Frantz St:ipulatioh Agreement of 
Confidential Materials and to Entry of Protection 
01·der). (Schwage1\ Sheila) 
Suppiemeut to Stipulation Agreement of 
Confidential .Ma1.erials and to Entry of Protection 
Order Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank 
(RE: related document(s)33 Stipulation Between 
Idaho Independent Bank, Tyson Frantz,Matthew 
Frantz, Tailored Management Services, LLC, 
Martin D. Frantz ru1d Cynthia M. Frantz Stipulation 
Agreement of Confidential Ma,erials and to Enrry 
of Prorection Order). (Schwager, Sheila) 
Order Granting Stipulation (Related Doc # TI) 
Signed on 9/30/2014. (alw) 
BNC Certificate of Mailing - Stipulated Order 
Notice Date 10/02/2014. (Admin.) 
Motion to Amend Morion 10 Continue Trial & 
Pretrial Order (related document(s)ll Order re 
Pretiial Proceedings Setting Date for Trial, 29 
Order on Stipulation) Motion to Continue Trial & 
Pretrial Order Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments: # l 
Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz# 2. Exhibit A to 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# J. Exhibit B to 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz#:!: Exhibit C to 
Declaration of Jonathon f rantz # ~ Affidavit of 
Martin Frantz) (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Mm.tin D. Frantz (RE: re]ated document(s) 
38 Motion to Amend Morion to Continue Trial & 
Pretrial Order (related document(s)Il Order 1·e 
Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for Trial, 29 
Order on Stipulation) Motion 10 Continue Tr;a/ & 
Pl'elrial Order Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments: # 1 
Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz# 2 Exhibit A to 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 3 Exhibit B to 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 4 Exhibit C to 
VVJ..t/ !,,,,V/ t...Vl,J/ J.Y.lVJ.~ Vt.. ii.. LUI J,, J\J\. ll V • 
Page 8 of 31 
Declaration of Jonathon # 5 Affidavit ' 
Martin Frantz) filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). Motion to Extend 
Time heaifag to be on 10/20/2014 at 10:00 
AM Video Boise to Coeur d' Alene (Mountain 
Time) for~ (Frantz, Jonathon) 
40 Notice of Service Certtficate of Service Filed by 
(2 pgs) Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz 
(RE: related document(s)38 Motion to Amend 
Motion to Continue Trial & Prell'ial Order (related 
document(s)2 l Order re Pretrial Proceedings 
Setting Date for Trial, 29 Order on Stipulation) 
Motion to Confinue Trial & Pre1rial Ordei' Filed by 
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz 
(Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz# 2 
Exhjbit A to Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 3 
Exhibit B to Declal.'ation of Jonatho11 Frantz# 4 
Exhibit C to Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 5 
Affidavit of Martin Frantz) filed by Defendant 
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M, Frantz, 39 
Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: relaled documem(s) 
38 Motion to A1nend Motion lo Continue Trial & 
Pretrial Order (related document(s)ll Order re 
Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for Tria1, 29 
Order on Stipulation) Motion lo Continue Trial & 
Pretrial Order Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments: # l 
Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz# 2 Exhibit A to 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz # 3 Exhibit B to 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 4 Exhibit C to 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# S Affidavit of 
Martin Frantz) filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). Motion to Extend 
Time hearing to be held on 10/20/2014 at 10:00 
AM Video - Bojse to Coeur d' Alene (Mountain 
Time) for~ filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, 
10/03/2014 Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). (Frantz, Jonarhon) 
10/03/2014 41 Amended Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants 
(2 pgs) Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related 
document(s)J,2 Notice of Hearing Filed by 
Defendat1ts Cynthia M. Frantz~ Martin D. Frantz 
(RE: related document(s)38 Motion to Amend 
Motion to Continue Trial & Pretrial Order (related 
docume11t(s)21 Order re Pretrial ProceedJn,gs 
Setting Date for Trial, 29 Order on Stipulation) 
Motion to Continue Trial & Pretrial Order Filed by 
vVJ,;/{.,U/l,VL.//!YIVH Vl.,,ll, !l!l 
10/06/2014 
42 
(3 pgs) 
10/06/2014 
43 
(146 pgs; 5 docs) 
10/10/2014 
10/10/2014 
!"f\J\ HV, 1, V'!V 
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Defe11dants Cynthia M. Martin 
(Attaclunents: # 1 Affidavit Jonathon Frantz# 2 
Exhibit A to Declaration Frantz# 3 
Exhibit B to Declaration Jonathon # 4 
Exhibit C to Declaration of Jonathon Frantz # 5 
Affidavit of Martin Frantz) filed by Defendant 
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Fl'antz). 
Motion to Extend Time hearing to be held on 
10/20/2014 at 10:00 AM Video • Boise to Coeur d1 
Alene (Mountain Time) for 38, filed by Defendant 
Ma1tin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). 
(Frantz, Jonathon) 
Corrective Action; Please refile notice of hearing to· 
show the correct year, 2014. (RE: related document 
(s)il Notice of Hearing filed by Defendant Martin 
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz) Con-ective 
Action due by 10/14/2014. (alw) 
Ame11ded Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants 
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related 
document(s)38 Motion to Amend Motion to 
Continue Trial & Pretrial Order (related document 
(s)ll Order re Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for 
Trial, 29 Order on Stipulation) Motion to Continue 
Trial & Pretrial Order Filed by Defendants 
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Al1achments: 
# 1 Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz# 2 Exhibit A to 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 3 Exhibit B to 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 4 Exhjbit C to 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 5 Affidavit of 
MarHn Frantz) filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). Motion to Continue 
hearing to be held on l 0/20/2014 at 10:00 AM 
Vjdeo - Boise to Coeur d1 Alene (Mountain Time) 
for J,!. (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Motion to Compel Production of Documents Filed 
by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank (Attachments: 
# 1 Memorandum in St1ppo1t # l Affidavit 
Affidavit of SheiJa R. Schwager in Suppol't of 
Motion to Compel Production of Documents # 1 
Affidavit Affidavit of John F. Kurtz Jr. in Support 
of Motion to Compel Production of Documents# 1 
Certificate of Compliance with Local Rule 7037.1) 
(Ku1tz, John) 
JV lU/ lJ/lVlVH Ul, !l l!Y! 
45 
(8 pgs) 
10/10/2014 
46 
(3 pgs) 
10/10/2014 
47 
(3 l pgs; 2 docs) 
10/13/2014 
10/15/2014 48 
(106 pgs; 2 docs) 
l' /1.J\ !l V, l, Vl: l 
10 of 31 
of Hearing 
Independent Bank related documen.t(s):13 
Motion to Compel Production 
by PJa:intiff ldaho Independent Bank 
# 1 Memorandum Support# 2 Affidavit 
Affidavit of Sheila R. Schwager in Support of 
Motion to Compel Production of Documents# 3 
Affidavit Affidavit of John F. Kurtz Jr. in Support 
of Motio11 to Compel Production of Documents # 4 
Certificate of Compliance with Locai Ruje 703 7. i) 
filed by Plaintiffidaho Independent Bank). Motion 
to Compe] hearing to be be]d on 10/20/2014 at 
l 0:00 AM Video - Boise to Coeur d' Alene 
(Mountain Time) for :1:1., (Kurtz, John) 
Objection to (related document(s): W Plaintftfs 
Limited Objection to Motion ro Withdraw as 
Attorney fer Defendants FHed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (Kurtz, Jolm) 
Notice of Hearing Filed by Plaintiffidaho 
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)45 
Objection to (related document(s): 16) Plaintiff's 
Limited Objection to Motion r.o Withdraw as 
AuorneY,for Defendants Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank). Miscellaneous herufog to be 
held on l 0/20/2014 at 10:00 AM Video - Boise to 
Coeur d'Alene (Mountain Time) for 45, (Kurtz, 
John) 
Objection to (related document(s): ll) to Morion lo 
Continue Trial and Pretrial Order Filed by Plaintiff 
Idaho Independent Bank (RE: !'elated document(s) 
38 Motion to Amend Motion ro Continue Trial & 
Pretrial Order (related document(s)6.l Order re 
Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for Trial, 29 
Order on Stipulation) Molton to Continue Trial & 
Pretrial Order). (Attachments: # l Affidavit of 
Sheila R. Schwager in Support of Objection to 
Motion to Continue Trial a11d Pret11aJ Order) 
(Schwager, Sheila) 
Amended AJ]idavil of John F. Kurtz .Jr. in Support 
of Motion lo Compel Production of Documents 
(amends patagraph #7) (related docm11ent(s)43 
Motion to Compel Production of Documents) 
Affidavit of John F. Kurlz Jr. in Support of Morion 
J VJ.,/ lUJ~mv~ Ul, ll lW l'l\!\ HV, l, UT/., 
11 of 31 
to Compel Production of Document:1 
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank (Anachrnents: # 
Exhibit A* 1) (Kurtz, Modified 
5/2014 (alw). 
49 Reply to (related document(s): 45 Objection filed 
(4 pgs) by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank) Filed by 
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz 
10/16/2014 (Frantz, Jonathon) 
50 Objection to (related document(s): 43, 44) to 
(4 pgs) Mor.ion to Compel, or in the alternative, Motion to 
Continue FiJed by Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, 
10/17/2014 Mart.in D. Frantz (Frantz, Jonathon) 
51 Hearing Held 
Appeuanccs: Sheila Schw11gc1· ~ Counsel for the 
l>Juintiff, Jon~ltbon Frantz ~UlCI Stephen McCrea 
~ Counsel fot· the Defemhmts 
Repo1·t of P1·oc.eedi.ngs: Defondaot.s Motion to 
Continue the Trial, Doc. No. 38, J>laintiff s 
Motion to Compel Production of Documents, 
Doc. No. 43 and Defendants Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel for the Defendants, Doc. 
No. 32. Argument pa·esented. After review and 
consideration, the Court DENIES the Motion t:o 
Continue the Trial. The trial will remain as 
scheduled for December 201.4, all ternas of the 
1>retrial oi-der sbaH remain iu effect. The Cout·t 
DENIES Counsels request to Withdraw as 
Counsel. The Motion to Compel is GRANTED. 
Order by the .Plaintiff .is forthcoming. 
(RE: l'elated document(s)38 Motion to Amend filed 
by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia 
M. Frantz, 43 Motion to Compel filed by PJaintiff 
Idaho Independent Bru1k, 45 Objection filed by 
10/20/2014 Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank) (Battle, Mel) 
52 Order Granting Motion To Compel (Related Doc # 
10/24/2014 (2 pgs) ru Signed on 10/24/2014. (zs) 
ll Order Denying Motion To Amend (RE: Related 
10/27/2014 (2 pgs) Doc# W Signed on 10/27/2014. (alw) 
10/30/2014 54 Order Denying Motion To Withdraw As Attorney 
(2 pgs) (Related Doc# J1) Signed on 10/30/2014. (alw) 
v V J.J/ f.. VI 1.,V ls)/ l!lV!l V L., 11.. l l!l r /1./t ll V, 1, V'.!..J 
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Motion to Witl1draw as Attorney for Motion to 
pgs; 1 Disqualffy Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, 
Filed by Defenda11ts Cynthia M. Martin 
Frantz (Attachments:# l Affidavit of Regina 
McCrea # 6. Exhibit A to Declaration of Regina 
McCrea# 2, Exhibit B to Declaration of Regina 
McCrea# 1. Exhibit C to Declaration of Regina 
McCrea#~ Affidavit of Martin Fr011tz # Q. Exhibit 
A to Declaration of Martin Frantz# 1 Exhibit B to 
Declaration of Martin Frantz#~ Affidavit of 
Jonathon Fi·antz # 2 Exhibit A to Declamtion of 
Jonathon Frantz # 10 Exhibit B to Declaratjon of 
10/31/2014 Jonatho11 Frantz) (Frantz, Jonathon) 
56 Notice of Trial Schedule Filed by the Court Please 
take notice, the Court hereby schedules the trial in 
this matter to commence on December 1, 2014 at 
9:30 a.m., continuing to December 2, 2014 at 9:30 
a.m., December 3-5, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. By 
November 17, 2014 the parties shall submit briefs, 
disclose witnesses and exhibits. A Witness original 
and two(2) Bench copies of all exhibits ru·e 
required. Exhibits need to be marked, tabbed and 
placed in a three-ring binder. All exhibits shall be 
delivered to the Coeur d'Alene Courthouse, 
11/03/2014 attention to Mel Battle. (Battle, Mel) 
57 Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
(2 pgs) Frantz, Mrutin D. Frantz (RE: related docume11t(s) 
55 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Moffon to 
Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Ha:wley, LLP 
Filed by Defenda.11ts Cynthia M. Frantz. Martin D. 
Frantz (Attachments:# 1 Affidavit of Regina 
McCrea # 2 Exhibit A to Declaration of Regina 
McCrea# 3 Exhibit B to Declaration of Regjna 
McCrea# 4 Exhibit C to Declaration ofRegjna 
McCrea# 5 Affidavit of Martin Frantz# 6 Exhibit 
A to Declaration of Martin Frantz# 7 Exhibit B to 
Declaration of Martin Frantz# 8 Affidavit of 
Jonathon Frantz # 9 Exhibit A to Declaration of 
Jonathon Frantz# 10 Exhibit B to Dec)a1·ation of 
Jonathon Fra11tz) filed by Defendant Martin D. 
Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). Motion to 
Disqualify Counsel hearing to be held on 
l l/17/2014 at 10:00 AM Video - Boise to Coeur d' 
11/04/2014 Alene (Mountain Time) for J2. (Frantz, Jonathon) 
l l/05/2014 
59 
(29 pgs; 3 docs) 
11/06/2014 
60 
(2 pgs) 
11/06/2014 
61 
(3 pgs) 
11/06/2014 
1 l/06/2014 62 
(2 pgs) 
"'' V .I. .I. 
13 31 
Amended Defendants 
Cynthia M. Martin (RE: related 
docui11ent(s)55 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney 
Morion lo Disqual(fy & 
Hawley, LLP Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Mrutin D. Frantz (Attachrnents: # l 
Affidavit of Regina McCrea# 2 ExJ'.1ibit A to 
Declaration of Regina McCrea # 3 Exhibit B to 
Declaration of Regina McCrea# 4 Exhibit C to 
Declaration of Regina McCrea# 5 Affidavit of 
Martin Frantz# 6 Exhibit A to Declaration of 
Martin Frantz# 7 Exhibit B to Declaration of 
Martin Fra11tz # 8 Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz # 9 
Exhibit A to Declaration of .Jonathon Frantz # 10 
Exhibit B to Declaration of Jonathon Frantz) filed 
by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia 
M. Frantz). Motion to Disqualify Counsel hearing 
to be held on 11/17/2014 at 10:00 AM Video~ 
Boise to Coeur d'Alene (Mountain Time) for 55, 
(Frantz, .Jonathon) 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Motfon to 
Disqualify Expert Witness Rand Wichman Filed by 
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Mar.tin D. Frantz 
(Attachments: # l Affidavit Second Affidavit of 
Marcin Frantz # I Exhibit A & B to Second 
Declaration of Martin Frantz) (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Notice ofHeaiing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document(s) 
59 Motion for Preliminary Injunctjon Motion to 
Df squalify Expert Witness Rand Wichman Filed by 
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz 
(Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Second Affidavit of 
Martin Frantz# 2 Exhibit A & B to Second 
Declaration of Martin Frantz) filed by Defendant 
Ma1ti11 D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). 
Disclosure Statement hearing to be held on 
11/17/2014 at l 0:00 AM at Video - Boise to Coeur 
d'Alene (Mountain Time). (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Motion to Determine Hardship Filed by Defendants 
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Frantz, 
Jonathon) 
Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document(s) 
fil. Motion to Detem1ine Hardship Filed by 
v V JJi t,,, VI 4,,;. l .,,)/ UJ.VH VI,,,, l .J- i 1'fl 
11i07/2014 
63 
(2 pgs) 
11/07/2014 
64 
(97 pgs; 4 docs) 
l l/07/2014 
65 
(2 pgs) 
11/07i2014 
11/13/2014 66 
(77 pgs· 3 docs) 
No. 
l°f\f\. HV, l, V 1: -J 
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Df'fe: Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin Frantz 
by Defendant Martin Frantz, Defendant 
M. (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Conective Action: Please refile Notice of Hearing 
and be sure to choose date/time/location so it will 
set to the calendar. {RE: related document(s)62 
Notice of Hearing filed by Defendant Martin D. 
Fnmtz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz) Conectlve 
Action due by 11/12/2014. (a]w) 
Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz. Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document(s) 
62 Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia 
M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document 
(s)6I Motion to Determine Hardship Filed by 
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz. Martin D. Frantz 
filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, Defendant 
Cynthia M. Frantz). filed by Defendant Martin D. 
Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). 
Miscellaneous hearing to be held on 11/17/2014 at 
10:00 AM Video • Boise to Coeur d'Alene 
(Mountain Time) for 62, (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Motion to 
Disqualify Experts- Maggie Lyons, Laura Burgan 
and Tes M Strunk Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments: # l Exhibit 
A# J Exhibit B # J Exhlbit C) (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Fra11tz, Martin D. Frantz (RE; related docurnent(s) 
64 Motion fol' Preliminaty Injunction Motion to 
Disqualify Experts- Maggie Lyons, Laura Burgan 
and Tes M Srrunk Filed by Defendants Cynchia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 
A # 2 Exhibit B # 3 Exhibit C) filed by Defendant 
Martin D. Frantz. Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). 
Miscellaneous hearing to be held on l l/ l 7/2014 at 
10:00 AM Video - Boise to Coeur d' Alene 
(Mountain Time) for .§1, (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Brief/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Withdraw as Attorney FiJed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)55 
Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Modon to 
Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP). 
l 
J %! LU/ l U 'J/ iVlV lV U l ; l j rl'll f JU NO, 
~ U Ban.kr,iptcy Court 
(262 pgs; 8 docs) 
11/13/2014 
68 
(5 pgs) 
11/14/2014 
69 
(33 pgs) 
11/14/2014 
70 
(13 pgs; 2 docs) 
11/14/2014 
11/17/2014 71 
Page 15 of3 l 
(Attachments: # l Affidavit of Merlyn W. Clark# l 
Affidavit of John F. Ku~ .) John) 
Brief/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
Prnliminary Injunction Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)59 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Motion to 
Disqualtfy Rtpert Witness Rand Wichman). 
(Attachrnents; # l Affidavit of Rand F. Wiclu11an # 
l Exhibit Wichman Exhibit Part I of 4 # J 
Wich111an Exhibits Part 2 of 4 # 1 Wichman 
Exhibits Part 3 of 4 # i Wichman Exhibits Part 4 of 
4 # .Q Affidavit of Sheila R. Schwager# 1 Affidavit 
of John F. Kurtz, Jr.) (Kurtz, John) 
Objectfon to (related document(s): 61) Mo1ionfer 
Finding of Hardship Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (RE: related doCLm1ent(s)fil 
Motion to Detennine Hardrhip). (Schwager, 
SheHa) 
Brief/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Preliminazy Injunction Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)64 
Motion for PreJiminary Injunction Mor.ion to 
Disqualify Experts- Maggie Lyons, Laura Burgan 
and Tes M. Slrunk). (Kurtz, John) 
Response to (related document(s): 66 Opposition 
B1ief/Memorandum filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Ban]() Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments:# l 
Affidavit of Regina McCrea- Suppleme11tal) 
(Frantz, Jonarl1on) 
Heating Continued/Rescheduled 
Appeunmces: Sheila Schwager antl .John Kurtz -
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Jonatholl Frontz and 
Ste1>hen McCrea - Counsel for the Defenchrnts 
Report o:t' Proceedings: 
Pending Motions. Motion to Disquality Hawley 
Troxell Eimis & Hawley, LLP, Doc. No. 55, 
Motion to Dis<}tU'tlify Expe11 Witness R~nd 
Wich,mrn, Doc. No. 59, Motion to Determine 
Hardsl1ip, Doc. No. 61 nnd Motfou to Disqualify 
No. 5 
UL/ LU/ U ::J/lVlVJ~ UL, lJ f!Yl 
11/18/2014 72 
(2 pgs) 
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Experts ~ Maggie Lyonsi Tes 
St1·unk, Doc. 
The Court oraJly enters prelimi.nary decision. 
Motioo to Determine Hardship, Doc. No. 61, is 
DENIED. 
The Cool't CONTINUES the Motion to 
:Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, 
LLP, Doe. No. 55, Motion to .Disqualify EX\)ert 
Witness Rand Wichm~10, Doc. No. 59, and che 
Motion to Disqualify E:,q)erts- Maggie Lyons, 
Laura Burgan nnd Tes M. St1'Unl<1 Doc. No. 64, 
for an Evidentiary Hearing to be heard 011 
December l, 2014 at 9:30 a.m. Pacific Time at 
the United States Courthouse, 6450 Mineral 
Drive, Coeur dAleo.e, Idaho. AH disclosures and 
brlefs for tllis henring a1·e due no later than 5:00 
p.m. Mountain Time on November 25, 2014. 
The trial scheduled to be heard on Decembet' 
1-5, 2014 is l1crcby VACATED. The cu.nent trial 
deadlines it.re hereby ARA Tl~)) until further 
notice. 
(RE: related docmnent(s)2.l Order re Pretrial 
Proceedings Setting Date for Trial, 55 Motion to 
Withdraw as Attorney filed by Defendant Martin D. 
Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, ~ Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant 
Mrutin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, fil. 
Motion to Detem1ine filed by Defendant Martin D. 
Frantz, Defe11dant Cynthia M. Frantz, 64 Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant 
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthla M. Frantz) 
Motion to Disqualify Counsel hearing to be held on 
12/1/2014 at 09:30 AM CDA- US Coui1house, 
Bai'lkxuptcy/Magistrate Courtroom for i2., Hearing 
to be heJd on 12/1/2014 at 09:30 AM CDA - US 
Courthouse, Bankruptcy/Magistrate Courtroom for 
22, Miscellaneous hearing to be held on 12/1/2014 
at 09:30 AM CDA - US Courthouse, 
Bankruptcy/Magistrate Courtroom for M., (Battle, 
Mel) (Entered: 11/18/2014) 
Notice regarding rescheduling trial. (sjh) 
JU Ul~/MVN UL: Lj l:'M 
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74 
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76 
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71 
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78 
(22 pgs; 3 docs) 
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(5 pgs) 
11/29/2014 
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Witness Ust Filed 
Bank. (Schwager, Sheila) 
Exhibit List Filed by Piaintiff 
Bank. (Schwager, SheiJa) 
Independent 
Witness List Filed by Defendants Cynthia M . 
Frantz. Martin D. Frantz. (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Exhibit List Filed by Defendants Cy1ithia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz. (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Expert Witness Disclosul'e of Je/Ji·ey Katz Filed by 
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz. 
(Frantz. Jonathon) 
MOTION in Limine to Prohibit E.."'C))ert Testimony 
of Jefferey Katz Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (Attaclm1ents: # l Memorandum 
in Support of Motion in Li mine# 2. Affidavit of 
John F. Kurtz, Jr. in Suppo1t of Motion in Limine) 
(Kurtz, John) 
Objection to (related document(s): ]j} Filed by 
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frn.ntz 
(Frantz, Jonathon) 
HearjJ1g Held 
Appesll'ances: Sheila Schwager and John Ku.rt2. 
fo1· Plaintiff, Jonath,m Frantz for Defendants 
Report of Proceedings: 
E'1idenfou-y Beariog regarding J>laiutiffs Motion 
in Limillc. Doc. No. 78, Defendants Motion to 
DisquaU(y Experts Maggie Lyons, Lau..-~ 
Bu1·g.1n and Tes M. Strunk. l)oc. No. 64 tnd 
Defendants motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell 
Ennis & Hawley, Doc. No. 55, and motion to 
disqualify CXIHWt Rand Wichman, Doc. No. 59. 
Parties sti1>ulate to the admission of Defendants 
e:xbibits 103, 106, 107, 112, 113, ll4, 115, 127 
and Plaintiffs exhibits 201, 202, 204, 217. 
JVL/ LU/ LUD/!V!Vl~ UL: !j rm 
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1.Plaintiffs Motion iu Liminc. Doc. No. 78. 
J>arties present oral argument. The Court enters; 
an onll ruling GRANTING Plaintiffs Motion. 
2.Defendants Motion to Disqualify Experts 
Maggie Lyons, Laura Burgan aud Tes M. 
Strunk Doc. No. 64. P.,rtics present out 
argmnent. The Court ente1·s un 01·1\I ruling 
DENYING .Defendants motion. 
3.Defeudsmts motion to disqu.tlify Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & I-fowley, Doc. No. 55, and 
motion to disqlu'llify expert Rm1d Wichmnn, 
Doc. No. 59: 
Michael Reagan sworn and examined. 
Regina McCrM sworn and examined. 
Defendants Exhibits 105, 110, 123 and Plaintiffs 
Exhibits 200,232,233,234,235,238,239,240, 
242, 243 admitted. 
Me1·lyn Clark sworn nnd examined. 
Marty Frantz sworn and examined. Defcn<hrnts 
· Exhibits l.26, 136, 1371 138, 139, 140, 141, 142 
admitted. 
Parties stipulate to the admhision of Plaintiffs 
exhibits 1.02-103, 105-107, 110-115, 117-124, 126-
1.27, 129, 1.32-164 and to J)efendnnts exhibits 
200-21.2, 215-231 (some of which were previously 
admitted). 
Merlyn Clnrk, previously sworn, is recalled and 
examined. 
Sheila ScJ1wagcr sworn and examined. 
John Kurtz sworn imd examined. 
Defendants rest. 
Court a·ecesses. :Hearing will l'esume oo Tuesday, 
Dec. 2, 2014, nt 8:30 a.m. 
(RE: related document(s)SS Moti011 to Withdraw as 
AUomey filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 59 Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Martin 
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 64 Motion 
JU LU/ LU 1:)/ !VJUN UL: lj r!Vl 
Bankruptcy 
fil. 
(4 pgs) 
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for Preliminary unction filed by Defendant 
Martin Frantz, Defendant 
(Battle, Mel) : 12/03/2014) 
Hearing Held 
Appea .. ances: Sheila Schwager and John Kurtz 
for Phlintiff, Jonathan :Frantz for Defendants 
Report of f'roceedings: 
Continued Evidentinry Hearing regarding 
Plaintiffs Motion in .Limine. Doc. No. 78, 
Defendants Motion to Disqualify Experts 
Maggie Lyons, Lnura Burgan and Tes M. 
Strunk. Doc. No. 64 ;rnd Defendants motion to 
disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hnwley, Doc. 
No. 55, and n1otion to disqi.iaJify· exJlert Rand 
Wichman, Ooc. No. 59. 
M)u·ty Frautz, previously sworn, is recalled and 
examined. 
Rimd Wichman - sworn i)nd exnminetl. 
Defendants stipulate tlrnt Rand Wichnum was 
an indepcndcn.t con.tractor and not an employee. 
Plaintiff rests. 
Marty Frantz, previously sworn, is recalled nnd 
e:xamin<ld. 
Defendants rest. 
All parties rest. Evidence is closed. 
P:lrtics present ornl closing argumeDts. 
The Court takes the matter under advisement. 
(RE: related document(s)SS Motion to Withdraw as 
Attomey fiJed by Defenda11t Martin D. Frantz, 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz) 59 Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Ma1tin 
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 64 Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant 
Ma11in D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Fra11tz) 
(Suzanne Hickok, Mel Battle) (Entered: 
12/03/2014) 
vVL/lU/L.UlJ/lY1VH Vl !J f!Vl 
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Order Denying Motion For Disqualification of 
Plaintiffs Experts (Related Doc# M), G1·an11ng 
Motion Limine # 78). on 
12/4/2014. (sjh) 
Notice of Hearing Filed by the Court. Please take 
notice a Telephonic Oral Ruling regarding 
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine. Doc. No. 78, 
Defendants Motion to Disqualify Experts Maggie 
Lyons, Laura Burgan and Tes M. Strwlk. Doc. No. 
64 and Defendants motion to disqualify Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Doc. No. 55, and motion 
to disqualify expert Rand Wichman, Doc. No. 59 
will be held on the December 10th, 2014 at l :00 
p.m. Pacific Time/ 2:00 p.m. Mountain Time. On 
the date and time specified, the parties shall call the 
Courts personal conferencing phone number at 
l-877-336-1829, enter access code 3956660, 
security code 2222 and follow the operators 
instrnctions. (Battle, Mel) 
Heari11.g Held 
At>i>earances: S1Jei1;1 Schwitger and Tim Kurtz -
Counsel for the Plaintiff, ,Jonnthon Krantz -
Counsel fo1· the Det'cndnnt 
Report of Proceedings: 
Oral Ruling regarding J)efendlrnts Motion to 
Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, 
Doc. No. 55, and Defentlan1·s Motion to 
Disqualify expert Rand Wichman, Doc. No. 59. 
The Court orally enters findings and 
conclusions, reseJ-ving the right to 11mend, 
supplement, or issue written findings. 
Defendants Motion to Disqualify Hawley Tro-xell 
Ennis & Hawley, Doc. No. 55, DENIED. 
Defendants Motion to Disqualify expert Rand 
Wichman, Doc. No. 59, D.ENlED. 
The Court will enter appropriate Order. 
Counsel shall submit to the Court their 
uoavaiJable trial dates for April, M1'1y and June 
2015 by tile ct1<l of this wccl<.. 
.JV Lr/ lUI lU l:J/lV!V!~ Ul, l 't f JV! 
Bai-ikruptcy 
85 
(1 pg) 
12/10/2014 
86 
(3 pgs) 
12/12/2014 
87 
12/12/2014 (3 pgs) 
88 
(3 pgs) 
12/29/2014 
89 
Ol/30/2015 (26 pgs) 
90 
01/30/2015 (4 pgs) 
21 
02/04/2015 (3 pgs) 
92 
02/04/2015 (7 pgs) 
03/05/2015 93 
(11 pgs) 
l' AA l~ 0, 
21 of 31 
(Proceedings recorded in Boise1 lD.) 
(RE: Motion to as 
Attorney filed Defendant Martin 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz: Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Martin 
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frnntz, 78 Motion 
in Limine filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent 
Bank) (Battle, Mel) 
Order DENYlNG motions to disqualify. Signed on 
12/10/2014 (RE: related document(s)SS Motion to 
Withdraw as Attomey filed by Defendant Martin D. 
Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 59 Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant 
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). 
(sjh) 
Notice ofllB's Unavailable Datesfo, Tri(.Jl Filed 
by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank. (Schwager, 
Sheila) 
Notice of Unavailibilify (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Modified on 12/12/2014 (alw). 
Order Rescheduling Trial for May 26-29, 2015 and 
June l ·S, 201 S (if necessary); setting video 
conference hearing fol' March 16, 2015 at 11:00 an1 
(MDT); 10:00 am (PDT) and establishing 
deadlines. Sjgned on 12/29/2014 (RE: related 
docume11t(s)2I Order re Pretrial Proceedings 
Setting Date for Trial). (sjh) 
Exhibit List Filed by PJaintiffJdaho Independent 
Bank. (Schwager, Sheila) 
Witness List Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent 
Bank. (Schwager, Sheila) 
Witness List Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz. (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Exhibit List Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frnntz. (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Motion to Strike Undisclosed Witnesses Filed by 
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank (Schwaget, 
Sheila) 
JVL/lU/ l'J/li!Vl~ UL,l'I: [!Yl 
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Notice Filed by Plaintiffidaho 
Independent Bank related 
Motion to Undisclosed Witnesses 
Plaintiff Idaho Bank). (Schwager, 
Sheila) 
Corrective Action: The date and time of the hearing 
was not entered into ECF when filing the Notice of 
Hearing. Please re-file. (RE: related document(s)94 
Notice of Hearing filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank) Conective Action due by 
3/10/2015. (ar) 
Notice of Hearing Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)93 
Motion to Strike Undisclosed Witnesses Filed by 
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank). Motion to Strike 
hearing to be held on 3/16/2015 at 11:00 AM Video 
- Boise to Coeur d' Alene (Mountain Time) for 21, 
(Schwager, Sheila) 
Objection to (related document(s): 21) Jvfotion ro 
Strike Witnesses Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Stipulation Between Plaintiff and Defe11dants 
tegarding Trial Exhibits Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank. (Schwager, Sheila) 
Reply to (related docu.ment(s): 93 Motion to Sn·ike 
Undisclosed Witnesses filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank) Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank (Schwager, Sheila) 
Hearing Held 
Appearnnces: Shella Schwager· Counsel for the 
Pfajntiff, Jonathon Krantz. Counsel for the 
Defendant 
Reflort of Proeeedings: 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Undisclosed 
Witnesses. Argument p1·cscutcd. After 
eonsideration 1 the Court orally enters findings, 
the Court GR.ANTS the ))laintiff s Motion to 
Strike Undisclo5cd Witnesses. An order is 
forthcoming by the Plain tiff. 
J VL/ lU/ lU 'JI l!!Vl~ Ul, l 't f!Vl rAA l~O. t'. U'.H 
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Trial Status Conference. The Court accepts the 
parties stipulation regiin.ling t:hc admission of 
e..xbibits. The Court orders Def,mse Counsel to 
deUve1· nil exhibits to the Coeur d'Alene 
Courthouse no l.ater than Ji'riday Ma1·ch 20, 
2015. Tbe exhibits shall be marked and tabbed 
in acconlmue to the pretrial orde•·. 
(RE: related docurnent(s)l Complaint filed by 
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank, 93 Motion to 
Snike filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank) 
(Battle, Mel) 
100 A.1t1ended Exhibit List Filed by Defendants Cynthia 
(2 pgs) M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document 
03/16/2015 (s)92 Exhibit List). (Frantz, Jonathon) 
lQ! Order Requiring Clarification. Signed on 3/18/2015 
(3 pgs) (RE: related document(s) l 00 Exhibit List filed by 
Defendant Maitin D. Frantz; Defendant Cyi1thia M. 
03/18/2015 Frantz). (sjh) 
102 Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
(3 pgs; 2 docs) Undisclosed Witnesses (Related Doc# 93) Signed 
03/18/2015 on 3/18/2015. (ar) 
w.. Notice of Transcript Requesl Filed by Plaintiff 
03/18/2015 (3 pgs) Idaho In.dependent Ba11k. (Schwager, Sheila) 
104 BNC Certificate of Mailing - Order on Motion to 
03/20/2015 (3 pgs) Strike Notice Date 03/20/2015. (Admin.) 
03/23/2015 105 Transcript regarding Hearing Held 12il0/14 RE: 
(2 pgs; 2 docs) Judge's Ruling. 
Remote electronic access to the transcr1pt is 
resuicted until 06/22/2015. The transcript may be 
viewed at the Bankruptcy Court Clerk's Office. 
[Court Reporter/Transcriber Gayle Ma1ti11~Lutz@ 
NW Transcripts, LLC, Telephone number 208~989-
3455.] Purchasing Pal'ty: Sheila Schwagel'@ 
Hawley Troxell 
(R£: related document(s) 84 Hearing Held 
Appean1nces: Sheila Schwager and Tim Kurtz w 
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Jonathon Krantz -
Counsel for the Defcudant 
UVU'/ l,,V/ t...Vl.J/JJ!V!l Vli• l'! 1Ui !'!\!\ HV, 1, VJJ 
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Report of Proceedings: 
Oral Ruling regan.ling Defendants Motion to 
Disquahfy Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, 
Doc. No. 55, and Defcuda.nts Motion to 
Disqualify expert Rnnd Wicbman, Doc. No. 59. 
The Court orally entc1·s findings and 
conclusions, rese1"1-ing the right to amend, 
supplement, or issue wl.'ittcn findings. 
Defendants Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell 
Ennis & Hawley, Doc. No. 55, DENlED. 
))efendants Motion to Disqualify expert Rlrncl 
Wichmau, Doc. No. 59, DENIED. 
The Court will cntc1· appropriate Ordet·. 
Counsel sJull st1bmit to the Court tbeil' 
unavailable ttial dotes for April, May ~,ncl ,June 
2015 by the end of this week. 
(Pi:oce.eding8 t·ecorded iJl Boise, ID.) 
(RE: related document(s)55 Motion to Withdraw as 
Attorney filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 59 Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Martin 
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 78 Motion 
in Li.mine filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent 
Bank)). Notice oflntent to Request Redaction 
DeadHne Due By 03/30/20 l S. Redaction Request 
Due By 04/13/2015. Redacted Transcript 
Submission Due By 04/23/2015. Transcript access 
will be restricted through 06/22/2015. (Lutz, Gayle) 
.lQ.6. Response to (related document(s): 10 l Order 
(4 pgs) (Genedc)) Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, 
03/24/2015 Matiin D. Frantz (Frantz, Jonathon) 
107 BNC Certificate of Mai1i11g - Notice of Filing of a 
03/29/2015 (2 pgs) Transcdpt Notice Date 03/29/2015. (Admin.) 
04/13/2015 108 Transcript regarding Heal'ing Held 12/01/14 RE: 
(3 pgs; 2 docs) Trial Day 1. 
Remote electronic access to the transcript is 
J'estricted until 07/13/2015. The transcript may be 
viewed at (he Bankruptcy Court Clerk's Office. 
Hawley eta I 
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[Court Reporter/Transcriber Bomiie Martinelli, 
Telephone number 
Sheila Schwager 
(RE: related document(s) 80 
Appearances: Sheila Schwager and ,John Kurtz 
fol' Ph1iutiff, Jon~ltlrnn Fnmtz for Defendants 
Report of F rocecdings: 
Evidentiary Hearing regarding Plaintiffs Mo1·ion 
in Umirie. Doc. No. 78, Defeudauts Motion to 
Disqualify .E:xpert!I M,,ggie Lyons, Lau,·~ 
Burg,m and Tes M. Strunk. Doc:. No. 64 and 
Defendant~ motion to disquaH1jr Hawley Ttoxcll 
Ennl"> & I·fawley, J)oc. No. 55, and motion to 
disqualify expert Rand Wichman, Doc. No. 59. 
Parties stipulate to the admission ofOefcndants 
exhibits 103, 106, 107, H2, 113,114,115, 127 
and Plaintiffs exhibits 201,202,204,217. · 
I.Plaintiffs Motion in Lhnil)c. Doc. No. 78. 
P~rties present on,l argument. The Coul't enters 
an ond r11ling GRANTING Plaintiffs Motion. 
2.DefeaHhmts Motion to Disqualify Experts 
Maggie Lyons, Laura Bul'gan 1111d Tes M. 
Strunk. Doc. No. 64. Pat·ties present ornl 
argume11t. Tbe Coul't enters ~ln oral ruling 
.DENYING Dcfenditnts motion. 
3.Dcfendants motion to dis~1ualify H;lwlcy 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Doc. No. 55, and 
motion to disqualify expet·t Rand Wichmlln, 
Doc. No. 59: 
Miclrne] Reagan sworn nnd examined. 
Regina McCrea sworn imd examined. 
Defendants Exhibits 105,110,123 and Plaintiffs 
Exhibits 200. 232, 233, 234, 235, 238, 239, 240, 
242, 243 admitted. 
Merlyn Clarksworn and examined. 
Marty Frantz sworn and examined. Defcndanf·s 
Exhibits 126,136,137,138,139, 1401141,142 
admitted. 
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Parties stipulate to the admission of Plaintiffs 
exhibits 102-103, JOS-107, 110-1 11 126-
1291 132-164 and to .Defendants exhibits 
200·212, 215-231 which were previously 
admitted). 
Merlyn Cfarl<, previously sworn, is recalled and 
exam,ned. 
Sheila Schwager sworn and examined. 
John I(U1·tz sworn and examined. 
Defenda11 ts rest. 
Court 1·eccsses. Hearing will resume on Tuesday, 
Dec. 2, 2014, at 8:30 n.m. 
(RE: related document(s)55 Molion to Withdraw as 
Altomey filed by Defendant Mal'tin D. Ftantz, 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 59 Motion fol' 
P1·eliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Martin 
D. Ft·antz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz. 64 Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant 
Mrutin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz)). 
Notice of Intent to Request Redaction Deadline 
Due By 04/20/2015. Redaction Request Due By 
05/4/2015. Redacted Transcript Submission Due 
By 05/14/2015. Transcript access will be l'esuicted 
through 07/13/2015. (Nunemacher, VaJerie) 
Modified on 4/13/2015 (ar). 
Transcript regarding Heru·ing Held 12/02/ l 4 RE: 
Day 2 Trial. 
Remote electronic access to the transcript is 
restl'icted until 07/13/2015. The transcript may be 
viewed at the Bankruptcy Com1 Clerk's Office. 
[Cou1t Reportel'/Transcriber Bormie Martinellli, 
Telephone number 208~765-3666.] Purchasing 
Party: Sheila Schwager 
(RE: related docmnent(s) fil. Hearing Held 
Appearances: Sheila Schwuger and John Kurtz 
for Pl11intiff, Jonnthan Fnrntz fo1' Defendants 
Report of Proceedings: 
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Continued Evidentiary Hearing regnrdiug 
Plaintiffs Motion in Limioe. Doc. No. 78, 
Defendants Motion to Disqualify Experts 
Maggie Lyons, Launt But·gan and Tes M. 
Strunk Doc. No. 64 and Defendnnts motion to 
disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Doc. 
No. 55, and motion to disqualify expert Rand 
Wichman, Doc. No. 59. 
Marty Frantz, 1ueviously sworn, is recalled and 
examined. 
Rnnd Wichmim - sworn nnd examined. 
Defendants stipulate that Rond Wichman was 
an indcpendellt coutractor und not im. employee. 
Plaintiff rests. 
Marty Frantz, previously sworn, is recalled llnd 
examined. 
Defendants rest. 
All parties rest. Evidence is closed. 
Partfos prese:nt o.-al closing arguments. 
The Court takes the matter under advisement. 
(RE: related document(s)55 Motion to Withdraw as 
Attorney filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, 
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 59 Motion for 
Preliinin!lly Injunction filed by Defendant Mal'tin 
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 64 Motion 
for Preliminary Tnjunction filed by Defendant 
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz) 
(Suzanne Hickok, Mel Battle)). Notice oflntem to 
Request Redaction Deadline Due By 04/20/2015. 
Redaction Request Due By 05/4/2015. Redacted 
Transcript Submission Due By 05/14/2015. 
Transcript access will be restricted through 
07/13/2015. (Nunemacher, Valerie) Modified on 
4/13/2015 (ar). 
1 JO BNC Ce1tificate of Maili11g - Notice of Filing of a 
04/17/2015 (3 pgs) Transcript Notice Date 04/17/2015. (Adrnin.) 
ill BNC Certificate of Mailing - Notice of Filing of a 
04/17/2015 (2 pgs) Transcript Notice Date 04/17/2015. (Admin.) 
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ill Pre-tlial Brief Filed by Plaintiffidaho Independent 
04/30/2015 (40 pgs) Bank. (Schwager, Sheila) 
114 Pre-u·iaJ Brief Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. 
04/30/2015 (2 pgs) Frantz, Martin D. Frantz. (Frantz, Jonathon) 
115 Notice of Hearing Filed by the Court. Please take 
(2 pgs) notice a Status Conference in the adversary 
proceeding shall be held on Wednesday, May 20, 
2015, at 9:00 a.m. (PDT)/10:00 a.m. (MDT), and 
counsel shall appear at either the United States 
Courthouse. 6450 Mineral D1ive, Coeur dAlene, 
Idaho, or the James A. McClure FedL Bldg. and 
U.S. Courthouse, 550 W. Fo11 St, Boise, Idaho. 
05/14/2015 (Battle, Mel) 
116 Heming .Held 
Appeantnces: Sheila Schwager and .John Kurtz -
Counsel for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank, 
Ste,,e MtC1·ea and Jonathon F1·antz ~ Counsel 
for Defendants Martin i.md Cynthia F1·antz, 
Corey Quinn - Rep1·escnting Cha11tm· 7 Trustee 
Report of Proceedings: Trial Status Conference. 
Argument presented rcgiu·ding the effects of the 
Approved Wnivor of Discharge. The Court 
orally enters ftndings and conclusions. Due to 
the Approved Waiver olDischa1·gc this 
AdvcrSlU'Y Proceeding i-~ re11dcrcd MOOT. The 
h·ia.l scheduled t.o commence on Mny 26, 2015 is 
bereby VACA TED. (Proceeding~ recorded in 
Boise, ID.) 
(RE: related documeot(s)l Complaint filed by 
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank, ill Notice of 
Hearing) (Battle, Mel) Modified on 5/20/2015 
05120/2015 (Battle, Mel). 
ill Motio11 For Sanctions Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
06/02/2015 (44 pgs) Independent Bani< (Schwager, Sheila) 
06/02/2015 118 Affidavit Re: Affidavit of Sheila R. Schwager in 
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Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)l 17 
Motion For Sanctions Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank). Motion for Sanctions hearing 
to be held on 6/15/20 J 5 at l 0:00 AM Video Baise 
to Coeur d' Alene (Mountain Time) for 117, 
(Schwager, Sheila) 
Bill of Costs Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent 
Bank. Objections to Bill of Costs due by: 
06/17/2015 (Schwager, Sheila) 
Application for Compensation Filed by Plaintiff 
Idaho Independent Ba.:nk. (Attachments: # l 
Memorandum in Support# 1 Affidavit of Sheila R. 
Schwager# J Affidavit of John F. Kurtz) 
(Schwager, SheiJa) Modified on 6/4/201 S (alw). 
Notice of Hearing Filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent B a11k (RE: related document( s)] 21 
Bill of Costs Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent 
Bank. Objections to Bill of Costs due by: 
06/17/2015 (Attachments:# 1 Memorandum in 
Support # 2 Affidavit of SheiJa R. Schwager # 3 
Affidavit of John F. Kurtz) filed by Plaintiff Idaho 
Independent Bank). Miscellaneous hearing to be 
held on 7/28/2015 at 09:30 AM CDA- US 
Cou11house, Bankruptcy/Magistrate Courtroom for 
121, (Schwager, Sheila). Related document(s) 123 
Application for Compensation Motion for 
Attomeys' Fees and Costs for Sheila Rae Schwager, 
Creditor's Attorney, Fee: $385402.50, Expenses: 
$23210.42. filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent 
Bank. Modified on 6/4/2015 (alw). 
Amended Application for Compensation Motion for 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs for Sheila Rae Schwager, 
Creditor's Attorney, Fee: $385402.50, Expenses: 
$23210.42. Filed by Attorney Sheila Rae Schwager 
Objections to Application for Compensation due by 
06/29/2015. (Attachments:# l Memorandum in 
Support# J Affidavit of Sheila R. Schwagel' # 1 
Affidavit of John F, Kt111:Z, Jr.) (Schwager, Sheila) 
Modified on 6/4/2015 (alw). *a111ended to use 
correct event code* 
V t.U/ VjJ/lYlV1' V' J ll!l 
125 
(3 pgs) 
06/12/2015 
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06/12/2015 
127 
06/15/2015 
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(7 pgs) 
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Jonathon 
for Sanctions# i Exhibit to Declaration of 
Jonathon Frantz # 1 Exhibit B to Declaration of 
Jonathon Frantz# 1 Exhibit C to Declaration of 
Jonathon Frantz# 2. Exhibit C-1 to Declai·ation of 
Jonathon Frantz) (Frantz, Jonathon) 
Supplement to Motion for Sanctions Filed by 
Plaintiff Idaho Independe11t Bartle (RE: related 
docurnent(s)l J 7 Motion For Sanctions). 
(Schwager, Sheila) 
Affidavit Re: Jane Bodle-Hill in Support of Motion 
for Sanctions Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent 
Bank (RE: related document(s)l25 Supplement). 
(Schwager, Sheila) 
Hearing Held 
Appeal'ances: Sheila Schw~lgcr - Counsel for 
Plaintiff, Jonathon Frantz - Counsel for the 
Defendant 
Repol't of Proceedings: Plaintiff Motion for 
Sanctions, Doc. No. 117. Argument presented. 
The Court deems the matt:cr submitted and 
undc.- advisement. A decision is forthcoming. 
(RE: related document(s) J 17 Morion for Sanctions 
filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank) (Battle, 
Mel) 
Objection to (related docim1ent(s): 121, 123) !]B's 
Motion.for Auorney Fees and Costs Filed by 
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Ma1tin D" Frantz 
(Frantz, Jonathon) 
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II II I 
1 West Sprague Suite 1 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (S09) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
I\MDLl:N L , 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & HawJey LLP 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR n IE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN fR/\NTZ, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY ) 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
-~--.) 
Cast! No. CVI5~1406 
l)KFENDANT'S REPLY RE 
DISMISSAL/ ADA Tl( 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs response is three-fold: 
lt!j VVt-/ VVV 
(a) That the adversary proceeding wilhin the bankruptcy was "rendered moor' 
so that there are no longer two pending actions; 
(b) Ri;s judicata does not apply because there has been and will be no finaJ 
judgment; and 
(c) A motion for disqualification is different Lhan an action for legal 
malpractice and breach of fiducjary duty. 
I/ rA ~AlNt HAM~ltN Lr tgJVVV/VVl.J 
it pending 
proceeding, or in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
the adversary 
1. The Adversary Proceeding as well as the Bankruptcy Proceeding Remain Pending-
Both WiU Result in a Fb1at Judgment. 
Plaintiff's first argument makes the factually incorrect statement I.hat the adversary 
proceeding is no longer pending because it was determined to be moot. As reflected in the 
Allidavit of Ms. Schwager, Mr. Fra.ntz filed an agreement that none of his debts were 
dischargeable. Thus, no trial of whether Mr. Frantz committed fraud is necessary. However, that 
docs not determine the proceeding. There are two motions pending - one for sanctions, and one 
for attorney's fees, which the Court has not ruled upon. Once the Court rules, ajudb1ffient in the 
amount of the sanctions as wcJI as auorney's fees will be entered. That wm be a 11nal judgment. 
Further, the bankruptcy remains pending. The precise issue which is fundamental to 
plaintiff's suit i11 this action, i.e., whether Merlyn Clark became Mr. Frant7.'s attorney in 
providing expert services to Mr. Bruce Owens, has been determined. That issue was not 
detennined solely for the Adversary Proceeding, but is a finding and conclusion of the 
Bankruptcy Court and wiJI continue through the conclusion or the bankruptcy. Defendant HTEH 
continues to represent JIB as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, adver.~e to Mr. Frantz. 
In short there remain at Jeast two pending proceedings, and plaintiff's argument to the 
contrary is factually inaccurate. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
There wm Be a Final Judgment Binding on Plaintiff, 
collateral cstoppe1 will never apply. That is based on the faulty assumption 
wilJ never be entered in either the adversary proceeding or the bankruptcy. 
~ 004/ 0 
a final judgment 
Plaintiff appears to also be arguing that the final judgment has to be one determining the 
issue subsequently litigated, i.e., the issue to be litigated in this action. That represents a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the law of res judicata in Idaho. While it is true that there does 
have to be a ".finaJ judgment" which concludes the action where the issue in question arose, there 
does not have to be a "final judgment" that Mr. CJark was not acling as Mr. Frantz's attorney. 
Where the specific issue raised m the subsequent action was actually determined in the previous 
action, a judgment finally concluding the action suffices for this element of res judicala. 
One of the cases cited by plaintiff, Fanners Nat'] Bank v. Shif~_y, 26 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 
762 (1994) is instructive on this issue. In that case, Fanner's National loaned money to Allen to 
purchase ca1l1e and equipment from Shirey, pursuant to a Dairy Sales Agreement. Both Shirey 
and the bank took a security interest in the ca1tlc and equipment, with Shirey subordinating its 
interest lo 1h0 Bank. Allen came to financial grief and Dlcd for protection from creditors under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Both Bank and Shirey filed claims as secured creditors and a 
Trustee was appointed. Bank proposed that it be allowed 10 sell the co!lateraJ and moved to lift 
lhe stay. Trustee agreed and signed a stipulation to that effect. Shirey did not object to e.ilher the 
motion or the stipulation until after Bank had sold the coHatcra]. Shirey then sued Bank in state 
court for the balance owed it by AlJen under a variety of theories . .Bank moved for summary 
judgment on the basis, inter alia, of res judicata. The trial court agreed, dismissed Shircy's action 
and the Idaho Supreme upheld that dismissat Holding that all three clcmcnls for res 
7 0 NE HAMBlE 14] 00!> QO 
a held 
subsequent action. 
The case includes an excellent discussion of re~ judicata commencing at page 68 and 
concluding on page 71 of 1.he Opinion at 126 Idaho. The case recog_nizcs that a different analysis 
applies depending on whether the second action is attempting to litigate the same claim between 
the same parties, or whether the same parties arc litigating a di11erenl claim, but involving issues 
which were determined in 1.he first The former situation is referenced ai:; the "Joyce" RuJc which 
states that: 
In an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand the 
former adjudication concludes parties and privies, not only as to every 
matter offered and received to sustain or defeat tho claim, but also as to 
every matter which might and should have been litigated in the First suit. 
It is correct that the claim in the Adversary Proceeding in the Frantz bankruptcy was non-
dischargeability due to fraud, while the claim in the instant action is for damages due to attorney 
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, under the J()yce Rule, res judicata/collateral 
estoppcJ would not apply. However, the analysis does not end there. For where, as here, the issue 
arjscs in a subsequent action based upon a different claim or demand, the "Marshall Rule" 
applies, based on Marshall v. Underwood, 38 ldaho 464, 466, 221 Pac. 1105 (1923). The 
Marshall Rule holds that judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppcl onJy as to those 
precise matters which were in fact decided. Fam1ers Nat'! Bank, supra at 126 ldaho 70. 
The Marshall Rule applies here to defeat plaintiff's claims. Here, the precise issue 
dispositivc of both the disqualification claim as well as the current malpractice/breach of 
fiduciary duty claim has been litigated between Mr. Franti!, IIB, and HI3's privy, HTEH. 'Jbat 
issue is whether Merlyn Clark became Mr. Frantz's attorney back in 2008 when he provided 
0 F P INE HAMB L p llJ 008/0 
that 
Once the final judgment is entered either or both, thal ruling becomes the the case and 
is binding on plaintiff. 
Based on Idaho Jaw as reflected in the Farmers Nat'l Bank case, p1aLnli ff is barred from 
relitiga1ing the issue of whether Merlyn Clark was ever acting as an attorney for Mr. frantz. 1 
3. Plaintiff's Distinction Between the Two Actions is lrrelev11nt to Disposition of this 
~. 
Plaintiffs final argument is that an action for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary 
duty is different than a motion for disqualification. The difference cited is that the Court, in a 
disqualification motion, conducts a "multi-faceted analysis_" The argument simply misses the 
point Tn order to succtled on his claim that Hr.EH violati;,d the rules regarding former clitmts, 
Frantz must prove that an attorney-client relationship existed between him and Merlyn Clark. In 
order to succeed on his current malpractice claim, Mr. Frantz is required to prove that an 
attorney-client relationship existed between him and Merlyn Clark. Although the ramifications of 
the determination of the issue are different (disqualification versus damages), the issue is the 
same. Neither chum can be successfully prosecuted without establishing that attorney-client 
relationship. In this case, lhat means that Mr. Frantz must prove that Merlyn Clark acted as his 
atlorney at law_ The bankruptcy court, sitting as trial judge in the adversary proceeding, after a 
two day cvidcntiary hearing, specifically found that there was no such relationship. 
Plaintiff doc:, nol ar~ue. and thus concedes. thatthe ''identity of the parties" requirement. through privily, exists_ 
In that regard, the Fannon; Nat'l Bank case, supr~ provides a good example of how the party ass1..ning res 
judicaui in the subsequent action need not be identical if he wa..s in privity with a party in the prior acLion. 
(Trustee in bankruptcy representing creditors-privily existing to bar later action in creditor's name_) 
0 PAIN HAMBLEN 
CONCLUSION 
the adversary proceeding, as wet I as the bankruptcy is 
should stay this action until such final judgment is entered. 
DATED this U day of July, 2015. 
141007 /0 
Alternatively, the Court 
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COUNTY OF KOOTI:N,&J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership. 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 15-1406 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY re: MOTION FOR 
PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, by and through his counsel of record and hereby submits his reply 
regarding his motion for pro hac vice admission of Jeffery Katz. 
The Defendant is now disingenuously insisting that Mr. Katz will be a witness despite the 
fact that Defendant filed to ever submit this argument in any of its previously filed briefs. 
Instead, Defendant cunningly attempts to create an issue in order to prevent Mr. Frantz from 
using the attorney of his choice. 
InitiaJly, while Defendant attempts to discredit Plaintiff's citation of authority, 
importantly, Defendant provides no contrary citations. This is because there is no guidance in 
Idaho law on the subject As a result, the Plaintiff has turned to well respected federal circuit 
case law, which has already had a substantial opportunity to consider the issue. The federal 
24-Ju 08:51 
is well reasoned and should apply here. 
Additional]y, Defendant is attempting to manufacture a scenario wherein Mr. Katz wrn 
be a witness in order to prevent him from being granted pro hac vice admission. However, what 
Defendant fails to recognize is that even were Mr. Katz to be a witness, it would still not prevent 
bim from representing Mr. Frantz in the remainder of the proceedings. I.R.P.C. Rule 3.7 only 
bars a lawyer from acting "as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness unless: ( 1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue." First, even if Mr. 
Katz was a necessary witness at tiial, it would only prevent Mr. Katz from being an attorney at 
trial. The purpose of rule is to ensure there is no confusion during the trial (as that is the only 
time the attorney's dual roles could be confused). See I.R.P.C. Rule 3.7, cmt. 2. Therefore, this 
rule could only bur Mr. Kutz from being an·-attornoy-at trial It cannot stand to bar him from pro 
hac vice admission entirely. 
Second, the Defense claims it wants to question Mr. Katz and determine "motives." To 
the extent Hawley Troxell desires to discover Mr. Frantz's motives in bringing this lawsuit, such 
is protected by the attorney-client relationship and not subject to discovery. To the extent the 
Defendant desires to question Mr. Katz regarding his motives (which are subjective) Mr. Katz 
testimony on the subject would necessmiJy be uncontroverted (there can be no other testimony as 
to Mr. Katz subjective motive). As a resu]t, such testimony would be excepted from rule 3.7. 
See I.R.P.C. Rule 3.7(a)(l) (an exception for testimony relating "to an uncontested issue"). 
Lastly, Mr. Katz's testimony is not "necessary" as required by rule 3. 7. Mr. Frantz' s 
motive in bringing this lawsuit is not an element of professional malpractice, nor is it an element 
of any defense thereto. Of course Mr. Frantz wants money from Hawley Troxel] to rectify 
p. 
21-Ju 08: +12082623894 
not 
the least bit to the lawsuit at hand and therefore Mr. Katz is not and would not be a necessary 
witness. Indeed, Mr. Katz testimony would not even be admissible as it would not be relevant. 
In conclusion, Mr. Katz at most could only be barred from representing Mr. Frantz at trail 
(not during the entire litigation); however, since Mr. Katz testimony would be both unnecessary 
(and irrelevant) as well as uncontested, rule 3.7 is inoperable in this circumstance. As a result, 
Mr. Katz shou]d be granted admission. 
FRANTZ LAW, PU.C 
By: Isl Jonathon Frantz 
DATED thls 24th day of July, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of July, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
John C. Riseborough 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] 
[X] 
[ ] 
Overnight Mail 
FAX (509) 838-0007 
Hand Delivery 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF !DAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, ) 
LLP, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 20151406 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR ABATE, 
AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PRO HAC VICE 
ADMISSION 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 
This matter is before the Court on the "Motion to Dismiss or Abate" defendant 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley (Hawley Troxell), against plaintiff, Martin Frantz 
(Frantz). Frantz' positions taken in this case demonstrate his misunderstanding of state 
and federal bankruptcy laws and their interaction. The relief sought by Frantz and the 
legal theory underpinning that requested relief demonstrate the absurdity of this 
litigation. Frantz is currently represented in this litigation in state court, and in his 
concurrent litigation in federal bankruptcy court, by his son, attorney Jonathon Frantz. 
Frantz' misunderstanding of our laws is discussed below. The relief sought in 
the Complaint and Jury Demand filed on February 20, 2015, are damages sustained by 
Frantz caused by Hawley Troxell's "legal malpractice and/or breach of fiduciary duty". 
Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 9, 1J B. The legal theory espoused in that Complaint 
and Jury Demand is Frantz' claim that when Frantz filed bankruptcy in October 2011, 
a 
allegedly 
confidential 
IIB was 
reporting the 
his assets." Id., p. 2, 1f 3. The fatal factual problem with Frantz' theory is that Hawley 
Troxell did not represent Frantz as an attorney in that prior litigation, thus, no conflict, 
and no malpractice in the bankruptcy proceeding. The fatal legal problem with Frantz' 
theory is that the Honorable Terry L. Myers, Presiding Chief Judge of the United States 
Bankruptcy Court, already decided that precise issue on December 10, 2014, after a 
two-day evidentiary hearing. Judge Myers found Merlyn Clark, an attorney for Hawley 
Troxell, was hired in this earlier litigation by Frantz' attorneys, Bruce Owens and Regina 
McCrea, to provide expert testimony, not to act as Frantz' attorney. Affidavit of John C. 
Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit IX, p. 12, LI. 10-15. Frantz breathed not a word 
about that prior decision in his Complaint and Jury Demand filed before this Court, filed 
two months after Judge Myers' decision. 
While not relevant to resolving this case, the Court feels compelled to note the 
manner in which Frantz alleges he sustained his damages in this case. Essentially, 
Frantz claims in his Complaint and Jury Demand that he did not lie to 118 and the 
bankruptcy court about his assets, but if he did lie, the only way the bankruptcy court 
could have found out that Frantz lied to IIB and the bankruptcy court was by Hawley 
Troxell disclosing confidential information to IIB and the bankruptcy court which was 
obtained in that prior litigation. Frantz alleges: 
23. Mr. Frantz's personal financial statements provided to 118 were 
not fraudulent. The only basis for a claim that they may have been 
fraudulent is if the claimant had knowledge of Mr. Frantz's business entity 
and the entity's ownership of the Guardian Angel Homes project. 
Complaint and Jury Demand, p.5, 1f 25. Let that sink in for a moment. The only way 
Hawley No. 
can case 
118 
damages in this state court action. 
At least Frantz was honest with this Court in his Complaint and Jury Demand 
about what he tried doing before the bankruptcy court (pursuing disqualification of 
Hawley Troxell as IIB's counsel in bankruptcy court), as Frantz alleges in this state court 
action: 
25. As a result of Defendant's use of information relating to 
Defendant's prior representation of Mr. Frantz to Mr. Frantz's 
disadvantage in the current proceedings, Mr. Frantz immediately began to 
pursue disqualification of Defendant from representing 118 in the 
bankruptcy proceeding as well as other proceedings in which Frantz' 
financial status was a significant issue. 
Id., p. 5, 1f 25. However, Frantz was completely silent in his complaint about what 
Judge Myers did with Frantz' effort to disqualify. As mentioned above, Frantz 
conveniently omitted any reference in his Complaint and Jury Demand filed before this 
Court the fact that two months earlier Judge Myers' decided Frantz had absolutely no 
basis upon which to disqualify Hawley Troxell. 
The wake of litigation left by Frantz is described as follows: 
In 2008, Frantz was at that time pursuing an attorney malpractice lawsuit against 
the law firm of Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S. (Witherspoon Kelley). 
Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit I, p. 2, 1f 2. This Court is more 
than familiar with that litigation, being assigned to preside over Marty D. Frantz v. 
Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., Kootenai County Case No. CV 2008 
2630. On June 8, 2009, this Court issued a "Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" in that case. 
Frantz Hawley 
that on 1 2008, Regina MCrea, for Frantz 
& expert 
standard of care for the attorney malpractice claim. Affidavit of John Riseborough, 
May 7, 2015, Exhibit Ill. Clark informed McCrea and Bruce Owens, McCrea's co-
counsel, that "any information [he] received would be discoverable in the Malpractice 
Lawsuit by the defendants in that case and that they should not provide [him] any 
information they would not want defendants to discover." Affidavit of John C. 
Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit V, p. 4, ,I 14. McCrea sent Clark materials he would 
need to review in order to render an opinion. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 
2015, Exhibit Ill "Mr. Clark reviewed the materials and authored a 21 page report 
dated May 4, 2009, reflecting his opinions." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), p. 2; Affidavit of John C. 
Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit I, p. 2, ,-r 5. That report was sent to McCrea. 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Abate 
(I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), p. 3; Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit I, p. 2, ,-r 
5. After this Court's June 8, 2009, "Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment", the attorney malpractice case Frantz v. Witherspoon 
Kelley resolved through mediation. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, 
Exhibit I, p. 2, ,-r 7. 
In "June 2010, Idaho Independent Bank (118) retained Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley to pursue claims against Mr. Frantz for failure to pay a loan that fully matured." 
Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 4, 1f 18. On June Hawley Troxell, its 
capacity as counsel for 118, sent a demand letter to Davidson, Backman, Medeiros, 
John 1, 
proceedings against 
During the bankruptcy proceedings Frantz and his wife, Cynthia M. Frantz, 
sought to disqualify Hawley Troxell as counsel for 118 pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.9. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit IX, p. 
7, LI. 24-25 through p. 8, LI. 1-2. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 instructs: "A 
lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent 
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's 
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former 
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing." I.R.C.P. 1.9(a). "The defendants 
assert[ed] that in 2008, Merlyn Clark, a partner at Hawley Troxell formed an attorney-
client relationship with Marty Frantz." Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, 
Exhibit IX, p. 8, LI. 5-7. The bankruptcy court held a two-day hearing on this matter, 
heard testimony from four witnesses, all of whom were subject to cross-examination, 
and the court reviewed an extensive number of exhibits. Id., p. 6, LI. 4-25 through p. 7, 
LI. 1-15. The Honorable Terry L. Myers, Presiding Chief Judge of the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho, concluded "Mr. Clark was acting as a 
testifying expert witness only. As such, an attorney-client relationship was not created." 
Id., p. 12, LI. 10-13. 
Specifically, Judge Myers made the following findings of fact and conclusions of 
law: 
The defendants' motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell as counsel for 
the plaintiff urges that disqualification based on Idaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.9. And as all the parties acknowledge, the IRPC are applicable 
in adversary proceedings in this Court under our local Bankruptcy Rule 
v~l,Qy 1i{g)ell, e!al 
defendants 2008, Merlyn a 
formed an attorney-client relationship Marty 
Professional 1 instructs that a lawyer who has 
represented a client a matter shall thereafter, 
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that 
person's interests are materially averse to the interest of the former client, 
unless the former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing. 
The plaintiff responds to this contention by noting that in 2008, 
Merlyn Clark was retained and acted solely as a testifying expert witness 
and did so on the subject of professional malpractice in Marty Frantz'[s] 
State Court lawsuit against Witherspoon Kelley in which Mr. Frantz was 
represented by Owens & Crandall. The plaintiff argues that Mr. Clark was 
not retained as co-counsel, nor did he in any way act as an attorney to Mr. 
Frantz. Thus plaintiff argues no attorney-client relationship was ever 
formed. 
The defendants respond that Clark, even if initially hired as an 
expert witness, became a consulting attorney expert when he reviewed 
confidential information and provided opinions on damages with the 
attorneys at Owens & Crandall, particularly Ms. McCrea. 
At hearing Mr. Clark was clear and direct and credible in his 
testimony. He testified, and the Court finds and concludes that his role in 
the malpractice litigation was solely that of a testifying expert witness. In 
that capacity he prepared and affidavit, Exhibit 200, to which he attached 
his expert opinions. Within that report Mr. Clark listed all the information 
he reviewed and considered in forming his opinion, as would be required 
for expert disclosure. No confidential information was there listed. 
Indeed, Mr. Clark stated that he did not receive any confidential 
information while evaluating the malpractice case as a testifying expert 
witness in such case. 
Mr. Clark was also clear that not only did he not review confidential 
information, he discussed with Owens & Crandall the fact that any 
information provided to him would be subject to discovery by the State 
Court defendants and thus, obviously, should not be included in any of the 
information provided to him. Such a warning is consistent with the limited 
role of a testifying expert witness, not one as a retained attorney or as co-
counsel. 
The defendants have placed a great deal of emphasis on the 
words, quote, "confidential and privileged," close quote, that appear on the 
top of Mr. Clark's communications with Owens & Crandall, as well as on 
his statement that he was hired, quote, "as an expert witness to provide 
advice and testimony on the subject of the alleged professional 
malpractice," close quote, as in Exhibit 200 at 9. 
Mr. Clark credibly testified that the word "advice" was in effect, as in 
advising Owens & Crandall which he would be able to testify to and what 
his opinion would be. Moreover the confidential and privileged 
nomenclature was intended, consistent with the rules that Mr. Clark and 
Owens & Crandall understood to reflect the fact that if they decided not to 
disclose him as a testifying expert witness, the report he created would 
~9it~~ Wdai~&1t1to discoveryB0!ntfiW5,i~@l@~ and given whole 
one of Marty Frantz'[s] State Court attorneys. She stated 
Mr. Clark was hired as an expert to establish and later testify to the 
standard of care in the malpractice litigation. 
While she testified that she asked Mr. Clark questions about 
damages, her testimony was not materially inconsistent with Mr. Clark's; 
and the question of what sorts of damages might be recoverable was 
certainly part and parcel of the charge to an expert on this subject. 
Moreover she did not recall providing any of the documents attached to 
her notes to Mr. Clark. Instead she asserted that her questions for Mr. 
Clark were based on his review of the depositions and the exhibits 
attached to those depositions. She did not testify that Mr. Clark provide 
advice beyond what Mr. Clark himself testified to. He did not believe 
certain damages were available and he would not provide expert 
testimony on that aspect of the litigation. But again, such discussions 
would be consistent with an expert's analysis of the facts in defining the 
testimony the expert is willing to provide in the litigation and the opinion 
that he would provide in his report. 
Ms. McCrea's testimony was responsive to questioning. I was 
impressed that she acted not as an advocate for the defendants' motion 
but as a percipient fact witness and she was careful and measured and 
clear in her testimony and in that was she was credible. Her testimony did 
not establish that Mr. Clark was a consulting expert, nor that he had 
entered into an attorney-client relationship with either her firm or with her 
firm's client. 
Marty Frantz testified as well. He testified as to the retention and 
use of Mr. Clark by his former malpractice lawyers at Owens & Crandall. 
But his testimony in that regard was not probative. He was not engaged 
in the discussions. He never spoke with Mr. Clark. He had no firsthand 
knowledge of the facts. Instead, he was simply interpreting the other 
evidence and expressing his opinion about its significance or its 
consequence. 
Whether it was volunteered from the witness stand or, more often 
than not, proffered in response to patently leading questions, it was not 
entitled to weight, even where arguably relevant. 
The Court concludes plaintiffs' analysis of the facts and the law is 
supported by the record. Mr. Clark was acting as a testifying expert 
witness only. As such, an attorney-client relationship was not created. 
There's no basis to disqualify Hawley Troxell under IRPC 1.9 and 
defendants['] motion ... will, therefore, be denied. 
24- p. 1 1 
On February 20, 201 in the instant case before the undersigned, Frantz filed 
Kelley. Specifically Hawley 
Represent[ed] IIB, a party with materially adverse interests to Mr. Frantz, 
in litigation and bankruptcy proceedings that are substantially related to 
the matter in which Defendant represented Mr. Frantz; [and] 
*** 
Us[ed] information related to Hawley Troxell's representation of Mr. Frantz 
to Mr. Frantz's financial disadvantage in the bankruptcy proceeding by 
claiming the Mr. Frantz's financial statements were fraudulent. 
Complaint and Jury Demand, pp. 5-6, ,T,I 29(a), (d); p. 7, 1J1J 38(a), (c). The bankruptcy 
case was ongoing at the time the Complaint in this instant case was filed. See 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz in Support of Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley, LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), Exhibit A. 
Hawley Troxell now "seeks dismissal of the instant action because issues 
fundamental to Plaintiff's claims herein, including whether an attorney with defendant 
Hawley Troxell formed an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff, has been raised by 
Plaintiff Frantz and litigated in an action currently pending in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court .... " Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), p. 1. In support, on May 7, 2015, Hawley Troxell 
filed a "Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)"; Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8))"; and the 
"Affidavit of John C. Riseborough". On July 14, 2015, Frantz filed his "Response to 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8))"; 
and the "Jonathon Frantz in Support of Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, 
LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate (1.R.C.P. 12(8}(8))". On July 21, 2015, Hawley 
Troxell filed "Defendant's Reply Re Dismissal/Abate". 
was a 
pending case. Frantz' counsel also admitted the adversary proceeding in bankruptcy 
court was still proceeding, but claimed that proceeding was now moot, the only issue to 
be decided was attorney fees. 
Frantz' attorney's claim that the adversary proceeding is moot is not well taken. 
Attached as Exhibit B to the Response of the Defendant Re: Pro Hae Vice Objection, is 
the Affidavit of Sheila Schwager, dated July 20, 2015. Schwager is a partner in Hawley 
Troxell, and has been involved in Frantz' bankruptcy proceeding. Schwager's Affidavit 
states in pertinent part: 
4. I have reviewed the Declaration of Jonathon Frantz and in 
particular the assertions that the Adversary Proceeding has been 
dismissed as moot. That is inaccurate, as indicated by the entire Docket 
of the Adversary Proceeding, attached hereto as Exhibit A, and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
5. On the eve of the two week trial of the Adversary Proceeding, 
Mr. and Mrs. Frantz filed a Section 727 Waiver of Discharge in their 
Bankruptcy Case, conceding the non-dischargability relief requested om 
the Adversary Proceeding, thus rendering a determination of 
dischargability moot. Specifically, the 727 Waiver of Discharge meant that 
none of the obligations owed to 118 would be discharged and therefore a 
trial on the section 523 non-discharge issues were not necessary. 
Accordingly, the trial date was vacated. However, despite counsel's 
suggestion to the contrary, no Order of Dismissal has been entered, and 
in fact the Adversary Proceeding remains pending. 
6. In that regard, 118 filed in the Adversary Proceeding on June 2, 
2015, Docket No. 117, a Motion for Sanctions, which was argued on June 
15, 2015. The court deemed the matter submitted and under advisement, 
with a decision to be forthcoming. See Ex. A, Docket No. 127. Further, 
on June 3, 2015, 118 filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs as the 
prevailing party in the Adversary Proceeding. That Motion is set for 
hearing for July 28, 2015. See Ex. A, Docket No. 121, 122, 123, 128. In 
short, no final order has been entered at this point in the Adversary 
Proceeding. If either or both of the motions are granted, a judgment will 
be entered accordingly. 
as 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The determination of whether to proceed with an action where a similar case is 
pending before another court is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
K!aue v. Hem, 133 Idaho 437,439, 988 P.2d 211,213 (1999) (citing Za/eha v. Rosholt, 
Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 129 Idaho 532, 533, 927 P.2d 925, 926 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
On appeal, the appeals court reviews the trial court decision to determine "(1) whether 
the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower 
court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) and whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. 
v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991 )). 
Ill. ANALYSIS OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR ABATE. 
A. Frantz is Judicially Estopped from Pursuing this Malpractice Claim due 
to the Pending Bankruptcy Proceeding. 
While not addressed by the parties in briefing, the Court must first address 
whether Frantz, a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, has standing to pursue this cause 
of action against Hawley Troxell for claims arising during the pending bankruptcy 
proceeding. This Court finds he does not have standing. 
A debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding is required to disclose all existing and 
potential assets. McCallisterv. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891,895,303 P.3d 578,582 (2013) 
(citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 521 (1 ), 541 (a)(7)). "[T]itle to the debtor's assets, including causes 
of action that belong to the debtor when bankruptcy is filed, vest in the bankruptcy 
a cause 
3d at 385). 
The doctrine of "[j]udicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking 
one position, then subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible with the 
first." Id. at 894, 303 P.3d at 581 (citing A & J Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 
116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). At oral argument in this state court case on July 28, 2015, this 
Court asked counsel for Frantz about standing. Counsel for Frantz was unclear 
whether this state court case was disclosed as an asset in the bankruptcy litigation, but 
the inference this Court is left with was it was not disclosed. The Court makes that 
inference based on Frantz' counsel's remark in oral argument to this Court. That 
remark was that Frantz only had a duty to disclose assets to the bankruptcy court which 
were in existence "at the time the bankruptcy case was filed." And, since this case was 
filed on February 20, 2015, " ... this case and Frantz' claim against Hawley Troxell, arose 
after the bankruptcy." Frantz' counsel's legal claim is contrary to the law. 
Judicial estoppel will be applied "when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts 
to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the bankruptcy, 
but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of action 
as a contingent asset." Id. at 895, 303 P.3d at 582 (citing A&J Const. Co., 141 Idaho at 
686, 116 P.3d at 16 (quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aerop/ex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 
(11th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added). It is necessary "to discourage debtors from 
concealing potential assets." Id. (citing Hamilton v. State & 
F.3d 778 (9th Cir.2001); Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286; Oneida Motor Freight, United 
4, 9 1 on 
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In this case, the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Frantz from pursuing this 
instant cause of action before this Court against Hawley Troxell. It is clear that the 
cause of action in this present case arose during the pendency of Frantz' bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
As mentioned above, in 2008, Frantz was pursuing an attorney malpractice 
lawsuit against Witherspoon Kelley. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, 
Exhibit I, p. 2, ,r 2. On December 16, 2008, counsel for Frantz in that case against 
Witherspoon Kelley contacted Merlyn Clark, an attorney with Hawley Troxell, to serve 
as an expert witness for that case. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, 
Exhibit Ill. Clark informed Frantz' counsel at the time in that lawsuit that "any 
information [he] received would be discoverable in the Malpractice Lawsuit by the 
defendants in that case and that they should not provide [him] any information they 
would not want defendants to discover." Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 
2015, Exhibit V, p. 4, ,r 14. Counsel for Frantz sent Clark materials to review that he 
would need to render an opinion about whether Witherspoon Kelley had violated the 
standard of care. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit Ill. "Mr. Clark 
reviewed the materials and authored a 21 page report dated May 4, 2009, reflecting his 
opinions." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss or 
Abate (1.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), p. 2; Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit I, 
p 2, iT That report was sent to counsel for Frantz. Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), Affidavit of 
18) & 
Hawley to pursue claims against Mr. Frantz for failure to pay a loan that fully matured." 
Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 4, 1f 18. On June 28, 2010, Hawley Troxell, in its 
capacity as counsel for IIB, sent a demand letter to Davidson, Backman, Medeiros, 
PLLC, counsel for the guarantors on the obligation, which included Frantz. Affidavit of 
John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit IV. In October 2011, Frantz filed for 
bankruptcy. Id., p. 4, 1f 19. Hawley Troxell represented IIB as a creditor in the 
bankruptcy proceedings against Frantz. Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 4, 1f 20. 
In this present case, Frantz filed his Complaint against Hawley Troxell for 
attorney malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty on February 20, 2015. See Complaint 
and Jury Demand. The allegations stem from Clark's role as an expert witness in the 
case between Frantz and Witherspoon Kelley. Id. Specifically Frantz claims Hawley 
Troxell: 
Represent[ed] IIB, a party with materially adverse interests to Mr. Frantz, 
in litigation and bankruptcy proceedings that are substantially related to 
the matter in which Defendant represented Mr. Frantz; [and] 
*** 
Us[ed] information related to Hawley Troxell's representation of Mr. Frantz 
to Mr. Frantz's financial disadvantage in the bankruptcy proceeding by 
claiming the Mr. Frantz's financial statements were fraudulent 
Complaint and Jury Demand, pp. 5-6, ,m 29(a), (d); p. 7, ,-r,-r 38(a), (c). The bankruptcy 
case was ongoing at the time the Complaint was filed. See Declaration of Jonathon 
Frantz in Support of Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP's Motion to 
Dismiss or Abate (LR.C.P. 12(8)(8)), Exhibit A 
is aware 
Hawley 
proceeding, when he was unable to discharge the debt against 118. Once Frantz filed 
for bankruptcy, any potential malpractice claim he had against Hawley Troxell was no 
longer his to assert; it was no longer his asset. Rather, it became an asset of the 
bankruptcy estate that only the bankruptcy trustee has standing to assert. It is 
immaterial that the bankruptcy proceeding was filed before the instant action. There is 
no evidence before this Court that Frantz claimed the malpractice as a potential asset 
in the bankruptcy proceeding. In any event, whether Frantz included it as an asset 
before the Bankruptcy Court is of no import to this Court. "Property that is not disclosed 
on the asset schedule, or otherwise administered by the time the bankruptcy case 
closes, remains property of the bankruptcy estate forever." McCal/ister, 154 Idaho at 
898, 303 P.3d at 585. There is no evidence that Frantz amended his asset schedule in 
the pending bankruptcy proceeding to reflect this subsequent state court lawsuit. 
Moreover, Frantz has not provided this Court with any evidence that, having initially 
claimed or amended his asset schedule to include the potential malpractice asset, the 
bankruptcy trustee waived the potential asset as property for the bankruptcy estate. As 
such, Frantz is judicially estopped from asserting this cause of action against Hawley 
Troxell. 
B. Dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). 
Alternatively, even if the Court found Frantz was not judicially estopped from 
brining this suit, the Court finds Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) merits dismissal 
of this action. 
vs 
same cause. 
1 are determine a 
proceed in such an instance: "First, the court should consider whether the other case 
has gone to judgment, in which event the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion may bar additional litigation. The second test is whether the court, although 
not barred from deciding the case, should nevertheless refrain from deciding it." Klaue 
v. Hem, 133 Idaho 437, 440, 988 P.2d 211, 214 (1999) (internal citations omitted). 
Each of these tests will be discussed in turn below. 
1. Test One: Res Judicata. 
Relitigation of a matter that was previously adjudicated is precluded by the 
doctrine of resjudicata. Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,256,668 P.2d 130, 132 (Ct. 
App. 1983). Res judicata encompasses both claim preclusion and issue preclusion or 
collateral estoppel. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613,617 
(2007) (citing Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002)). "Claim 
preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or 
upon claims 'relating to the same cause of action ... which might have been made.' 
Issue preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party 
or its privy." Id. (internal citations omitted). 
a. Claim preclusion. 
For claim preclusion to apply, the subsequent action must have the same parties 
or their privies, same claim and a final judgment. Id. at 124, 157 P.3d at 618 (citing 
Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805; Farmers Nat'/ Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 
68, 878 762, 767 (1994)); see a/so Foster v. Anthony, 122 Idaho 
8 
(citing 1 at 
418 (quoting Kite v. Eckley, 48 Idaho 454, 459, 282 P. 868, 869 (1929))). Attorneys are 
in privity with their clients from a prior action when "their only interest in the present 
action ar[ises] from their representation of their clients in the former action, and they 
were named solely for their alleged conduct in that capacity." Berkshire Investments, 
LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81,278 P.3d 943,951 (2012). 
Moreover, "[c]laim preclusion bars adjudication not only on the matters offered 
and received to defeat the claim, but also as to 'every matter which might and should 
have been litigated in the first suit"' Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho at 126, 157 
P.3d at 620 (citing Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434,437, 849 
P.2d 107, 110 (1993)). 
Here, the Court finds that since at the present time there is no final judgment in 
the bankruptcy proceeding (at least in the proof presented to this Court), claim 
preclusion does not bar litigation of the malpractice and fiduciary duty claim in the 
instant action. In the near future, there may be a final judgment in the bankruptcy 
action. At that time this state court action would be barred based on the additional 
ground of claim preclusion. However, at the time of this decision by this Court there is 
no final judgment. Thus, claim preclusion does not apply at this moment. 
b. Issue Preclusion. 
For issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior 
proceeding, five factors must be met: 
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the 
Title 114 Idaho at 124,157 P.3d at618 (citing Rodriguez v. Dep'tofCorr., 
136 Idaho 90, 93, 29 P.3d 401, 404 (2001 )). 
The matter litigated before the bankruptcy court was whether Hawley Troxell 
should have been disqualified as counsel for 118 in the bankruptcy proceeding based on 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 
2015, Exhibit IX, p. 7, LI. 24-25 through p. 8, LI. 1-2. Idaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.9 instructs: "A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall 
not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in 
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client 
unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing." i.R.C.P. 1.9(a). 
"The defendants assert[ed] that in 2008, Merlyn Clark, a partner at Hawley Troxell 
formed an attorney-client relationship with Marty Frantz." Affidavit of John C. 
Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit IX, p. 8, LI. 5-7. The bankruptcy court held a two-
day hearing on this matter, heard testimony from four witnesses whom were subject to 
cross-examination, and reviewed an extensive number of exhibits. Id., p. 6, LI. 4-25 
through p. 7, LI. 1-15. The bankruptcy court concluded, "Mr. Clark was acting as a 
testifying expert witness only. As such, an attorney-client relationship was not created." 
Id., p. 12, LI. 10-13. 
The cause of action in this present case is for attorney malpractice against 
Hawley Troxell, alleging the same misconduct by Merlyn Clark. See Complaint The 
four elements of a legal-malpractice claim are: ) there is an attorney-client 
care 
a 
650, 654 (1982)). 
1) 1 
The first element was clearly litigated in front of the bankruptcy court. Judge 
Myers held a two-day hearing solely on the issue of whether Merlyn Clark had formed 
an attorney-client relationship with Frantz during the litigation between Frantz and 
Witherspoon Kelley. Judge Myers definitively found no such attorney-client relationship 
was created. Frantz argues that "the issue raised in the [bankruptcy p]roceeding, 
although similar, is legally distinct and would not have any preclusive effect" Response 
to Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.RC.P. 12(8)(8)), 
p. 4. Frantz claims, "[a] legal malpractice claim requires that an attorney owe a duty to 
the Plaintiff, a different requirement than the 'former client' of Rule 1.9 that 
encompasses a broader category of individuals." Id. 
While it is true that a claim for attorney malpractice requires a showing that the 
defendant attorney owed a duty to the plaintiff, it also requires an attorney-client 
relationship. All four elements must be present for a plaintiff to prevail on a malpractice 
claim. Frantz had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the attorney-client relationship 
issue in the bankruptcy case. It is identical to one of the elements required for a 
malpractice cause of action, and a finding against Frantz on that one element is 
dispositive of the entire cause of action before this Court. 
Moreover, the bankruptcy court actually decided the issue of whether an 
attorney-client relationship existed between Merlyn Clark, a partner for Hawley Troxell, 
and Frantz. While Hawley Troxell was not a party to the bankruptcy action, as stated in 
Martittwa~f ~~QJAA-r§~~~i9Jil' 
a 
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation". Both parties agree there is no final 
judgment in this case. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), p. 6; Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, 
LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate (1.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), pp. 3-4. "The ninth circuit has 
defined a final bankruptcy decision as one that ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. [Moreover], an order that 
grants relief from the automatic stay is final for the purposes of appeal." Farmers Nat. 
Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70, 878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). Among other things, an automatic stay ends at the time the debtor's 
discharge is granted or denied. 11 U.S.C. § 362. There has been no evidence 
presented to this Court showing Frantz was granted a discharge of the debt owing to 
IIB, or was denied or waived discharge of the debt owing to 118. Absent such a 
showing, there is no evidence before this Court of a final judgment on the merits in the 
bankruptcy proceeding. As such, issue preclusion cannot be used to bar Frantz' 
malpractice suit at this time. 
2. Test Two: Another Pending Action. 
"The determination of whether to proceed with a case where a similar case is 
pending elsewhere, and has not gone to judgment, is discretionary, and will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of that discretion." Klaue, 133 Idaho at 440, 988 P.2d at 
214 (citing Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 129 Idaho 532, 533, 927 P.2d 
925, 926 (Ct. App.1996); Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar, 106 Idaho 905,908,684 P.2d 
310 case 
a 
identity and degree 
which the claims or issues are similar." Diet Ctr., Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22-23, 
855 P.2d 481, 483-84 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Wing, at 106 Idaho at 908, 684 P.2d at 
310). Moreover, the court should "consider whether the court in which the matter 
already is pending is in a position to determine the whole controversy and to settle all 
the rights of the parties." Id. (citing 21 C.J.S. Courts§ 188, at 222 (1990)). 
As discussed above, the matter before the bankruptcy court involves the same 
parties, Hawley Troxell being in privity with a party to the bankruptcy litigation, IIB, as 
counsel in that case, and the same issue, whether an attorney-client relationship 
existed between Frantz and Merlyn Clark of Hawley Troxell. The bankruptcy court has 
"original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or 
arising in or related to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). "'[A]rising in' 
proceedings are those that are not based on any right expressly created by title 11, but 
nevertheless, would have no existence outside of the bankruptcy." In re Old Cutters, 
Inc., 474 B.R. 219, 226 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012) (citing Eastport Assocs. v. City of Los 
Angeles (In re Eastport Assocs.), 935 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.1991)). In other words, 
but for the bankruptcy, the claim would not exist. See also A.H. Robins Co. v. Dalkon 
Shield Claimants Trust, 86 F.3d 364, 372 (4th Cir. 1996). 
Here, the legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims did not originate 
from any work Hawley Troxell did for Frantz in the bankruptcy case. This is not a case 
where Hawley Troxell represented Frantz in the bankruptcy proceeding and then 
provided him with negligent advice during those proceedings. See A.H. Robins Co. v. 
a 
duty, Frantz claims in part that Hawley Troxell: 
Represent[ed] 118, a party with materially adverse interests to Mr. Frantz, 
in litigation and bankruptcy proceedings that are substantially related to 
the matter in which Defendant represented Mr. Frantz; [and] 
*** 
Us[ed] information related to Hawley Troxell's representation of Mr. Frantz 
to Mr. Frantz's financial disadvantage in the bankruptcy proceeding by 
claiming the Mr. Frantz's financial statements were fraudulent. 
Complaint and Jury Demand, pp. 5-6, ,m 29(a), (d); p. 7, ,m 38(a), (c). As such, the 
Court finds this case arises under the title 11 bankruptcy proceedings. 
In the alternative, even if this Court could find that this case does not arise under 
title 11 (and, as just stated, this Court does not), it is a "related to" proceeding. See In 
re Old Cutters, Inc., 474 B.R. at 226. To determine whether a proceeding is "related 
to", the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the following test: 
[W]hether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any 
effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy . ... Thus, the 
proceeding need not necessarily be against the debtor or against the 
debtor's property. An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could 
alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either 
positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling 
and administration of the bankruptcy estate. 
Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300,308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 
403 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984,994 (3d Cir.1984) (emphasis 
in original)). "In vesting jurisdiction over matters "related to" bankruptcy cases in the 
district courts, and in allowing those district courts to refer such matters to bankruptcy 
courts, 'Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts 
so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the 
etal 
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IIB's claim against Frantz was not discharged from the bankruptcy proceeding 
due to fraud on the part of Frantz. Defendant's Reply Re Dismissal/Abate, p. 4; 
Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 4, ,r 22. Frantz maintains that IIB would not have 
claimed his financial statements were fraudulent without the knowledge it gained from 
Hawley Troxell because of its prior relationship with Frantz during the Witherspoon 
Kelley malpractice action. Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 6, ,r 29(d); p. 7, ,r 38(c). 
The malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims arose during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy proceedings. As stated above, once Frantz filed for bankruptcy, any 
potential claims he had against Hawley Troxell no longer belonged to him, but rather 
became an asset of the bankruptcy estate. As property of the estate the claims are 
clearly "related to" the bankruptcy proceeding. The outcome of the action would alter 
the administration of the bankruptcy estate. 
This Court find that this case falls within the "comprehensive jurisdiction [of] the 
bankruptcy courts." As such, the Court, in its discretion, dismisses this action pursuant 
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) as "another action pending between the same 
parties for the same cause" exists. The same parties in the present case are (and 
have) litigating (and have litigated) the same issues in the bankruptcy case. 
It is noted that the Court "may take into account the occasionally competing 
objectives of judicial economy, minimizing costs and delay to litigants, obtaining prompt 
and orderly disposition of each claim or issue, and avoiding potentially inconsistent 
judgments." Diet Ctr., Inc., 124 Idaho at 22-23, 855 P .2d at 483-84 (citing Wing, 106 
M:artih'-µ;;jc!rlf,,;,l;j'4aQij, 1®,, 3 ~WI~~ 
regarding judicial 
minimizing costs and delay to litigants, obtaining prompt and orderly disposition of each 
claim or issue, and avoiding potentially inconsistent judgments, it is unnecessary to 
evaluate those factors in light of the analysis reached above, ie., another action is 
pending between the same parties for the same cause. 
IV. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE IS DENIED. 
On April 7, 2015, counsel for Frantz filed a Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission of 
Jeffery Katz. Katz is an attorney licensed in Illinois, Kentucky and Wisconsin, but not 
Idaho. Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission p. 1. 
While dismissal of Frantz' case due to lack of standing and alternatively, due to 
another action pending, causes the issue of Frantz' Motion for Admission Pro Hae Vice 
to now be moot, this Court will briefly discuss the same in case there is a claim on 
appeal that this Court denied Frantz a competent attorney to represent him in this state 
court litigation. Also, at oral argument on July 28, 2015, counsel for Frantz made the 
claim that he had intended Katz to handle the oral argument on Hawley Troxell's Motion 
to Dismiss or Abate, and were it not for Katz' hospitalization, Katz would have handled 
the argument. It is unknown how or why counsel for Frantz planned on having Katz 
make argument regarding the Motion to Dismiss or Abate, because on July 28, 2015, 
Katz had yet to be admitted pro hac vice. 
On April 22, 2015, counsel for Hawley Troxell filed an "Objection to Motion for 
Pro Hae Vice Admission". Hawley Troxell claims that Katz violated the provisions of 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 by making "unauthorized contact with the 
Marti,;1f:}~c;lfm~µi@,Q~ 1 J~ia ho 1nm~pe1~~:Wl'Je~&!'M~a 
was aware IBwas 
118, forwarded to an attorney Troxeli 
representing 118 in the bankruptcy matter, which read: "I represent Marty Frantz in a 
newly filed action against his former attorneys at the Howley (sic) Troxell firm. I would 
like to discuss this matter with you and discuss how it may be financially beneficial to 
you." Affidavit of John F. Kurtz, Jr., p. 3, 1i 9. On June 1, 2015, Frantz filed his 
"Response to Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission." On June 26, 2015, 
Hawley Troxell filed its "Reply Re: Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission." 
Oral argument on this motion was held on June 30, 2015, at which time this Court 
asked counsel how, in light of that email, could Katz not become a witness in this case. 
That is an additional and separate issue from the unauthorized contact issue. 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3. 7 "Lawyer as Witness" reads: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer 
is likely to be a necessary witness unless: 
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal 
services rendered in the case; or 
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 
hardship on the client. 
The Court finds Katz will likely have to testify in this case. The Court finds none of the 
three exceptions to IRPC 3.7 (a) apply to Katz as a witness. Thus, this Court finds that it 
would be improper to allow admission pro hac vice of an out of state attorney who 
would, if appointed, violate the Idaho Rules of Professional Responsibility, possibly for 
unauthorized contact (the Court does not decide that issue now), but without a doubt as 
to the prohibition of likely being a witness in a matter. It would be irresponsible of this 
Court to knowingly put Katz in that position. Accordingly, plaintiff Frantz' Motion for 
AND ORDER 
Hawley or Abate 
is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff Frantz' Motion for Admission Pro Hae Vice 
is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendant Hawley Troxell is the prevailing party in 
this action as against Martin Frantz. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED counsel for defendant Hawley Troxell prepare a 
Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
Entered this 29th day of July, 2015. 
rhn T. .Mitchell, District Judge 
Certificate of Service J 
I certify that on the ~{f day of July,\Ql5, a tru copy of the foregoing was mailed 
postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile to eacl'lof the following: 
Lawyer 
Johnathon Frantz 
Fax# 
208-262-3894-/ 
Hon. Terry L. Myers, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge 
Via fax 208 334-1334 / 
I Lawyer 
John C. Riseborough 509-838-0007 
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E HAMBLEN 
7 West Sprague Avenue Suite l200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455~6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DTSTRTCT COlJR'I' OF THE FIRST JUDLCIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF JDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-1406 
Plaintifl: ) 
) 
vs. ) DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
) Ott AW AIU) OF COSTS, INCLUDING 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNTS & HA WI .EY ) REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
. --· ·-~·) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff filed this action on February 20, 2015, alleging legal malpractice against 
defendant l lawley Troxwell Ennis & I lawley, LLP ("HTEH") contending that HTEH, through 
its partner, Merlyn Clark, had fonned an attorney-client relarionship with plaintiff in 2008 in 
association with a suil by plainliff against one of his former law finns. That suit was concluded 
in mid-2009. ln this action plaintiff contends that, subsequent to Mr. Clark's representation, 
HTEH, through other members of the firm, began representing a creditor, Idaho Independent 
Bank, adverse to plaintiff Frantz in a bankruptcy proceeding he had filed in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho, Docket No. BK-11-21337-TLM, and an Adversary 
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was 
or 
through the prior representation against plaintiff Frantz, resulting damages. Plaintiff brought 
this suit de.spite having failed in his c1Iort to disqualify IITEII in said Adversary Proceeding 
based on identical contentions. To determine plainti.:ff s Motion to Djsqualify, the Honorable 
Judge Terry L. Myers held a two-day cvidentiary hearing and found that Merlyn Clark had never 
been plaintiff Frantz's attorney and that neither Mr. Clark nor HTEH had received, iet alone 
used, confidential information. Uy Order dated December 9, 2014, Judge Myers denied 
plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify and HTEH continues to represent Idaho Independent Bank in 
those bankruptcy proceedings which remain pending. 
Defendant in this action filed on Amended Answer on May 14, 2015, denying plaintiffs 
allegations, aJleging that plaintifrs claim is based 011 a commercial transaclion within the 
provisions of Idaho Code 12-120(3) asserting defenses including, inter alia, res judicata and 
seeking an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12~ 121, 12-120(3) and 12-123. After 
reviewing the testimony and evidence presented to Judge Myers in connection with Plaintifrs 
Motion to Disqualify HTEH, counsel for the defense moved for dismissal of plaintiff's action 
under IRCP I2(b)(8). 
This Court, after reviewing the briefing and evidentiary materials submitted, and h~aring 
the argument of counsel, granLed the defense's motion and dismissed plaintiff's action on the 
basis that (a) Frantz lacked standing as an individual to assert a cause of action which should be 
an asset of the bankruptcy estate; and (b) that the identical issue had been previously determined 
in an action that is currently pending, which decision will likely fuUy determine lhe righls of the 
parties as to the issue of whether Merlyn Clark was ever an attorney of plaintiff Frant;,:. 
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The defense now assens ils ba!5is for an award of attorney's fees. 
IT. DEFENDANTS ARF: ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF FEES PURSUANT TO 
IDAHO CODE 12-120(3) 
As the Court is likely aware, the ldaho Code allows for an award of allorney's 
fees to the prevailing party where the suit involves a contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
services. The statute provides Lhat: 
IC 12-120. Attorney's Fees in Civil Actions - ... 
(3) In any civil action to recover oo an open account, account 
stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to 
the purchase or sale of goods. wares, merchandjse, or services and in any 
commercial transilcliun unless otht.'rWi!-itl provided by law, the prevailing 
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's foe to be set by the court, 
to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes. The 
term ''party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
The determination of whether a case is based on a commercial transaction for the purpose 
of J.C. § 12-120(3) is a quei,tion of law. Great Plains Eguipment. Inc. v. NW Pipeline Corp., 136 
Idaho 466, 336 P.3d 218 (2001). The appropriate inquiry is whether the commercial transaction 
constituted the gravamen of the lawsuit and was the basis on which a party was attempting to 
recover. Id. at 472, 36 P.3d at 224. 
For the purposes of this section, Idaho recognizes that negligence in providing legal 
representation can qualify as a ''commercial transaction." See City or McCall v. Buxton, 146 
Idaho 656, 201 PJd 629 (2009) .:1Howcd where attorney advice caused losses arising out of 
construction contract). Herc, plaintiff's damages are alleged to be his inability to discharge his 
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to 
indebtedness arose from real estate development transactions. Further, plaintiff's claim arose out 
of his alleged retaining of Merlyn Clark to act as his attorney in representation regarding a 
lawsuit against his former firm, whic.:h <.:laim was based on a i.,ommercial transaction as weil, i.e., 
misrepresentation in the value of real property purchased by Frant7 .. 
Given the Court's disposition of the issue, the existence of a commercial transaction was 
not established. However, where ~ t:01nmcrciaJ lransac1ion has been alleged, an award of fot.:s 
under this statute is aJlowable even if the commercial transaction is not established. See Gamer 
v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462 at 469-470. Jn its Amended Answer, the defense affirmatively alleged 
that plaintiff's claim wai;; based on a commercial transaction (17), and affimu:i.tively ~ought an 
award of fees Wlder LC. §12-120(3), c,~, Claim for Fees). 
Under the circumstances of this case. an award of fees pursuan1 to LC. §12-120(3) is appropriate. 
Ill. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF FEES PURSUANT TO 
J.C. §12-121. 
Idaho Code §12-121 provides: 
12-i21. ATTORl"{EY'S FEES· ln any civil ac1ion, the judge may award 
reasonable attorney's foes Lo Lhe prevailing pany <.)r panies, provided that thi~ 
section shalJ not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for 
the award of attorney's fee;:;. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include 
any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state 
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof 
The statute however must be read in conjunction with Rule 54(e)(l) which provides that 
foes arc appropriate in a civil action where the case has been brought frivoloLtSly, unreasonably, 
or without foundation. 
0 o: F INE AM 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, 
which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the 
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided 
for by any statute or contract Provided, attorney's fees under section 12-
121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from 
th(;! facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation; .... 
@013 0 
This Court specifically found that defendant was the prevailing party. Thus the remaining issue 
is whether this is a frivolous suit without foundation. 
Here, plaintiff brought a motion to disqualify defendant HTEH in the Adversary 
Proceeding in plaintiff's bankruptcy, contending that Merlyn Clark was his attorney, had 
obtained confidential information, and that defendant l JTr:11 was utilizing that confidential 
information in representing Merlyn framz's creditors in the bankruptcy. The United States 
Bankruptcy Judge for the District of ldaho, Judge Myers, held a two•day cvidcntiary hearing 
during which time plaintiff and others Lestified and were subject to cross examination. Judge 
Myer::; issu1.1d an exlensivc oral ruling denying the motion and specifically finding Merlyn CJark 
had never been plaintiff Prantz's attorney, had not been provided confidential infonnation, and 
that HTEH was not utilizing confidential informatfon jn the bankruptcy proceeding. The Court 
entered an Order denying Frantz1s motion based on those factual findings, which Order was 
entered D~cember 9, 2014. 
Nevertheless, on February 15, 2015, plaintiff F'rantz brought this action. 
Plaintiff Frantz asserted no legal or factual basis for his ability to rclitigatc this action 
and, indeed, his Complaint did not mention that the issue had been previously determined. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court is fully apprised or the facts and circumstances which preceded plaintiff 
Frantz's initiation of this action. Before the Court is the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of the 
Memorandum of Costs and r'ecs, as well as the Memorandum of Costs and Fees itself The Court 
should therefore allow an award of cnst5, including reasonable auomey fees, wider the statutory 
provisions cited. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMflTED this~day of AUb'11St, 2015. 
PATNE HAMBLEN LLP 
ISB 
7 West Sprague A venue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201 ~3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE D1STR1CT COURT OF THF. FIRST JUDrCIAL DJSTR1CT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) Case No. CVIS-1406 
) 
) 
) 
l lA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & f IA WLEY 
LLP, an Jdaho Limited Liability Par1ncrship, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSf:L JN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
Mfl:MORANDUM 014' COSTS 
INCLUDING ATTORNEYF:EES 
Defendant. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
: ss. 
County of Spokane ) 
) 
__ ) 
JOHN C. RJSEBOROlJGH, being first duJy swom on oath deposes and states: 
lg]U lb/V;;J:J 
1. J am the auomey representing defendant Hawley Troxell r:nnis & I lawlcy, LLP 
("IITEII") in this action, and J have personal knowledge of the matters asserted herein. 
2. The rate for my services for defendant in this action is $190 an hour. The hourly 
rate for Rebecca Stewart, an associate with this finn, is $175. The hourly rate for Cynthia Bryan, 
a paralegal with this firm is $90. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this rcforcnce 
incorporated herein is a true and correct itemized statement of the work done by me, 
Ms. Stewart, and Ms. Bryan relative to this matter. 
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reasonable considering the factors set forth 
Procedure, to wit: 
Rule 54(e)(3) 
A. The time and labor required: 
B. The novelty and difficulty of the 
question: 
C. The skill requisite to pcrfom1 the 
legal service properly and Lhc 
experience and abflity of the attorney 
in the particular field of law: 
D. The prevailing charges for like work: 
E. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent: 
F. Time limitations imposed by client or 
circumstances of this case: 
0. The amount involved and the results: 
H. Undesirability of case: 
f. · l'he nature and length of the 
profos::;icmal relationship with the 
cJient: 
J. Awards in similar cases: 
that the amount 
Rule 54(c)(3) of the Idaho Rules 
Explanation 
See exhibit aLtached hereto. 
are 
Civi1 
Not particularly novel or difficult. 
Procedurally unusual. 
This representation required the average skill 
of an cxpe1ience.d trial attorney. I have 
reasonable skill, a)though no special 
knowledge or experience with bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
The fees requested are within the range of fees 
in this area for this type of case. 
The fee was calculated on an hourly basis. 
None. 
Plaintiff sought damages in the form of 
recoupment of fees expended in the 
bankruptcy action, as weH as damages for the 
inability to discharge over $6 million of debt 
in bankruptcy. •4Jl plaintiff's clai.-ns were 
dismi~sed upon motion. 
Not a factor. 
This is tht:: first time I have represented 
HTEH. 
I believe and state that the dismissal obtained 
in this action is appropriate and within the 
range of outcomes for similar cases. 
VO/V ~AlNt HAM~LtN l P 
Costs as a Matter of Right - lRCP 54(J)(l)(C): 
Court Filing Fees: 
Discretionary Costs-IRCP 54(d){J)(D): 
Hearing Transcript Bankruptcy Cou1t: 
TOTAi, COSTS: 
Attorney's Fees - IRCP S4(c)( 1 ): 
John C. Riseborough 75.40 hours at $190 per hour 
Rebecca L. Stewan 26.5 hours at $175 per hour 
Paralegal Fees: 
Cynthia L. Bryan 9. 7 hours at $90 per hour 
TOTAL ATTORNEY AND PARALEGAL FEES: 
Rceapitu Jation: 
Total costs: 
Total Attorney/ParaJegal Pees: 
TOT AL FEES AND COSTS CLAJMED: 
DATED this .lt!:_ day of August, 2015. 
JLc/Z-r C. RJSEBOROUGH 
$ 
141 18 035 
$ 140.95 
$ J ,208. t S 
$ 1,349.10 
$ 14,326.00 
$ 4,637.50 
873.00 
$ 19,836.50 
$ 1,349.lO 
$ 19,836.50 
$ 21.185.60 
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STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
: ss. 
County of Spokane ) 
John C. Riseborough, being fi rst duly sworn on oath, deposes and states: 
I am the attorney of record for the above•named defendant.c,; T have read the contents of 
the foregoing Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and Exhibit "A" thereto; th.at to my best 
of knowledge and belie( the items therein are true and correct; that the costs claims are in 
compliance with Rule 54(d)(5), I.R.C.P., and that the items in the above bill have been 
reasonably and necessarily incurred in this action. 
JO~SEBOROUGH 
SUBSC.Rl.BED AND SWORN to before me this _JQ_ day of August, 2015. 
Print Nami::: ____ _...._ ......... ....__.:...;:'-1.::-.1..""'-'-.:;.+--
Notary Public in and for the State 
of Washington, residing at Spokane 
My Commission Expires: 6 \ S\ \ t) 
At~JIJ.r\~13'J1tOis6~Sliru<dW&J PPORT OF DE~lil~"fl.$76·2015 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS INCLLIDINti Arl'ORNEY FEES· 4 
465 of 513 
Vcl/V UI 
HAND DELIVERY 
U.S. MAIL 
OVERNIGHT MAlL 
FAX TRANSMISSION 
l;\Spodo<.-s\00196\00038\J>LEAD\O I 4 73785. I)()(' 
PA!Nt HAM~Lt Lr 
SERVICE 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post falls, fdaho 838S4 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
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FRANTZ V. HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
., . :Di'te, v''. ·~4~· : . ,',If'' ' , Descl'.~l1ti"n ' · ~ '· · "" '· LJ/,~ Time· Amount .,, 
' ' ' e, ,\ 
·';'~Hi.~· i ]fil ' ~!~ ' ~ \ I I ( ' ,' ', c ;; Expended Cbmrged: / • \Ji, ,, '~·· '' ' .. ' ; ··.~ ',' .: ; ' ,,l. ',, 1, .. ~ 
' ' 
02/25/2015 JCR Review Complaint, review 1.40 I.40 $ 266.00 
docket entries for .suits where 
FranLz was plaintiff from 2007 . I to present~ e-message to Ms. I Amrine. 
02/26/2015 JCR Follow~up with Ms. Amrine re .20 .20 18.00 
new assignment and col1atera1 
estoppeL 
02/28/2015 JCR Review of investigative file, 2.00 2.00 380.00 
Complaint and accompanying 
materials re bankruptcy 
hearing. 
03/03/2015 CB Review Court Rules re .30 .30 27.00 
Appearance and Special 
Appearance. 
03/03/2015 CB Draft Special Appearance. .20 .20 18.00 
03/03/201 S CB Telephone call to advise .10 .JO 9.00 
Jonathan Frantz of Special 
Appearance on behalf of 
Defendant. 
03/09/2015 JCR E·message exchange with .30 .30 57.00 
Client re contact by Mr. Katz, 
.Frantz bankruptcy expert, with 
IIB CEO and response. 
03/09/2015 CB Draft initial co1Tespondence to .20 .20 18.00 
client. ____ .. 
03/09/2015 CB Draft initial correspondence to .20 .20 18.00 
Ms. Amrine. 
03/11/2015 JCR Complete review of file from .60 .60 114.00 
bankruptcy court on hearing 
for Motion to Disqualify. 
03/11/2015 JCR Review notes; telephone .30 .30 57.00 
conference with Mr. Meadows 
re scope of hcaring, transcript 
and response to Mr. Katz. 
"-·--
l 
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Amrine re proposed handling. 
03/12/2015 JCR E-message to coordinate .20 .20 38.00 
ordering of transcript of 
hearing on Motion to 
Disqualify. 
03/23/2015 JCR E-message to/from client re .20 .20 38.00 
recovery of Merlyn Clark's 
expert file. 
03/27/2015 JCR Review transcript or Judge's .40 .40 76.00 
oral ruling re disquaJification. 
04/0l/2015 RLS Review transcript of ruling by .60 .60 105.00 
Judge Myers re Motion to 
Disqualify Hawley Troxell. 
04/02/2015 R.LS Research claim and issue 2.30 2.30 402.50 
prccJusion as it would relate to 
the hearing at the Bankruptcy 
level. 
04/02/2015 RLS Draft memorandum section re .80 .80 152.00 
claim precJ usion. 
04/06/20] 5 RLS Finalize draft memorandum .90 .90 J 57.50 
with inclusion of claim 
preclusion and analysis based 
011 our facts in this matter. 
04/13/2015 RLS Continue drafting analysis l.90 1.90 361.00 
section, to include whether res 
judicata is "ripe" at this time 
for ultimate inclusion in 
Motion to Dismiss. 
-·--·--04/14/2015 JCR £-message exchange 1with .20 .20 38.00 
client re service of Complaint 
and invoice or reporter for trial 
transcript. 
04/14/2015 RLS Finalize Emalysis regarding LOO LOO 175.00 
ripeness for res judicata/ 
collateral esloppel and proof 
necessary to prove professional 
malpractice. 
2 
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exchange with 
Schwager re Answer 
Hae Vice Petition. 
04/21/20[5 JCR Extended telephone conference .50 .50 95.00 
with Mr. John Kuru re 
background of suit, Katz 
contact and Motion to Dismiss. 
04/21/2015 JCR Review memo re collateral .40 .40 76.00 
estoppe1; brief research re 
whether a summary judgment 
ruling can supply the "final 
judgmenl on the merits'' 
requirement. 
04/21/201 S JCR Review Rules of ProfessionaJ 1.20 1.20 228.00 
Conduct re ..:x-parte contact 
with client and lawyer as 
witness; draJ'l o~jcction to pro 
hac vice motion by frantz's 
counsel and Affidavit of Sheila 
Schwager. 
04/21/201 S JCR Complete objection to Motion 1.00 1.00 190.00 
for Admission Pro Hae Vice; 
draft Affidavit of JCR; review 
additional malerials on issue 
from client. 
04/21/2015 CB Review numerous emails from .50 .50 45.00 
cJient re status, pleadings filed, 
Motion for Pro Hae Vice of 
Frantz. 
04/22/20l5 JCR Revise Affidavit of Sheila .70 .70 133.00 
Schwager, Objection to Pro 
Hae Vice admission and 
Affidavit of JCR~ e-message to 
cJicnt re same. 
04/22/2015 CB Review two transcripts in 4.20 4.20 378.00 
Bankruptcy mancr to locate 
testimony of various witnesses 
re Merlyn Clark acting as an 
expen witness vs. attorney and 
draft summary of same. 
3 
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argued. 
04/22/2015 RLS Research is~ue of whether .40 .40 70.00 
Order on Summary Judgment 
is a "linal" jm.lgmcnt for 
purposes of res judicatal 
collateral estoppel in Idaho. 
04/23/2015 CB Review and revise summary of .50 .50 45.00 
witness testimony re Merlyn 
Clark. 
04/24/2015 JCR Review Affidavit of John .50 .so 95.00 
Kurtz and approve for 
transmhtal to court. 
04/24/201 S JCR E·message exchange with .20 .20 38.00 
clients re John Kurtz's 
Affidavit and Objection 10 Pro 
Ilac Vice request. 
-- . ··- ~-.~ 
04/24/2015 JCR Study An::iwcr and materials .70 .70 133.00 
from client to prepare Answer. 
___ ._ 
04/27/2015 JCR E-message to cljents re JO .30 57.00 
Answtr. 
04/29/2015 JCR Review of transcript and 2.00 2.00 380.00 
bankruptcy file. 
04/30/2015 JCR Draft Answct· and Affirmative 1.30 1.30 247.00 
Defenses. 
04/30/2015 JCR Complete draft of Answer and 1.20 1.20 228.00 
Affirmative Defenses; c-
message to clients re same. 
-•~w, <&U-"', 
04/30/2015 RLS Research lRCP 12(b)(8) for .80 .80 140.00 
affinnaLive <lefense in 
Answer/afiim1at1ve pleading. 
05/01/2015 JCR Complete Answer and transmit .70 .70 133.00 
to clients. 
--05/0J/2015 RLS Draft the Motion to Dismiss. .30 .30 52.50 
4 
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Research 
standards of affirmative 
defense motion to dismiss 
pending action based on same 
cause of action and same 
parties. 
05/01/2015 RLS Draft Memorandum in Support 3.00 3.00 525.00 
of Motion to Dismiss/Stay 
pursuant to 12(b)(8). 
05/01/2015 RLS Research quoted bankruptcy .40 .40 70.00 
rules by Honorable Terry 
Myers in oral ruling. 
---05/02/2015 JCR Continue drafting initial 60-day 2.00 2.00 380.00 
report. 
05/02/2015 JCR Prepare budget estimate. .80 .80 152.00 
05/03/2015 JCR E-message cxchang-es with Ms. .40 .40 76.00 
Si.:hwagcr n: revision.'$ lo 
Answer and 12(b)(8) motion. 
05/03/2015 JCR Extended telephone conference .30 .30 57.00 
with John Kurtz re Answer and 
Motion per 12(b)(8). 
05/03/2015 JCR Revise Answer and .80 .80 152.00 
Affinnati ve Defenses per cJient 
suggestions. 
05/03/2015 JCR Review case law re 12(b)(8) .60 .60 114.00 
discretion and decision points. 
05/03/2015 JCR Review and revise 1.00 1.00 190.00 
Memorandum in Support of 
J2(b)(8) Motion; dictate 
expanded fact section. 
05/04/2015 JCR Revise Memorandum re 1.60 1.60 304.00 
12(b)(8) Motion. 
05/04/2015 JCR Additional legal research re 1.20 1.20 228.00 
formation of attorney/client 
relationship; ABA Op 97-401 
and fiduciary duty creation. 
05/04/2015 JCR Revision and addition to .50 .50 95.00 
Answer. 
5 
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Research review 
privity as it applies to the 
"same party" aspect of l2(b)(8) 
rule to support argument to 
dismiss. 
05/04/2015 RLS Draft legal section of Motion to 1.80 1.80 176.80 
Dismiss to include law and 
analysis on privity. 
05/05/2015 JCR Complete draft of 2.00 2.00 380.00 
Memorandum in Support of 
l 2(b)(8) Motion. 
05/05/2015 JCR Draft Affidavit re Exhibits in .40 .40 76.00 
Support of Motion. 
05/05/2015 RLS Draft section of Brief on 2.00 2.00 350.00 
judicial economy and relate to 
issues of Hwt in our case. 
,-n.---t•.---
05/05/2015 RLS Research regarding application .40 .40 70.00 
of judicjal economy in 12(b)(8) 
dismissal. 
05/06/20] 5 RLS Prepare and assemble exhibits .60 .60 105.00 
to be attached to Declaration of 
JCR in support of the Motion 
and Me111orandu111 to Dismiss 
pursmmt to 12(b)(8). 
05/07/2015 JCR Revise Affidavit and select 1.00 1.00 190.00 
exhibits for Motion per 
12(b)(8). 
05/07/2015 JCR Review and approve changes 1.60 1.60 304.00 
I suggested by Ms. Schwager for 
Memorandum in Support of 
12(b)(8) Motion: review 
changes proposed by John 
Kurtz; final revision and 
approve for service and filing. 
05/07/2015 .ICR Review 3-dayNoticc of .20 .20 38.00 
Default. 
6 
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· Dest ',. 
E-message 1;xchange with 
Meadows re slatute of 
limitations dcicnse; review 
Minnick case; e-message to 
Ms. Amrine re correction to 
60-day report. 
05/07/2015 JCR Review declaration of Nick .20 .20 38.00 
Miller re Trigeo motion. 
OS/07/2015 CB Draft Notice of Appearance. .20 .20 18.00 
05/08/2015 JCR E-message to Ms. Amrine re .to .10 19.00 
setting of motions and status. 
05/13/2015 JCR E-message from Ms. Amrine; L50 1.50 285.00 
research re application ofJC 
12-120(3) to these facts; c~ 
message and advice re results 
and opinion on opportunity to 
obtain fees under that statute. 
05/13/2015 JCR Amend Answer to allege 12- .40 .40 76.00 
120 entitlement to fees. 
05/13/2015 JCR Review notice of change in .30 .30 57.00 
date for scheduling conference; 
e-mcssagc to clients re same. 
05/14/2015 CD Review Notice of Scheduling .10 10 9.00 
Conference. 
05/20/2015 CB Review emails of client re .20 .20 18.00 
Frantz's Waiver of Discharge. 
05i22/20]5 JCR Review Waiver of Discharge "l I\ .30 57.00 . .:JV 
and correspondence from client 
re same; e-message re 
significance or plaintiffs 
action in that regard. 
06/02/2015 JCR Review response of plaintiff to .30 .30 57.00 
Objection to Admission Pro 
Hae Vice. 
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'Telephone 
Mr. Frantz re date for hearing; 
Motion for Pro T lac Vice and 
scheduling conference; 
conference with Mr. 
Riseborough re same. 
__ ,._..,. ___ 
06/03/2015 CB Review emrli I correspondence 1.00 LOO 90.00 
of clients re scheduling 
conference. T cl ephone 
conference with court clerk; 
draft A111cnded Note for 
Hearing;, docket dates. 
06/08/2015 JCR Review c-maiJ from Frantz to .50 .50 95.00 
JIB and earlier transmittals. 
06/08/2015 JCR Telephone conference with .30 ,30 57.00 
John Kurtz re Frantz e-mai) 
and appropriate response . 
.. ·--·-···I" .. -, .. ---.,,-.. ,~. ·---···-·.., ... -- ..... --... ~---
06/08/2015 JCR Telephone cunforcncc with .30 .30 57.00 
expert John Strait re potential 
assistance on conflicts issue. 
06/08/2015 JCR E-messagc to/from clients and .30 .30 57.00 
Ms. Amrine re selection of 
expert for professional liability. 
06/08/2015 JCR Review Memorandum 1.00 1.00 190.00 
Decision of Judge Myers re 
Motion to Reconvert or 
Dismiss. 
06i09/2015 JCR £-message to/from clients re .20 'Jf'l ,;;.v 38.00 
liability expert selection. 
06/09/2015 JCR E-me5sage and re$iponse to Ms. .30 .30 57.00 
Schwager's im.1ufry of 
testimony of Frantz and 
conversion hearing. 
06/09/2015 JCR Review pleadings and affidavit .50 .50 95.00 
re motions for sanctions, note 
witnesses and documents 
recovered. 
8 
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Am~tt 
re 
implicalions of former 
client assertion of conflict. 
06/lS/201 S CB Download bankruptcy JO .30 27.00 
materials received from clients. 
06/16/2015 JCR Draft Affidavit of Mr. Gustave! .30 .30 57.00 
re e-message from Katz and 
Frantz. 
06/16/2015 JCR E-message from client and .20 .20 38.00 
revise Gustave! Affidavit. 
06/16/2015 JCR Draft reply to response to 1.00 1.00 190.00 
objection to admission pro hac 
vice; draft Affidavit of JCR re 
"probate" of plaintiffs in 
Bank.rnptcy Cou11. 
06/16/2016 JCR Review bankruptcy pleadings 1.10 1.10 209.00 
from Ms. Schwager re Frantz's 
Motion for Waiver of 
Discharge. 
06/16/2015 JCR Review pleadings from State 1.20 1.20 228.00 
Court action and counterclaims 
of Frant:t. v::;. llB; review of 
bankruptcy pleadings re 
termination of stay as to some 
claims. 
06/17/201 S JCR Review of correspondence and 2.00 2.00 .380.00 
e-mail files from client re Mr. 
Clark's work as expert. 
06/17/2015 RLS Review ail pleadings filed on .40 .40 76.00 
the pro hac vice matter. 
06/17/2015 RLS Review Idaho Rules of .60 .60 105.00 
Professional C onduc1 for 
appropriate language for Reply 
Brief. 
06/17/2015 RLS Draft anaJysis of plaintiff's .60 .60 105.00 
Reply Brief regarding the Pro 
Hae Vice Motion. 
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Research and begin drafting 
RepJy Brief to suppon 
Objection to Pro Hae Vice 
Motion. 
06/19/2015 JCR Complete review of .40 .40 76.00 
correspondence and e-mail file 
from client re Clark's 
representaLion. 
06/19/2015 RLS Review and incorporate 1.70 1.70 297.50 
recommended additions to 
Reply Brief ohjecting to Pro 
Hae Vice c1umission. 
06/25/2015 JCR E-messagc exchange with John .20 .20 38.00 
Kurtz re Katz's disclosure to 
Bankruptcy Court and Reply 
Memo. 
--· 06/25/2015 JCR E·mcssagc with Ms. Schwager .40 .40 76.00 
re conlacl wiLh Mr. Frantz re 
mediation; forward plaintiffs 
request for combined 
mediation with JJ8 lawsuit. 
06/25/2015 JCR Revise reply per John Kurtz'.s .40 AO 76.00 
t..:ommcnts; c•messagc to 
forward proposed changes. 
06/25/2015 JCR E-mcssagc to and from Ms. .30 .30 57.00 
Amrine re mediation proposal; 
e-message lo Mr. Frantz re 
declination to joint mediation. 
06/29/2015 JCR Review Motion to Strike .50 .50 9S.OO 
Defense Affidavits, Affidavit 
of Mr. FrantL: and 
Memorandum in Support; 
analysis of appropriate 
response. 
06/29/2015 JCR Review c-mcssagc from Mr. .10 .10 19.00 
Frant:l re mediation. 
10 
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1 Prepare argument on 
Motion to Allow Katz 
Admission Pro Hae Vice; 
research re Bar Commission 
Rules re proc.:edure; prepare for 
scheduling conference. 
06/30/2015 JCR Attend hearing on Motion to 2.40 2.40 456.00 
allow admission of Kat:r. and 
scheduling conference; follow-
up conforcncl: with Mr. Frantz 
re theory of damages and 
discovery plan. 
07/01/2015 JCR Draft report of results of 1.00 1.00 190.00 
hearing on Motion Pro Hae 
Vice. 
01!01!201S CB Review email exchange with .20 .20 18.00 
client re Plaintiff's Motion for 
Pro Hae Vice. 
07/01/2015 CB Review emails re possible .10 .10 9.00 
mediation. 
07/03/2015 JCR E-message from Ms. .30 .30 57.00 
Schwager; finalize report of 
pro hac vice hearing. 
07/06/2015 .TCR Draft correspondence to Ms . .20 .20 38.00 
Amrine re Court's Scheduling 
Order. 
07/06/2015 .TCR Review Case ScheduJing .30 .30 57.00 
Order; e-mcssage to Mr. 
Meadows re potential judge 
challenges. 
07/06/2015 JCR Review Amended Note for .20 .20 38.00 
Hearing re Admission Pro Hae 
Vice. 
07/13/2015 JCR Begin review of plaintiffs .30 JO 57.00 
Brief re Pro Hae Vice; e-
message exchange with Ms. 
Schwager. 
11 
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Complete 
Plaintifr s Brief re 
Vice. 
07/13/2015 JCR Review Affidavit of Katz; .JO .30 57.00 
compare tu file materials to 
date. 
07/14/2015 .TCR Review Declaration of Frantz .20 .20 38.00 
re dismissal of Adversary 
Proceeding as moot; e-message 
to Ms. Schwager re same. 
07/14/2015 JCR Review additional Declaration .30 JO 57.00 
of Frantz and review of 
bankruptcy docket re whether 
action has been dismissed. 
07/14/2015 .TCR Review e-message from Ms . .40 .40 76.00 
Schwager; draft Affidavit of 
Ms. Schwag1;r re stalus of 
Adversary Proceeding. 
07/15/2015 JCR E-message to/from Ms. .20 .20 38.00 
Schwager re Frantz position in 
Bankruptcy Court re reasons 
for waiver of discharge. 
07/16/2015 JCR Begin review of file materials .80 .80 152.00 
of Merlyn Clark. 
07/17/2015 JCR Review case Jaw cited by .60 .60 114.00 
Frantz. 
07/17/2015 .ICR Draft response to Frantz Brief 1.00 1.00 190.00 
re Pro Hae Vice admission. 
07/18/2015 JCR E-message exchange with Ms. .10 .10 19.00 
Schwager re Affidavit. 
07/18/2015 JCR Review pJaintiff s response to .80 .80 152.00 
Motion lo Abate and Affidavit 
of Counsel Frantz. 
07/18/2015 JCR E-message exchange with Ms. .30 .30 57.00 
Schwager; review Affidavit of 
Schwager and recommend 
revisions. 
12 
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Continued of 
Troxell Ennis & Mawley' s files 
from Merlyn Clark re polcnliaJ 
confidential information 
received from Frantz or 
Owens. 
07/20/2015 JCR Review Response Brief of .50 .50 95.00 
plaintiff re Molion to Dismiss. 
07/20/2015 JCR Legal research re cases cited by 1.00 1.00 190.00 
plaintiff in response. 
·---·-"-07/20/2015 JCR Draft Reply Hrief re Motion to 1.40 1.40 266.00 
Dismiss. 
07/21/2015 JCR Complete Reply Brief re .80 .80 152.00 
Motion to Dismiss and Abate. 
07/21/2015 CD Review Case. Schedule Order .40 .40 36.00 
and docket dates. 
1-, ............... ,_,, 
07/27/2015 CB Tc]ephone call to Judge .10 .10 9.00 
Mitchell's chambers re hearing 
tomorrow. 
07/28/2015 JCR Review materials, prepare .80 .80 152.00 
argument re Pro Hae Vice 
admission. 
07/28/2015 JCR Review materials and filings, 2.00 2.00 380.00 
prepare argument re Motions to 
Dismiss or Abate and 
Objection re l'ro Hae Vice 
07/28/2015 JCR To Court for hea.."-ing on '1 If\ 2.10 399.00 
Motions re Admission Pro Hae 
"'· LV I 
Vice; and Motion to Dismiss or 
Abate, attend hearing, argue 
motion, r~lurn 10 off'icc. 
07/28/2015 JCR Draft e-message report of .50 .50 95.00 
results of hearing on Motion to 
Abate and for Admission Pro 
Hae Vice. 
07/29/2015 JCR E-message Lo and from Ms. .10 .10 I 19.00 
Schwager re rcsuJts of hearing. 
13 
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Review Opinion Judge 
Mitchell dismissing action. 
07/30/201 S JCR E-message to clients re Judge's JO JO 57.00 
opinion and n.:sponscs. 
07/31/2015 JCR Research re basis for IC 12-121 L70 1.70 323.00 
, fee award; review case law re 
lC 12-120(3) award. 
07/31/2015 JCR Draft Memo of Authorities in l.60 1.60 304.00 
Support or Award of Fees and 
Costs; draft Affidavit of JCR re 
foes and costs; draft Judgment; 
draft Motion for Award of Fees 
and Costs. 
07/31/2015 JCR Review time entries and costs 1.00 1.00 190.00 
to select fees to request, review 
Memo of Costs and Affidavit 
of Costs and Fees. 
TOTALS: 111.60 111.60 $19,569.20 
l:\Spodocs\00l 96\0003S\Pt,~AO\{J 1475231.DOCX 
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VU/Vt/4, !-.J 
7 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
1gJ VVb/ V,:50 
lN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE .FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) 
) CaseNo.CV15-1406 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
) INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENN1S & I IA WLEY ) 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
_________ .) 
Pursuant to Rules 54(d) and 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant 
submits the following Memorandum of Costs and Fees: 
Costs as a Matter of Right - IRCP 54(d)(l)(C): 
Court Filing Fees: 
Discretionary Costs - IRCP,,~4(d)(l)(D): 
Hearing Transcript Bankruptcy Cot1n: 
TOT AL COSTS: 
Attorney's Fees - IRCP 54(e)(l}: 
John C. Riseborough 75.40 hours at $190 per hour 
Rebecca L. Stewart 26.50 hours at $175 per hour 
MEMORANDUM 0~' COSTS JNCLUf)!N(; /\ TTORNEY 
FEl!J8rt.if1 Frantz vs Troxell, 
$ 140.95 
$ 1,208.15 
$ 1,349.10 
$ 14,326.00 
$ 4,637.50 
V '-'/ "' • /' "' ' ! V. (.,.V 1 /'i{\ r ri.1.r,~ nt'lMDLCN Lt.. 
Paralegal Fees: 
at 
Total Attorney and Paralegal Fees: 
Retapitulation: 
Total costs: 
Total Attorney/Paralegal Fees: 
TOTAL FEES AND COSTS CLAlMED: 
lg)VVI/V,j::J 
$ 19,836.50 
$ 1,349.40 
$ 19,836.50 
$ 21,185.60 
The foregoing Statement of Costs and Attorney's fees incurred by defendants in this 
action is correct and in compliance with Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
foregoing Statement of Attorney's recs and Paralegal Fees is supported by the Atlidavit of 
Counsel filed together herewith, pursuant to Rule 54(e)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this~ day of August, 2015. 
PAlNR HAMBLEN LLP 
By:~Jf~~~-
, C. Riseborough, 1S'1 #7898 
ttomeys for Defendant 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY 
FEl:B&irtlli 
VV/ Vt/ G..V ! 
k 
t nt\ 
HAND DELIVERY 
U.S. MAIL 
OVERNIGHT MA 11. 
.FAX TRANSMISSION 
L \Spoao~-s\00 J 96\00038\PLEAD\014 73 783 .DOC 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS !NCLUDINO ATTORNEY 
FEli!SrtiQ! Frantz 
OJ? SERVICE 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St Suite A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83854 
true 
0 0 0 
X 
X 
AX 
HAND DELIVERY 
u_s. MAIL 
OVERNIGHT MJ\TL 
FAX TRANSM1SS10N 
l:\Spoducs\00 I 96\0003K\PLF.I\D\() 14731101. DOC 
PINE HAMBLEN LL 
Jonathon Frant:t 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83854 
{t]015/ 
""'-'/'-'1/G.VI iV,G.V rt\/\ PAlNE HAMBLEN LP 
JOHN R1SEB0R0UGH, (SB 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
' j ~ 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DJSTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF JDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & lIA WLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CVlS-1406 
) 
) 
) MOTION FOR AN A WARD OF 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) 
) 
) 
) 
t{ll 004/U 
COMES NOW Defendant, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, as prevailing pany, and 
moves the Court for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to IRCP 54(d), 54(e) and 
I.C. §12-120(3) and §12-i21. This Motion is based on the records and files herein, the 
Memorandum Decision and Order of this Court dated JuJy 29, 2015, the Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorney's Fees, the Atlidavit of John C. Riseborough, and the Memorandum of Authorities 
in support thereof. 
DATED this 5 dayof_""'"j_ll"i_C._v. __ / "7 _______ , 2015. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
By:_--:F-'~"""""-' ...;..c ....... !?__~~------
~C. Riseborough, ISB #7898 
Attorneys for Defendant 
08 10 20 
)( 
HAND DELIVERY 
U.S.MAIL 
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f AX TRANSMISSION 
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HIE MB EH 
OFSERVIC:E 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83854 
@ 005/03 
7 West 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
........... ,,.'T"r- (~.r tnFtUO l _ 
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COUHTY Of KOOTENAI 1 
FILED: 
201~ AUG O AH IQ: 26 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) 
) Case No. CV15-1406 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) JUDGMENT 
) 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY ) 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
JUDGMENT is entered as follows: 
Plaintiff's Complaint and each of the claims therein is dismissed with prejudice. 
The amount of costs and Defendant's entitlement to attorney's fees will be determined in 
a subsequent proceeding. 
DONE this :t!'aay of--'-"~>-+,u"""--+J...,_,D-"-'-'=------' 2015. 
JUDGMENT-1 
By:_,#.JC..tt"-"--=C__,,_/_d ____ _ 
J¢in C. Riseborough, ISB #7898 
Attorneys for Defendant 
JUDGMENT-2 
HAND DELIVERY 
U.S. MAIL 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
FAX TRAi"JSMISSION 
!: \Spodocs\00196\00038\P LEAD\O 14 73 773. DOC 
JUDGMENT- 3 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Falls, Idaho 8385.4 
~3'6-000 I 
./ 25-Aug 15:56 
Jonathon Frantz 
LAW, 
Lincoln 
Post Falls, Idaho 83815 
Ph: 208-262-3893 
Fax: 208-262-3894 
Email: jonathon@cdalegal.com 
ISB No. 9129 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
HAWLEY TROXELL El'.~IS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
I. Introduction 
Case No.: CVlS-1406 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Plaintiff Martin Frantz ("Frantz") filed a legal malpractice action against Defendant Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell") on February 20, 2015 for Hawley Troxell 's 
conflicted representation and revelation of confidential information submitted by Frantz to 
Hawley Troxell within the scope of the representation. 
II. Argument 
Attorney Fees Cannot Be Awarded to Defendant under I.C. §12-120(3) because there is 
no Commercial Transaction Integral to any Claim 
This lawsuit, while one for malpractice, is not based off of the commercial transaction 
which occurred in or about 2008 to 2009 when Martin Frantz hired Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley, LLP ("HT') to represent him. Indeed, this complaint does not aver any misconduct in 
AN 
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fees are not awardable in this matter because there is no commercial transaction which is integral 
to this claim. 
To be sme, Idaho allows attorney fees in malpractice lawsuits; however, such fees are not 
allowed when "[t]he gravamen of[the] case was an effort to enforce a statutory scheme ... " 
Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 631 (1995). Instead, the commercial transaction 
must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party seeks to recover. 
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763 (1995). 
In KeJly, the lawsuit sought dissolution of the partnership which was formed for 
commercial purposes (real estate development). 127 Idaho at 626. The dissolution sought, 
however, was to be go\l.erne.clex.r.h1si\l.ely by s.tate statute. lei. at 627. Thei:e, 1hf£ourt denied 
attorney fees to the prevailing party under I.C.§ 12-120(3) because the suit was to enforce a 
statutory scheme, not a commercial transaction. Id. at 631. 
In the case at hand, the Frantzes sought to enforce a statutory scheme, the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct. The Frantzes had no quarrel with HT regarding the quality of work they 
did during active representation, but their conduct years later; which conduct violated a statutory 
scheme (the rules of professional conducl). Even though there are commercial lrnnsaclions 
tangential to this case, none are the gravamen of this laws11it. The crnx is HT's violation of the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. As such, since there is no commercial transaction integral 
to this claim, attorney fees are not appropriate under l.C. § 12-120(3). 
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both a good faith legal and factual bases pursuing this action. 
Specifically, in the Court's order dismissing this case, it found that res judicata did not bar this 
case, but instead that the "other pending action" doctrine did, which doctrine is discretionary, 
meaning the Court could have heard this case if it so chose. Klaue, 133 Idaho 437, 440 (1999). 
Furthermore, the Frantzes had a good faith believe that there was no other pending action 
because the action in whlch the disqualification hearing arose was dismissed as moot. See Deel. 
of Jonathon Frantz (dated July 14, 2015), Ex. A ("this Adversary Proceeding is rendered MOOT. 
The trial ... is hereby VACATED."). As a result, there will be no final judgment on the merits; 
thus the Frantzes have no ability to appeal any decision therein, save any dispute over fees and 
costs. However, a judgment for fees will not produce an appealable order as to all other 
interlocutory orders in the case. 
lt is true, the bankruptcy case (No. 11-21337-TLM) continues. But as pointed out above, 
the adversary proceeding (No. 13-07024-TLM) has been mooted. Inside the bankruptcy case 
(No. 11-21337-TLM) there has been no such ruling regarding the defendant Hawley Troxell 
because Hawley Troxell has not used the Frantzes' confidential information therein. Thus, what 
the Court has referred to as the other pending action has been dismissed as moot. As such, the 
Frantzes had good faith grounds to believe there was no other pending action. 
Additionally, this Court also found this case was ban-ed by judicial estoppel. However, 
there too, the Frantzes bad a good faith belief that judiciaJ estoppel would not apply because this 
malpractice claim is not owned by the bankruptcy estate. As noted by the Court, a debtor in a 
banlauptcy proceeding is required to disclose all existing and potential assets, "including causes 
action that belong to the debtor when the bankruptcy is filed." See Memo. Decision and 
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not was not 
until Hawley Troxell filed the adversary proceeding that this claim arose, for it was in that 
proceeding where Hawley Troxe]l used confidential information and took a position directly 
adverse to the Frantzes which could be subject to this lawsuit. 
As a result, when the bankruptcy was filed in 2011, the Frantzes did not have any claim 
against Hawley Troxell and therefore there is nothing to list. Instead, that claim arose nearly two 
years after the Frantzes fi1ed for bankruptcy. Thus, the Frantzes had a good faith belief that this 
claim is not property of the estate and therefore not subject to judicial estoppel. 
After all, excluding clairvoyance, the Frantzes cannot list this lawsuit as property of the 
estate two years before the claim exists. In 2011, the Frantzes did not know that the adversary 
proceeding would be filed. Moreover, in 2011 the Frantzes did not know that Hawley Troxell 
would represent an adverse party therein. 
More importantly, a bankruptcy estate is only comprised of "property as of the 
commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." 11 USC §54l(a).3 Therefore, property acquired after 
a person files bankruptcy generaHy belongs to the debtor and not the estate. Since this claim 
arose two year after the Frantzes filed for bankruptcy, they had a good faith belief that this claim 
was their property, not belonging to the bankruptcy estate. 
m. Other Considerations 
Further, the Court, in its opinion, seemed to take the position that the Frantzes were liable 
for fraud in the adversary proceeding. Nothing could be further from the truth. In early 2013, 
1 Note the case number's year of origin: 11-21337-TLM, representing the origin year of 2011. 
2 This affidavit was mistakenly filed as "Ex. B" to Response of Defendant re Pro Hae Vice Objection. See 
email from John Riseborough, July 29, 2015 to the Court and the Frantzes. 
3 While there are exceptions for different chapters of the bankruptcy code, there is no relevant exception 
here. 
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discharge on his record, Mr. Frantz would not be able to work post-bankruptcy. See Ex. A, 
attached hereto (Deel. of Martin Frantz in Support of Waiver of Discharge, filed February 16, 
2015 in Case No. 11-21337-TLM) (explaining why the Frantzes filed their waiver of discharge). 
The Frantzes bankruptcy discharge waiver had nothing to do with IJB 's pending discharge 
litigation. Instead, it was purely a matter of whether or not the Frantzes would be able to revive 
their development company. 
IV. Conclusion 
Because there is no commercial transaction integral to this claim and because the 
Frantzes had a good faith basis for pursuing this claim, Defendant's Motion for an Award of 
Attorney's Fees must be denied. 
DATED THIS 25th day of Augst, 2015. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
By: __ Isl ___ _ 
Jonathon Frantz 
CERTIFlCA TE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of August, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of this document upon: 
John C. Riseborough 
via fax at: 509-838-0007 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
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West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 9920lw3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
f acsimilc: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell EMis & Hawley LLP 
ALEO: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FTRST .TUD1CTAL DTSTRTCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND 1~·0R THE COUNTY OF KOOTF.NAT 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) Case No. CVIS-1406 
) 
14 
vs. 
) RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT RTEH 
) TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
) AWARD OF FEES 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENN1S & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
· Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Plaintiff Frantz has filed its objection to defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley's 
(HTEH) Motion for an Award of Fees. Significantly, the objection does not take issue with the 
amount of fees or costs being sought. Rather the objection argues that (a) IC§ 12-120(3) does 
not apply as the malpractice claim was not based on a commercial transaction and (b) no fees are 
awardablc under lC § 12-121 because this malpractice claim was not pursued frivolously or 
without foundation. Neither of the objections is valid and accordingly the CoUrt should award the 
full amount of fees. 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT HTEH TO PLAlN'l1Y:FS OBJECTION TO OF FEES 
Awa:rdable Under IC§ 12-120(3) 
sets out §1 
20(3) and will not be repeated here. gravamen of plaintiff's complaint against HTEH is that 
its actions ca.used plaintiff financial losses in his commercial dealings with Idaho Independent 
Bank Plaintiffs retention of Merlyn Clark as an expert witness was in support of litigation 
which was likewise based on plaintiff Frantz's com.merciaJ dealings_ The statute applies and fees 
are awaxdable. 
Plaintiff's principal argument is that his claim against HTEH was really an effort to 
enforce a statutory scheme. This argument fails for at least three reasons: (a) there is no statutory 
scheme involved, (b) the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are enforced by the Supreme 
Court and its Bar Association, not individuals and (c) Idaho would not recognize a cause of 
action based on a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
That the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are not a "statutory scheme" is self evident. 
Further, the majority of jurisdictions do not recognize a cause of action for the violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. l R. Ma1len & J. Smith. Legal Malpractice, pp. 759-761, §6.31, 
2013 Edition. The Idaho rules recognize this. See Preamble Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, 
,ifl l, l 2, 19 and 20. Although such a violation may be evidence of a vioiation of the standard of 
care, the violation itself is not actionable. 2 R. Mallen & J. Smith Legal Malpractice, pg. 1279, 
§20:7, 2013 Edition. The provisions oflC §12-120(3) apply and fees should be awarded. 
Fees Awardable Under IC §12-121 
Plaintiff next argues that, despite the fact that the identical issue, i.e., whether Merlyn 
Clark and HTEH ever formed an attorney-client relationship with him, had been previous1y 
RESPONSE OF DEf'ENDANT HTEH TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION AWARD OF 
Bankruptcy of is frivolous, 
Plaintiff first argues that plaintiff had a good faith basis for his suit because "The pending 
action in which the disqualification hearing arose was dismissed as moot." Plaintiff ignores the 
facl that this suit was brought shortly after the adverse decision in the Bankruptcy court on his 
Motion to Disqualify HTEH, and before plaintiffs decision to waive discharge and the resulting 
finding that the adversary proceeding was thus moot. Indeed, while this action was pending, 
plaintiff first attempted a limited waiver of discharge in favor of minority creditors only. Any 
"good faith belief' that no other proceeding was pending must have been formed well after this 
suit was brought_ and pursued. Finally the argument ignores the Court's correct observation that 
the bankruptcy proceeding remains pending. 
Plaintiff also argues that his prosecution of this case was; justified because the Court erred 
in applying judicial estoppel. How that excuses his pursuit of this action is unc1ear. Nevertheless, 
in making this argument, p1atntiff ignores the authority cited by the Court that causes of which 
the debtor is aware during the pendency of an action arc likewise assets of the Estate. Plaintiff 
continues to argue that the cause of action did not arise until HTEH used confidential 
information in the adversary proceeding. Setting aside for a moment the fact that there is 
absolutely no proof of HTEH's use of confidential information, use of confidential information is 
not required for a cause of action based on a conilict of interest. Plaintiff knew or should have 
known prior to filing his bankruptcy that Merlyn Clark was a partner at HTEH. (He paid 
Mr. Clark's bill directly to HTEH.) He further was aware that HTEH was representing a party 
adverse to him in an effort to collect a substantial indebtedness from him. Any cause of action 
based on conflict ofintcrcst existed at the time of the bankruptcy filing. 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT HTEH TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO A WARD OF FEES 3 
Martin VS Troxell, 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs objections fail. Plaintiff concedes that the attorney's fees and costs being 
sought are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court should make an award of fees and costs in the full 
amount requested by defendant 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED tbis jJ_ day of September, 2015. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
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September, 
following: 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law~ PLLC 
307 N. Linco]n St Suite A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83854 
Theresa Henry 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT HTEH TO PLAlNTlFF'S OBJECTION AW ARO FEES· S 
l!:!J V IV I I 
Email: jonathon@cdalegal.com 
ISB No. 9129 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appeliant, Martin Frantz 
STATE OF fOAHO l 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI I 
FILED: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No.: CV-2015-1406 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: L4 
Filing Fee: $129.00 
Supreme Court No. ______ _ 
TO: The above-named parties: Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP and its attorneys: 
John C. Riseborough 
Pain Hamblen LLP 
717 West Sprague Ave, Suite 1200 
Spokane, WA 99201 
[Attorney for Defendant] 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Martin Frantz, appeals against the above-named 
Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court, from the Judgment entered in the above-
entitled action following a hearing upon a motion to dismiss entered on August 10, 2015 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- Pg. 1 
as 
as 
above is an appealable order under and pursuant to LA.R. 1 l(a)(l). 
3. Appellant's preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which may be supplemented, 
is as follows: 
a. Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Frantz lacks standing to bring this 
lawsuit? 
b. Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Frantz is judicially estopped from 
bringing this lawsuit? 
c. Did the district court err in dismissing sua sponte, as judicially estopped, Mr. 
Frantz' s claims? 
d. Did the district court err in dismissing this action pursuant to IRCP 12(b )(8) 
fmding that "another action pending between the same parties for the same cause" 
existed? 
e. Did the district court err in fmding that Mr. Frantz has no damages unless he 
admits he lied to his creditors and the bankruptcy court? 
f. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Katz motion for pro hac vice admission? 
g. Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Katz will likely have to testify in this 
case? 
h. Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees pursuant to 12-120(3 )? 
1. Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees pursuant to 12-121? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- Pg. 2 
5. A reporter's transcript is requested its entirety for the hearings conducted on or about 
July 28, 2015 and September 17,2015. 
6. Appellant requests that the following documents, including those automatically included 
uner I.A.R. 28, be included in the clerk's record as well as the following documents: 
a. February 20, 2015- Complaint and Jury Demand 
b. April 7, 2015- Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission 
c. April 22, 2015- Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission 
d. April 22, 2015- Affidavit of John C. Riseborough 
e. April 24, 2015- Affidavit ofJohn F. Kurtz, Jr. 
f. May 4, 2015- Notice of Appearance (of John C. Riseborough) 
g. May 7, 2015- Motion to Dismiss or Abate 
h. May 7, 2015- Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss or Abate 
1. May 7, 2015- Affidavit of John C. Riseborough 
J. June 1, 2015- Response to Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission 
k. June 1, 2015- Declaration of Jonathon Frantz 
l. June 1, 2015- Objection to Affidavit of John F. Kurtz 
m. June 1, 2015- Objection to Affidavit of John C. Riseborough 
n. June 26, 2015- Affidavit ofJohn C. Riseborough 
o. June 26, 201 Affidavit Jack Gustavel 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- Pg. 3 
to 
Vice Admission 
s. July 13, 2015- Declaration of Jefferey Katz in Support of Motion for Pro Hae 
Vice Admission 
t. July 14, 2015- Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP's Motion to 
Dismiss or Abate (IRCP I2(b)(8)) 
u. July 14, 2015- Declaration of Jonathon Frantz in Support of Response to Hawley 
Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate 
v. July 20, 2015- Response of Defendant re: Pro Hae Vice Objection 
w. July 21, 2015- Defendantly Reply re: Dismissal/Abate 
x. July 24, 2015- Plaintiff's Reply re: Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission 
y. July 29, 2015- Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss or Abate, and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Pro Hae Vice 
Admission 
z. August 7, 2015-Defendant's Brief in Support of Award of Costs, Including 
Reasonable Attorney Fees 
aa. August 7, 2015- Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees 
bb. August 10, 2015- Judgment 
cc. August 25, 2015- Objection to Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees 
dd. September 14, 2015- Reply of Defendant HTEH to Plaintiff's Objection to Award 
of Fees 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- Pg. 4 
The deposit for preparation of the clerk's record (electronic copy) has been paid; 
c. The appellate filing fee in the amount of $129.00 has been paid; and, 
d. Service has been made upon the trial court reporter and all parties required to be 
served pursuant to I.A.R. 20. 
DATED THIS 21st day of September, 2015. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
By: ___ _ 
Jonathon Frantz 
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correct copy of this document upon: 
Via 1st Class Mail-
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Isl Jonathon Frantz 
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THE STATE Of IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership. 
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The above.named Plaintiff and his attorney, JONATHON FRANTZ; 
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Clerk of the above..entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant in the above-entitled proceeding 
hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 19, l.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the 
reporter's transcript and of the Clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the 
I.A.R. and the Notice of Appeal. 
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PAlNt HAMBLEN LLP 
Record: 
Defendant's Reply re 
dated June 26, 2015. 
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Admission, 
b. Defendant's Memorandum. of Costs lncJuding Attorney Fees, dated 
August 7. 2015. 
c. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough in Support ofDefendant,s Memorandum 
of Costs including Attorney Fees, dated August 7, 2015. 
2. I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the Reporter and Clerk of the 
District Coun and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this _j_ day of October, 2015. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
FOR ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORDS 
vs Troxell, etai Docket No, 
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Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) 
) Case No. CV15-1406 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) JUDGMENT 
) 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY ) 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Judgment is entered as follows: 
As against plaintiff Martin Frantz and in favor of defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley, LLP, costs and attorney's fees awarded as follows: 
Costs as a matter ofright I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C): 
Discretionary Costs -I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D): 
Attorney's Fees and Paralegal Fees I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l): 
TOTAL JUDGMENT: 
DONE this lQ, ~y of {!) cA:v Lt e-- , 2015. 
$ 140.95 
$ 1,208.15 
$19,836.50 
$21,185.60 
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DOCKET NO. 43576 
( MARTIN FRANTZ 
( 
( vs. 
( 
( HAWLEY TROXELL 
( ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on October 20, 2015, I lodged a transcript 
of 56 pages in length , including the July 28, 2015, Hearing Re: Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss or Abate; Plaintiff's Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission, and 
the September 17, 2015, Hearing Re: Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, in 
the above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of 
Kootenai in the First Judicial District. 
~D~ 
October 20, 2015 
Martin Frantz vs Hawley Troxell , etal Docket No. 43576-2015 511of513 
PLAINTIFF/ APPELLANT, 
VS. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & 
HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Partnership, 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. 43576 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and Transcript to 
each of the Attorneys of record in this cause as follows: 
JONA THON FRANTZ 
307 N. Lindon St., Ste A 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
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JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH 
717 W. Sprague Ave., Ste 1200 
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Jim Brannon 
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Liability Partnership, ) 
) 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT ) 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the 
County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause was 
compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that no exhibits were offered in this case. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record and 
Transcript was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were mailed 
by U.S. mail, postage prepaid on 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I 
Idaho this ----=---
set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County, 
JIM BRANNON 
Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
